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THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE*
HENRY A. FENN and EDwRD
PART

II -

F. KoE

PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION

For over a generation, the most prevalent criticism of existing probate laws
has been directed at the time and expense involved in settling a decedent's
estate. 351 The draftsmen of the 1974 Florida Probate Code (1974 Code) responded to this criticism by restructuring or eliminating many of the old
statutes and adopting several of the reforms recommended by the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC). Despite these often major changes, the procedures established by the 1974 Code for the probate of wills and the administration of
decedents' estates remain complex. Indeed, a person examining the details of
these procedures may continue to ask whether such an elaborate scheme is
necessary and what function it serves. A brief answer is that some orderly
procedure is needed to settle the conflicting claims that arise upon the death of
the owner of property. 52 The further pertinent inquiry -whether the new
procedures are the ones best suited to resolve these confficting claims -can
best be considered by an examination of the individual provisions.
*Copyright 1975 by Henry A. Fenn and Edward F. Koren.
Part I of this article was published in the University of Florida Law Review, Volume 27,
No. 1.
351. See text accompanying notes 1-17 supra (part 1).
352. Much of the complexity of probate and administration procedures is a result of an
attempt to provide an orderly resolution of these various types of conflicts. For instance, once
the law grants the power of testation, it must provide a means for assuring that the true
intention of the testator is carried out; hence the procedure for proving the validity of the
will. See text accompanying notes 463-482 infra. This procedure also serves to establish the
claims of the devisees of the will, while the contest procedure serves to protect the conflicting claims of those who, but for the will, would be entitled to the decedent's property
See text accompanying notes 525-574 infra. The conflicting claims between persons in possession of the decedent's property and those entitled to receive it under the will or by intestate
succession could be settled by individual actions against the possessors. The expense and
near chaotic results of such a method, however, dictate the designation of one or more
persons to serve as personal representative, with sole authority to collect the assets of the
decedent on behalf of both the beneficiaries and creditors. See text accompanying notes 593655 infra.
There is, of course, a conflict between the interests of beneficiaries and creditors, not only
because of possible disputes with regard to the amount and validity of a claim, but also because as long as claims are outstanding, they constitute an impediment to the receipt or
enjoyment of the decedent's property by the beneficiaries. The need for prompt settlement of
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THE PASSAGE OF TITLE

To justify usual probate procedures, it is frequently stated that probate is
necessary to prove title to real property 353 and that administration is required
because title to personal property passes to the personal representative.3While these statements are generally true, they merely reflect the effects of,
rather than reasons for, the procedures adopted.3 5 5 Nevertheless, the concepts
regarding passage of title are so basic and so pervade the law of administration
of decedents' estates that discussion of them at the outset seems desirable.
Until 1939, there was no doubt that Florida followed the common law rule
that title to realty passed at death to the decedent's heirs or devisees. 356 This
rule had been retained by the 1933 Probate Code, even though the personal
representative was given the possession of real property and the authority to
sell it for the payment of debts. 3 57 In 1939, however, the legislature amended
section 732.26, which concerned the effect of probate, to read in part:
(1) The will of any person who heretofore . . .or .. .hereafter dies a

resident of the state must be admitted to probate in an original proceeding in the state in order to establish its validity. Until so admitted to
probate, such will shall be ineffective to convey title to, or the right to
possession of, real or personal property of the testator; and, until such
probate proceedings have been had, no personal representative shall
acquire title to, or the right to possession of, any personal property
owned by the decedent at the time of his death, notwithstanding that
probate or administration proceedings have been had in some other
state or country ...The title to personal property wheresoever situate
of a person who hereafter dies a resident of the state shall not pass
under his will to the legatee or legatees named or designated therein
until after such personal property has been administered upon and distributed by the domiciliary personal representative of his estate; provided that this section shall not apply to any property as to which a
valid order has been entered that no administration is necessary as to
such property or as to the estate of which such property is a part. 358
these conflicts justifies the nonclaim procedure. See text accompanying notes 747-758 infra.
Finally, possible conflicts between the personal representative and the beneficiaries may arise
because of his acts while administering what ultimately is to be the beneficiaries' property.
The statutory provision for accounting and discharge provide an orderly method for resolving
these conflicts. See text accompanying notes 794-846 infra.
353. T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS 503-05 (2d ed. 1953); T. THOMAS, FLORIDA ESTATES
PRACTICE GUIDE 7-3 (1974).
354. T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 562.

355. Thus, there is no necessity that probate be used to establish title to real property.
At common law, and in some states today, wills devising real property were not probated. If
a question arose as to the devisee's title, the will was introduced in evidence and the attesting
witnesses called to testify as to its due execution and validity. Id. at 481-82. Occasionally the
same will was held valid in one action and invalid in another. Id. at 481 & n.3. Similarly,
giving the title to personal property to the personal representative is not a necessary result.
The UPC, §3-101, passes such title directly to the heirs or devisees, subject to the personal
representative's "power over title." UPC §3-711 and Comment.
356. Jones v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 132 Fla. 807, 182 So. 226 (1938). See also
FLA. STAT. §731.21 (1973), carried forward into the 1974 Code in both §§732.514 and 733.102.
357. Jones v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 132 Fla. 807, 809, 182 So. 226, 227 (1938).
358. FLA. STAT. §732.26 (1973). The primary purpose of the amendment, which was made
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Thereafter, because the amendment only affected wills of Florida residents, the
law appeared to be that title to the real property of a resident testator passed
only upon probate of the willa59 whereas in the case of a resident intestate or
a nonresident, whether testate or intestate, the title continued to pass at

death.360

This anomalous situation is rectified by the 1974 Code, which changes the
provision to read:
(1) The will of a person who died a resident of the state must be aditted to probate in an original proceeding in the state in order to
establish its validity. Until admitted to probate, the will shall be ineffective to prove title to or the right to possession of, property of the
testator and no personal representative shall have the right to possession
of, or any authority to deal with personal property owned by the
decedent at the time of his death, notwithstanding that administration
proceedings have been had in some other state or country. The title to
personal property wherever located of a person who dies a resident of
the state shall not pass under his will until the personal property has
been administered and distributed.361
By eliminating the phrases "to convey title" and "acquire title," the legislature
clearly intended to revert to the common law view that title passes at death.
The personal representative continues to have the right to possession of real
property and the title to personal property, although neither may be proven
by Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19673, §1, appears to have been to supplement a new statute designed
to ensure that wills of Florida residents were probated in Florida courts. That new provision,
§732.36, was enacted simultaneously as a companion bill, Fla. Laws 1939, ch. 19672, and imposed criminal liability for attempting to avoid Florida probate:
"(i) From and after the effective date of this section no person or corporation shall
procure, or aid, abet or assist another in procuring, the probate of the estate or will of a
person who heretofore has died a resident of this state or of a person who hereafter dies a
resident of this state, in any other state or country prior to the probate of such estate or will
in this state.
"(2) Any person or corporation who shall knowingly and intentionally procure, or aid,
abet or assist another in procuring, the probate of the estate or a will of a person who heretofore has died a resident of this state or of a person who hereafter dies a resident of this
state, in any other state or country prior to probate of such estate or will in this state, shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in §775.083."
359. Compare In re Purdy's Estate, 54 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1951), with Estate of Bagley v.
United States, 443 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1971). In Bagley, the issue was whether the taxable
estate included property subject to a power of appointment where the donee died prior to
the probate of a Florida residents will creating the power. After discussing several Florida
cases, including Purdy, the court said: "We do not perceive that these Florida cases diminish
the proposition that passage of title under a will dates back to the time of death once the
will is probated. Appellant points to §732.26, supra, to bolster his theory of probate as interest-creating.5 We view this statute, however, in pari materia with §731.21, supra, and it becomes an integral part of title-perfecting rather than interest-creating; i.e., that probate is
required before title is perfected by dating passage of title back to the time of death. There
is nothing in the decision in Purdy's Estate which militates against this construction of the
two statutes." Estate of Bagley v. United States, supra at 1269.
360. See Jones v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 132 Fla. 807, 810, 182 So. 226, 227-28
(1938); Nedd v. Starry, 143 So. 2d 522, 526-27 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
361. FP §733.103 (1974).
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until after probate.3 62 Because the 1974 Code rejects the "flexible system of
administration" advocated by the UPC, 363 this appears to be a satisfactory
result; certainly it is another example of the efforts of the draftsmen to
minimize changes unsupported by persuasive data.3 6 4 Nevertheless, "scarecrow"
statutes such as this provision and the current section 732.36365 which are designed to prevent the wills of Florida residents from being originally probated
in other states, are not only completely ineffective,C6 but evidence an undesirable parochialism and should be repealed. If this were done, however, it
would be desirable to substitute a provision stating that a will must be admitted to probate before it can be used to prove title, thereby avoiding any
contention that the validity of a will may be established by any means other
7
than its probate36
To further emphasize the importance of probate, the 1974 Code adopts
existing law requiring a will to be probated before any proceeding for its
construction may be maintained. 368 Moreover, probate also appears to be required before the personal representative may petition the court for a de3 69
termination of devisees.
JURISDICTlION, VENUE, PROCESS AND PARTIES

The concepts of jurisdiction, venue and process are basic to an understanding of the probate and administration procedures established by the 1974
Code. Equally basic is the question of who are necessary parties to the various
proceedings that may be required for the settlement of a decedent's estate.
Jurisdiction
Since January 1, 1973, the circuit courts of Florida have had exclusive
original jurisdiction "of proceedings relating to the settlement of the estates
of decedents ... the granting of letters testamentary ... and other jurisdiction
usually pertaining to courts of probate." 3 7 ° This transfer of probate jurisdiction from the former county judge's courts to the circuit courts has eliminated
some of the jurisdictional problems in the administration of decedents'
362.

For a discussion of the duty of the personal representative under the 1974 Code to

take possession of real property, see text accompanying notes 633-655 infra.
363. The UPC considers the descent of title directly to the successors an "essential
characteristic" of its "flexible system of administration." UPC art. 3, General Comment. For
further discussion of this system and its rejection in the 1974 Code, see text accompanying
notes 444-446 infra.
364. See text accompanying notes 42 and 43 supra (part I).
365. See note 358 supra.
366. The ineffectiveness of these provisions is evidenced by the fact that Florida Statutes
Annotated lists no case in which the issue has even been raised.
367. See note 355 supra.
368. Compare FPC §733.211 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.42 (1973).
369. Compare FPC §733.105 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.25 (1973). The Code purports
to allow the determination to be made "irrespective of whether the estate of the deceased
person is administered," FPC §733.105(3) (1974), but it would seem necessary to establish the
validity of the will by probate before the issue of uncertain beneficiaries would arise.
370. FLA. CONST. art. V, §20(c)(3); FLA. STAT. §26.012(1)(b) (1973).
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estates.871 Whether the probate judges or probate divisions of the circuit
courts3 72 will now handle all matters pertaining to the settlement of decedents'
estates and testamentary trusts remains unclear, however. 373 Prior to 1973,
matters such as a suit upon a claim to which an objection had been filed 37 4
and the determination of ownership of property claimed by both the estate
and a third person37 5 were settled by separate actions rather than by proceedings before the probate judge. After the restructuring of the courts in 1973, it
was unclear whether this separation of responsibilities was to be continued.
Possibly it was intended that such actions would continue to be determined by
a separate circuit court judge,37 6 or, where the amount in issue did not exceed
7
$2,500, by the county court.
I Although a new provision of the -1974 Code may represent an attempt to
clarify these uncertainties, there are several ambiguities in its language. The
section provides that "[t]he court may determine all questions concerning
either liquidated claims or matters not requiring trial by jury."787 "Court" is

871. See T. THoMAs, supra note 353, at 6-1 to 6-5, for a discussion of decisions concerning
the limitations upon the jurisdiction of the county judge's courts in matters concerning
decedents' estates.
372. The Florida Constitution, art V, §7 authorizes specialized divisions in the circuit
'courts. Currently, probate divisions seem to have been created in the 2d, 5th, 9th, 11th, 12th,
13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th Circuits. 48 FLA. B.J. 404-14 (1974).
873. FLA. STAT. §§26.012(2)(b), (c) (1973). As courts of general equitable jurisdiction, the
circuit courts have always had jurisdiction over trusts. FLA. STAT. §26.012(2)(c) (1973).
374. See text accompanying notes 747-754 infra.
375. E.g., Dacus v.Blackwell, 90 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1956); In re Estate of Sackett, 171 So.
2d 906 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1965).
376. The only case found that has considered the relationship of the probate division and
other divisions of the circuit court seems to have accepted the concept of the continued
division of responsibilities. ponder v. State Dep't of Health &:Rehabilitative Serv., 284 So.
2d 463 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1973). In that case, the trial court had denied the administrator's
motion to dismiss a suit that had not been filed until three days after the time for suit had
expired. On appeal, the claimant argued that denial of the motion to dismiss "was in effect
an exercise by the circuit court of the authority formerly granted to county judges but now
properly exercised by the circuit court to extend the time within which suits may be fied."
Id. at 464. Relying on §733.18(2) (concerning objections to claims), the district court of
appeal rejected the argument: "We think that it is clear that the power to extend the time
for the filing of suits rests in the judge of the probate cause and not in the trial judge."i Id.
377. FLA. CONsr., art. V, §6(b) gives the county courts "the jurisdiction prescribed by
general law," and art. V, §20(c)(4) gives them original jurisdiction "of all actions at law in
which the matter in controversy does not exceed the sum of two thousand five hundred
dollars ($2,500) exclusive of interest and costs, except those within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the circuit courts." See also FLA. STAT. §34.01(1) (1973). The circuit courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction "in all actions at law not cognizable by the county courts; of proceedings
relating to the settlement of the estate of decedents .... " FLA. CoNsr., art. V, §20(c)(3). See
also FLA. STAT. §26.012(l) (1973). Thus, if litigation is necessary to determine the validity of
a claim of less than $2,500 that is fied in a decedent's estate, or the ownership of property
worth less than $2,500 that is claimed by both the decedents estate and a third person,
whether it should be brought in the county court or in the circuit court would seem to
depend upon whether these determinations are treated as "actions of law" or "proceedings
relating to the settlement of the estate of decedents." FLA. CONSr. art. V, §20(c)(3).
378. FPC §73.705(5) (1974).
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defined as the circuit court by the 1974 Code, 379 but in this instance it must
refer only to the judge handling probate matters, because other circuit court
judges clearly can try jury cases. 380 A second ambiguity is whether the provision ("The court may determine. . .") is merely permissive or is intended to
require the probate judge to handle all matters involving decedents' estates
except those involving jury trials. Finally, the provision does not clarify what
disposition is to be made of a case in which the right to a jury trial has been
waived.38 l Amendments clarifying these matters and delineating the jurisdictional authority of the circuit and county courts in estate litigation involving
less than $2,500382 would avoid future litigation and insure uniformity among
the circuits.
The 1973 amendment to article V also transferred to the circuit courts the
administration of estates of missing persons who are presumed to be dead.383
The 1974 Code reduces from seven years to five years the period of continuous
absence necessary to raise a presumption of death.38 4 In addition, a new provision expressly accords protection to persons dealing with the personal representative where the alleged decedent is later found to be alive.385
The jurisdictional provisions relating to foreign personal representatives
and the ancillary administration of estates of nonresident decedents are discussed in a later section of this article. 386 The statutes governing jurisdiction
over the appointment of guardians for minors or other incompetents, the administration of their estates, and the administration of trusts are beyond the
scope of this article, although they are included in chapter 74-106.387
Venue
Except for two questionable additions, 388 the provisions of the 1974 Code
concerning venue for probate and the granting of letters are taken from existing law with only editorial changes. 38 9 For the resident decedent, venue is in

379. FPC §731.201(4) (1974).
380. See FLA. STAT. §§26.012(2)(a), 34.01 (1973); Cf., State ex rel. Renaldi v. Sandstrom,
276 So. 2d 109 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973), where the court, determining the power of the circuit
court to issue writs of habeas corpus, referred to the recent "consolidation of the trial court
system into two levels, county and circuit courts." Id. (emphasis added).
381. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.430.
382. See discussion in note 377 supra.
383. The 1974 Code continues to grant the circuit courts jurisdiction over the administration of these estates. Compare FPC §733.209 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.32 (1973). The
jurisdiction of the circuit court to appoint a conservator of a missing person's property
before presumption of death arises is not entirely clear. Chapter 747 of the Florida Statutes
continues to grant the circuit court jurisdiction to appoint conservators for "absentees" as
defined therein, but the definitions do not seem to include a person who merely disappeared
without any known reason. FLA. STAT. §§747.01-.02 (1973).
384. Compare FPC §731.103(3) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.32 (1973).
385. FPC §733.611 (1974).
386. See text accompanying notes 911-947 infra.
387. See chapters 744 and 737 of Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 106.
388. See text accompanying notes 392-395, 398-410 infra.
389. Compare FPC §733.101 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.06 (1973).
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the county where the decedent had his domicile;3 90 for the nonresident, it is in
any county where the decedent possessed any property 91 or, if he possessed no
property in the state, "where any creditor or debtor of the decedent resides."3' 92
The addition of the phrase "creditor or" to existing law is puzzling. Presumably, the reason for allowing venue in a county where a debtor of the
decedent resides is that the debt is an asset of the estate, even though it is not
"possessed" by the decedent. No such rationale exists in the case of a creditor.
If the intent is to make it easier for a Florida creditor to obtain the appointment of a personal representative- 3 and thereby collect his debt from the
estate, the addition is undesirable. Convenience to a single creditor should not
outweigh the inconvenience to other creditors and to the beneficiaries of the
estate of allowing administration in a county with which the decedent had
such slight contact.394 Therefore, the phrase "creditor or" should be eliminated
from the Code. 895
The effect of laying venue in the wrong county is explicitly stated for the
first time in the 1974 Code. A new subdivision has been added to the venue
section, providing that the court may transfer "the action"39 6 in the same

manner as provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure397 and further stating
that "[a]ny action taken by the court or the parties before the transfer is not
affected because of the improper venue."39 8 A later sections- 9 bars any challenge
to "venue or jurisdiction," unless it is filed within four months after the first
publication of notice of administration.

°°

While these provisions quite obviously are intended to nullify the decision
in State ex rel. McGreevy v. Dowling,401 the extent to which this intent will be
390. FPC §733.101(1) (1974). Neither "domicile" nor "residence" is defined in the 1974
Code but the terms appear to be used interchangeably, as in the present law. For example,
§733.101(4) provides that a married woman whose husband is "a nonresident of Florida may
establish or designate a separate domicile in this state." The terms are similarly used in the
UPC, which defines "nonresident decedent" as one who was "domiciled in another jurisdiction." UPC §1-201(26).
391. FPC §733.101(2) (1974).
392. FPC §733.101(3) (1974).
393. FPC §733.202 allows "any interested person" to petition for administration and FPC
§731.201(17) includes "creditors" in its definition of "interested persons."
394. In State ex rel. McGreevy v. Dowling, 223 So. 2d 89 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1969), the court
emphasized the importance of proper venue and, in footnote 2 of the opinion, elaborated
upon the "inconvenience and hindrance to creditors and other persons interested in the
estate." See note 403 infra. If there is no debtor or property in this state, there would be
no purpose in a creditor attempting to appoint a personal representative.
395. In fact, the entire subsection (3) could be replaced by a simple rewording of subsection (2) to read "in any county where any property of the decedent was located."
396. Because probate and administration matters are regularly referred to as "proceedings" in FPC §733.101 and elsewhere in the Code, the term "action" should be changed to
"proceeding" for conformity.
397. FPC §733.101(5) (1974).
398. Id.
399. FPC §§733.210(1)(b), (3) (1974). For further discussions of §733.210 see text accompanying notes 513-524 and 747-748 infra.
400. FPC §733.210(1) (1974). Such notice must be published by the personal representative "upon issuance of letters." Id.
401. 223 So. 2d 89 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1969).
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realized must await court interpretation. In Dowling, the Third District Court
of Appeal held that a probate court had exceeded its jurisdiction by admitting
a will to probate when the original petition showed improper venue on its
face. In reaching this result, the court stated:
[A] proceeding for probate is not susceptible to waiver of the venue as
fixed by law. This is so because by its nature probate is not only for the
benefit of the distributees under the will or heirs and next of kin, but is
equally for the benefit 4of
possible unknown creditors and other persons
02
interested in the estate.
This point was further emphasized in a footnote 403 that elaborated upon the
"inconvenience and hindrance to creditors and other persons interested in the
estate" that would be created by a failure to carefully restrict venue. 40 4 The
court's rationale seems equally persuasive under the 1974 Code. Thus, if a
creditor who has filed a caveat 405 in the county of the decedent's domicile did
not receive notice of the petition for administration, and therefore failed to
file a claim within the nonclaim period,406 he might well challenge the effec40 7
tiveness of the publication in the county other than that of the domicile.
Even if the probate proceedings were not set aside entirely as an unlawful exercise of jurisdiction,4 8 the facts would seem to justify a holding that the
402. Id. at 91.
403. "For example, the only notice required to be given to creditors is by publication in
the county in which the probate proceeding is pending, and creditors must file their claims
in the cause there within six months after the first publication of such notice. §733.15 Fla.
Stat., F.S.A. While it is true thai probate in the county of domicile of the decedent (as
provided for by the venue statute) imposes on creditors the burden of investigating in that
county for probate and published notice, it would appear unduly burdensome and impracticable for creditors to be required to investigate from month to month in every other
county until they located the one in which probate was in progress, or risk loss of their
claims through lack of knowledge of the existence of a probate proceeding in some other or
remote county.
"The same is true of persons 'interested' in an estate in which a will has been admitted
to probate (in addition to those persons to whom notice of probate is required to be mailed,
under §732.28 (1) and (2), Fla. Stat., F.S.A., to-wit: named legatees or devisees, or known
surviving spouses or heirs at law). This is so because under §732.28 (3) Fla. Stat., F.S.A. the
county judge is required to publish notice in the county in which the probate proceeding is
pending giving such other 'interested' persons notice that a will of the decedent has been
admitted to probate, and notice to them of the six-month period after such notice to which
they are limited for challenging the probate of such will." Id. at 93 n.2.
404. Id. at 93.
405. While the statutory authorization for filing a caveat, contained in FLA. STAT. §732.29,
is not continued in the 1974 Code, it is the authors' understanding that the procedure will
be continued in the revised Probate and Guardianship Rules.
406. See text accompanying notes 747-758 infra for a discussion of the nonclaim procedure under the 1974 Code.
407. The challenge might be made less persuasive if the personal representative ensured
that publication was made in a newspaper of general circulation in the county of domicile,
but it would seem that the creditor has a right to rely upon receiving the actual citation
demanded by his caveat, in lieu of the continual watch for the notice of publication.
408. In Dowling, the court said: "Although a court may possess jurisdiction consisting
of power to deal with a class of cases, it is an unlawful exercise of its jurisdiction to entertain
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personal representative is estopped from setting up the nonclaim statute as a
bar to the filing and processing of the claim.409 By similar reasoning, a beneficiary under a prior will, who had no notice of probate in the wrong venue
except through publication of the petition for administration, might be allowed to contest the validity of a will after the period for contest had expired. 10 Therefore, it would appear to be inviting lengthy delay and expensive litigation to interpret these new provisions as authorizing the procedure condemned in Dowling.
Process
Under existing law, there is an apparent conflict between the terms used
to define the type of process required in the various probate and administration procedures. The current statute refers to "citation," 411 while the Rules of
Probate and Guardianship Procedure (PGR) use the term "summons. ' 412 The
1974 Code resolves this conflict by introducing a new term, "formal notice," to
refer to process by which jurisdiction over a party is obtained 413 and using the
term "informal notice" 414 as the equivalent of "notice" as presently defined in
the PGR. 41 This new terminology, which will require a reorientation in the
thinking of practitioners in the field of probate and estate administration, may
perhaps be justified as more consistent with the concept that such proceedings
are in rem rather than in personam,4 1 6 but the frequent use throughout. the
a case or proceeding when the initial pleading which is filed for the purpose of revoking the
jurisdiction of the court shows facts which establish that the venue for such case or proceeding is not in that county, and is fixed by law in another county." State ex rel. McGreevy
v. Dowling, 223 So. 2d 89, 91 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1969) (emphasis added). The fact that FPC
§733.210 purports to bar any challenge directed to the venue or jurisdiction of the court
subsequent to four months after the first publication of notice of administration in no way
changes the fact that in FPC §733.101(l) the legislature has fixed by law the venue in the
county where the decedent had his domicile. Moreover, it can well be argued that FPC
§§733.101(4), .210 should be applied only where there was a mistake in the choice of venue
and not where venue was deliberately laid in the wrong court.
409. The earliest case applying the doctrine of estoppel to allow the late filing of a
claim under the 1933 Probate Code involved a somewhat similar effort to withhold information from a creditor regarding where the estate was being administered until after the nonclaim period had run. Adams v. Hackensack Trust Co., 156 Fla. 20, 22 So. 2d 392 (1945).
410. See text accompanying notes 525-574 infra for a discussion of the procedure and
time limitations for contests of wills under the 1974 Code.
411. FLA. STAT. §732.09 (1973).
412. PGR 5.050. The conflict is more apparent than real, however, because PGR 5.020(e)
defines "process" as "citation, summons, subpoena, order to show cause, and any other order
of the court by which jurisdiction is obtained of a party."
413. FPC §731.301(1) (1974).
414. FPC §731.301(2) (1974).
415. PGR 5.020(f) defines "notice" as "[t]he service of pleadings, motions and other
papers subsequent to obtaining jurisdiction of the party and when required by law or these
rules, other than process."
416. In re Williamson's Estate, 95 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1957) and cases therein cited.
That this is the purpose seems corroborated by the provisions of FPC §731.301(l)(c): "Formal
notice shall be sufficient to acquire jurisdiction over the person receiving formal notice to the
extent of the person's interest in the estate subject to administration" (emphasis added), but
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Code of the word "notice" without either the adjective "formal" or "informal"'417 Will only cause confusion and should be rectified.
Apart from this change in terminology, the manner of service of both
formal and informal notice, and proof of service, under the new statute are
similar to existing modes of service of citation and notice. The one exception
is that the 1974 Code allows service of formal notice to be made by certified or
registered mail, as well as by the existing modes of service of citation. 411

Parties
A perennial problem in the diverse court proceedings arising out of the
administration of decedents' estates and trusts (both inter vivos and testamentary) is the determination and joinder of necessary parties. Normally all
persons whose property rights are affected by the particular proceeding are
necessary parties, or, to state it differently, persons whose property rights are
affected by the proceeding generally are not bound thereby unless they are
given notice and an opportunity to be heard. 419 There are, however, two well
established exceptions to the usual rule that have been developed by the
courts, either for convenience or through necessity.420 Where a person's interest
is thought to be adequately protected by a trustee, personal representative, or
guardian, the fiduciary is considered the necessary party and the beneficiary or
ward, even though known, need not be made a party, and will be bound by the
judicial action taken.421 Where unborn or unascertained persons may have
property interests in an estate or trust that cannot be adequately represented
by the fiduciary, a second exception, known as "virtual representation," has
developed because of the need to provide living and ascertained persons with
a prompt and final determination when required. 422 A third exception, which
such purpose could have been better emphasized by inserting the word "only" before the
italicized language.
417. See §§731.301(3) and 733.302, where the reference seems to be to both formal and
informal notice; §§731.303(4), 732.901(2), 733.816(1) and 734.102(1), in which formal notice
seems to be needed; and §§732.107(2), 732.204, 732.403, 732.803 and 733.705, in which informal notice would seem to be sufficient. Similarly, ambiguous use of the term "notice" may
be found in chapters 737 (trusts) and 744 (guardians) of Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 106, which are
not within the scope of this article.
418. Compare FPC §731.301 (1974), with PGR 5.050.
419. "It is a fundamental principle of Anglo-American law that every person is entitled
to notice and an opportunity to be heard in a judicial proceeding in which his interests are
to be adjudicated." 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.82, at 543 (1952).
420. "The doctrine of representation applies for reasons not only of convenience and
justice, but of necessity also, because it is impossible to make them personally parties. Necessity is recognized as an all sufficient reason for it wherever such necessity exists." Blocker v.
Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 288, 137 So. 249, 252 (1931) (quoting 23 R.C.L. 583, 584).
421. 4 L. SIMEs & A. SsrrH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 127-28 (1956). The authors
point out that this is a case of "actual representation," in contrast to the "virtual representation" discussed in the text accompanying notes 422, 428-436 infra.
422. "The reason behind the exception is a simple one of human relationships, implicit
in the principle that human laws, and all other temporal things, are for the living; not for
the dead or for those not yet in being, if to hold otherwise would result in injustice to living persons. Because parties are not in being, and therefore cannot be brought before the
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is not yet fully developed, concerns the binding effect of a consent or other act
by a holder of a power of revocation 423 or a presently exercisable general
power of appointment.424 The theory underlying this exception is that, because
a holder of such a power has unlimited control over the disposition of the
property subject to it, possession of the power is tantamount to ownership and
therefore his acts should be binding upon the persons who later receive the
property through, or in default of, an exercise of the power.425
The 1974 Code codifies each of these exceptions by adopting the language of the UPC426 with several modifications.427 The provision allowing a
trustee or personal representative to represent his beneficiaries and a guardian
of the property to represent his ward, where the fiduciary has no interest in the
litigation adverse to that of the beneficiaries or ward, is merely a continuation
of existing Florida law .42 The virtual representation doctrine has also been
applied in Florida,429 but a slight change in language from the UPC may
limit the future use of the doctrine in this state. The UPC provides that an
unborn or unacertained person is bound if represented by another party having
"a substantially identical interest" in the proceeding.43 0 The 1974 Code, how-

tribunal, is not sufficient reason for a court to stand by, helpless and impotent, when rights

of living persons, in ordinary common sense, ought to be adjudicated." Mabry v. Scott, 51
Cal. App. 2d 245, 252-53, 124 P.2d 659, 663-64 (Dist. C. App. 1942), cert. denied, Title Ins.
& Trust Co. v. Mabry, 317 U.S. 670 (1943). See also Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So.
249 (1931). For detailed discussions of the "virtual representation doctrine," see 1 AMCAN
LAW or PROPERTY §§4.85-.90; RE=rATEmENT OF PROPERTY §§180-85 (1936); L. SimEs& A. SmrrH,
supra note 421, §§1803-24; text accompanying notes 428-436 infra.
423. The major case in this area arose when the beneficiaries of a revocable trust attempted to surcharge the trustee for acts that had been consented to by the settlor. Although
finding a breach of trust, the New York Court of Appeals denied the surcharge, holding that
the consent of the settlor bound the beneficiaries. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon,
291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
424. The cases in this area are more numerous, but have arisen under similar circumstances- an attempted surcharge of the trustee for acts consented to by the holder of the
power. E.g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Russell, 290 N.Y. 593, 48 N.E.2d 704
(1943); Perkins' Trust Estate, 314 Pa. 49, 170 A. 255 (1934); Johnson v. Snaman, 76 S.W.2d
824 (rex. Civ. App. 1934). The concept is not applicable, however, if the power is not
presently exercisable. State ex rel. Beardsley v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 124 Conn.
416, 200 A. 567 (1938); Scott's Estate, 353 Pa. 575, 46 A.2d 174 (1946). Nor does it appear
that the takers in default will be bound by the consent of the donee of the power. Reyburn's
Estate, 43 Pa. D. & C. 85 (1942).
425. E.g., City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943);
Perkins' Trust Estate, 314 Pa. 49, 170 A. 255 (1934). For a detailed discussion of the development of this doctrine, see 3 A. ScoTr, THE LAw OF TRuSrs §216.2 (3d ed. 1967).

426. UPC §1-403(b).
427. FPC §731.303(2) (1974).
428. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210 and cases cited thereunder in 30 FLA. STAT. ANN. nn. 10 et seq.
(1967). The UPO would allow representation by a guardian of the person or a parent of a
minor child, UPC §1-403(2)(ii), but FPC §731.303(3) provides: "Orders binding a guardian of
the person shall not bind the ward."
429. Blocker v. Blocker, 103 Fla. 285, 137 So. 249 (1931). See also FLA. STAT. §§737.06, .07
(1973).
430. UPC §1-403(2)(iii).
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ever, requires the other party to have "the same interest."431 Although "same"
can mean "substantially identical, 432 the deliberate choice of the word "same"
in lieu of the UPC phrase must indicate an intention to use it in its primary
sense, that is, "identical." If so, this would prevent the representation of unborn and unascertained persons by anyone having an interest differing either
in quantity433 or in quality 3 4 from that of the unborn or unascertained

persons. This unnecessarily limits the underlying theory of the doctrine 435 and
will cause unnecessary expense and delay in the proceeding by requiring the
more frequent appointment of a guardian ad litem.436

The new provision437 allowing an order binding a holder of a power of
revocation or a presently exercisable general power of appointment to bind
other persons to the extent that their interests are subject to the power has no
counterpart in existing Florida law and seems a desirable addition. The term
"presently exercisable general power of appointment," used in both this section4 3 and the corresponding section of the UPC,4 39 presumably is derived
from the definitions in the Restatement of Property44o and, therefore, should
431. FPC §731.303(2)(c) (1974). Similarly §731.303(4)(b) provides: "Notice is given to
unborn or unascertained persons . . . by giving notice to all known persons whose interests
..are the same as those of the unborn or unascertained person." (emphasis added.)
432. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1507 (4th ed. rev. 1968). Webster also defines "same" to
mean "1. being the very one; identical. 2. alike in kind, quality, amount or degree; corresponding ...
WEBSR's NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1289 (1960).
433. For instance, in a per stirpes class gift, a person with a one-eighth interest in the
remainder conceivably would be unable to represent unborn beneficiaries who might share a
one-quarter interest.
434. An obvious example of a difference in quality would be an attempt to have a person
with a remainder for life represent the ultimate remaindermen.
435. "The virtual representation doctrine is based upon two things: the impracticality of
making the represented person an actual party to the proceeding, and the self-interest of the
representing person who has an interest in the property so similar to the person whom he
represents that, in serving his own interest, he will adequately serve the interests of the
person who is not in fact a party." I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.85 (1952) (emphasis
added).
"The principal requirement for [the doctrine of virtual representation] is that the
person who is actually joined (the representative) must have an interest which is so similar
to that of the unborn person that his claim properly presented, will also be an effective
presentation of the claim of the unborn person." 4 L. SIMEs & A. SMsITH, supra note 421, at
§1824 (emphasis added).
436. FPC §731.303(5) allows the court to appoint a guardian ad litem whenever it "determines that representation of the interest otherwise would be inadequate" and continues:
"If not precluded by conflicts of interest, a guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent
several persons or interests." If the several persons do not have "the same" interest in
quality and quantity, however, the question arises whether the court must appoint separate
guardians ad litem for each.
437. FPC §731.301(2)(a) (197.4).
438. Id.
439. UPC §1-403(2)(a).
440. The RESTATEMENT provides: "A power presently exercisable, as the term is used in
this Restatement, is a power as to which the donor has not manifested an intent that its
exercise shall be postponed." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §321(2) (1936). And "[a] power is
general, as the term is used in this Restatement, if (a) being exercisable before the death of
the donee, it can be exercised wholly in favor of the donee, .... " Id. §320(1).
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be interpreted to mean "a power as to which the donor has not manifested an
intent that the exercise shall be postponed" and which "can be exercised
4 41
wholly in favor of the donee."
BEGINNING ADMINISTRATION

Before embarking upon a discussion of the procedural aspects of the 1974
Code, the increased importance of the Probate and Guardianship Rules should
be mentioned. Present statutory law is more than fifty per cent procedural and
the current PGR merely follow statutory language with occasional clarifications. This probably is due to a natural reluctance on the part of rules committees to create apparent conflicts between the rules and the statutes. 442 Under
the 1974 Code, however, many of the procedural provisions found in the current probate code are eliminated, although many others are retained in order
to provide continuity and thus a better understanding of the new law. The
intent is that, after greater familiarity with the structure of the 1974 Code is
attained, most procedural provisions will be removed from the statutes and full
reliance placed upon the PGR. The attainment of this goal would represent a
most important contribution to probate reform. Without the inhibiting effect
of detailed procedural provisions in the statutes, rules committees could more
easily adjust and keep current the probate procedures. In the meantime, it
should be kept in mind that seemingly incomplete procedural provisions in
the 1974 Code are supplemented by the PGR and are not necessarily defects in
the Code's structure." 3
The 1974 Code offers interested parties four possible ways of proceeding
with the settlement of a decedent's estate. Several of these alternatives, how441. Id.

442. The FLA. CONsT., art. V, §2(a) directs the Florida supreme court to "adopt rules for
the practice and procedure in all courts" and FLA. STAT. §25.371 (1973) provides: "[W]hen a
rule is adopted by the Supreme Court concerning practice and procedure, and such rule conflicts with a statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision." The authors are not inclined to enter into a futile discussion of what constitutes procedure and what constitutes
substantive law. As the above quoted statute recognizes, the fact that a matter appears in
the Rules would seem to be a decision by the court of last resort of this state that the
matter is procedural.
443. The supreme court has recognized the importance of a definitive revision of the
PGR and the time necessarily involved in making such a revision. On July 17, 1974, in In re
Transition Rule 19, Florida Probate Code, 297 So. 2d 307, it adopted the following rule:
"The Court recognizes that the 1974 session of the Legislature has passed a comprehensive
Florida Probate Code which for ready understanding and continuity included many provisions pertaining solely to procedure, a function reserved exclusively in the Florida Supreme
Court under Article V, §2(a), Florida Constitution, under its rule making power.
"It is appreciated, however, that for a time, until complete new Probate and Guardianship
Rules (now under review in committee) are promulgated by appropriate consideration of the
rules committees of The Florida Bar and this Court, uniformity will best be provided by a
transition rule allowing the temporary use of the precedural aspects included in the Probate
Code, for an interim period of time effectively July 1, 1975, when said Probate Code shall
become effective, and the date when a complete set of probate rules of procedure is adopted,
to include the procedural aspects of said new Florida Probate Code.
"We accordingly adopt the following as Transition Rule 19, effective July 1, 1975, to
terminate upon adoption by this Court of new Probate and Guardianship rules ....
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ever, are severely restricted by limitations on the size or nature of the property
within the estate. As a result, the new Code is far from the "flexible system of
administration" advocated by the draftsmen of the UPC.444 The legislative
rejection of this system, and the resulting retention of close court supervision
over the acts of the personal representative, evidences the paternalistic attitude
that has long characterized the probate laws of this country. 445 Because this
decision fails to meet the demands for reduced court supervision, it constitutes
the greatest weakness in the 1974 Code and almost certainly will promote demand for further reform of our probate laws.446 Nevertheless, some progress
has been made and, hopefully, the foundation laid for greater flexibility in the
future.
To facilitate a better understanding of different methods of settling an
estate, the changes made in the standard procedure will be discussed first. Then
the discussion will focus on the extent to which this standard procedure may
44
be simplified by use of the statutory provisions for family administration, 7
448
and the disposition of personal property without
summary administration,
449
administration.
Petition
As under existing law, the first step in commencing the administration of
a decedent's estate under the 1974 Code is the filing of a petition for adTRANSITION RULE 19. FLORIDA PROBATE CODE
"All of those matters contained in the 1974 Florida Probate Code pertaining to practice
and procedure are hereby adopted as if they were rules promulgated by this Court and shall
be controlling in all such matters, together with the present Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure; and where conflict exists between said two, the provisions of the Florida
Probate Code shall control.
"This Rule shall become effective July 1, 1975, and shall automatically terminate upon
adoption by this Court of new Probate and Guardianship Rules."
444. UPC art. III, General Comment.
445. The UPC seeks to eliminate this paternalism by first giving the personal representative broad powers exercisable without court supervision and then providing a system of administration by which, after appointment of the personal representative, no recourse to the
court is required unless some interested party asks for court intervention and then only to
the extent requested. UPC art. III, General Comment; Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code:
Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REv. 453, 492-94 (1970). But see, Saunders, A
Texas View of Independent Administration and Other Devices for Probate Flexibility, UPC
NOTES, Nov. 1974, at 3.
446. The cost and delay caused by court supervision is the basis of most of the criticism,
of existing probate law. See text accompanying notes 11-34 (part I). Perhaps at one time,
when the beneficiaries of the estate were uninformed and inexperienced widows and minor
children, such supervision was justified. Today it seems to be a major source of irritation. To
tell an adult, whether a surviving spouse or child, that it is necessary for him to bear the
expense and delay of numerous court proceedings in order that his rights may be protected,
when he would prefer to protect them himself, or, more frequently, feels that he needs no
court portection, is to offend his sense of dignity as well as to deplete his pocketbook.
447. FPC §§735.101-.106 (1974). See text accompanying notes 953-969 infra.
448. FPC §§735.201-.209 (1974). See text accompanying notes 970-981 infra.
449. FPC §§735.301-.302 (1974). See text accompanying notes 982-988 infra.
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ministration.450 Although the language of the Code is different, the elements
that must be included in the petition are quite similar to those required by
the present statute.4 5 In the case of a testate estate, a single petition will undoubtedly continue to be used for both the probate of the will and the appointment of a personal representative; the failure to include a separate section concerning the added elements needed in a petition for probate 52 is
rectified by the PGR.453 Similarly, the Rules, but not the Code, require that
the petition be verified.45 4 Unless a caveat is filed, 55 no notice need be given
before the granting of a petition for probate, 456 or the granting of letters, if the
petitioner is entitled to preference of appointment. 457 If, however, there is an
individual qualified to act who is entitled to a preference "equal to or greater
than" the person applying for letters,458 formal notice0 59 must be given to each
such person unless it is waived in writing.4 60 With the exception of the clarifying phrase quoted in the preceding sentence, 461 this procedure for obtaining
462
letters is unchanged from present law.
Proof of Wills

The Code's requirements for proving a will are undoubtedly intended to
continue the existing law with ofily editorial changes. 463 In excepting the self450. FPC §733.202 (1974).
451. Compare FPC §73.202 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.4 (1973).
452. Compare FPC §732.202 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.23 (1973)..453. PGR Form 5.640.
454. PGR 5.110 and 5.200. These-are incorporated into §731.104 of the 1974.Code, which
provides: "When verification is required in this code or by rule, every document filed with
the court under this code or the rule shall include-an oath, affirmation or the following
statement: 'Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing and the
facts alleged are true, to the best of my knowledge, and belief.' Any person who shall will-.
fully include a false statement in a document filed with the. court under this code shall be
guilty of perjury and upon conviction shall be punished. accordingly." (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 442-443 supra..
455. For the status of a caveat under the 1974 Code, see note 405 supra.
456. PGR 5.110.
.
...
457. FPC §733.203 (1974). For the preferences in appointment see FPC §783.301, discussed.
in text accompanying notes 483-500 infra.
458. See note 457 supra.
459. See text accompanying notes 413-418 supra.
460. FPC §733.203 (1974).
461. Both FLA. STAT. §732.43(3) (1973) and PGR 5.200 provided for citation to anyone
"entitled to preference over the person applying" (emphasis added); thus it was uncertain
whether citation had to be issued to a person entitled to equal preference.
462. Compare FPC §§733.202, .203 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§732.23, .43 (1973).
463. Compare FPC §733.201 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.24 (1973). The new statute
provides:
"(1) Wills other than wills that are self-proved may be admitted to probate upon the
oath of any attesting witness taken before the court or before the clerk or before a commissioner appointed by the court.
"(2) If it appears to the court that the attesting witnesses have gone to parts unknown or
are dead or after execution. of the will have become incompetent or their testimony cannot
be obtained within a reasonable time, a will may be admitted to probate upon the oath of
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proved will464 from the usual requirements of proof, however, the draftsmen
46 5
This omisinadvertently omitted any provision for the proof of such wills.

4 66
sion should be rectified by adding an appropriate provision to the statute.
Moreover, the seemingly innocuous change from the term "executor" to "personal representative" in subsection (2) of the statute may have unforeseen
consequences.4 67 If no attesting witness is available, the will may be admitted
to probate upon the oath of the "personal representative." This would permit
using the oath of an interested person not selected by the testator, obviously
contradicting the next clause of the statute, which, except in the case of an
executor, only allows an oath by "any person having no interest in the
estate." 468 It would be desirable to eliminate this contradiction by inserting
after the words "personal representative" the phrase "nominated by the will"
9
and thus preserve the intent of the existing law.46
The 1974 Code continues the special requirements for probate of foreign
47 2
1
0
language wills,4 7 notorial wills,47 wills of residents after foreign probate
and lost or destroyed wills,473 although numerous editorial changes have been

made in each. In the case of foreign language wills, a substantial change is
effected by eliminating the requirement for a citation (or formal notice) to
the surviving spouse, heirs at law, and all beneficiaries under the will before it
is admitted to probate. Presumably, the purpose of the citation was to allow
the parties to be heard in connection with the establishment of the complete
English translation.4 7 4 Perhaps formal notice was thought to be unnecessary in
the new law because the rights of interested parties are protected by retaining
the provision for a redetermination of the correctness of the translation at a

the personal representative as provided in subsection (I) whether he is interested in the
estate or not, or of any person having no interest in the estate under the will, that he believes the writing exhibited to be the true last will of the decedent."
464. The phrase "other than wills that are self-proved" was inserted in §733.201(1). See
discussion of self-proved wills in text accompanying notes 126-136 supra (part I).
465. The draftsmen of the 1974 Code were evidently unwilling to accept the provisions
of UPC §3-406(b), which provides: "If the will is self-proved, compliance with signature
requirements for execution is conclusively presumed and other requirements of execution
are presumed subject to rebuttal without the testimony of any witness upon filing the will
and the acknowledgment and affidavits annexed or attached thereto, unless there is proof of
fraud or forgery affecting the acknowledgement or affidavit."
466. PGR 5.120 has not been changed to reflect the adoption of the self-proved will
provision in 1973. (FLA. STAT. §731.071 (1973)); nor would it seem appropriate to change the
rule without changing the statute as long as the statutory provisions for proof of other wills
are continued. If the self-proved will is to have any real significance, it would seem that a
provision similar to the UPC should be adopted. See note 465 supra.

467. See note 463 supra.
468. FPC §733.201(2) (1974).
469. See FLA. STAT. §732.24(2) (1973).
470. Compare FPC §733.204 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.34 (1973).
471. Compare FPC §733.205 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.37 (1973).
472. Compare FPC §733.206 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.35 (1973).
473. Compare FPC §733.207 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.27 (1973).
474. FLA. STAT. §732.34(1) (1973). This seems the only reason for requiring citation here,
where the content of the will is in doubt, and not in the case of the usual will.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/1

16

Fenn and Koren: The Florida 1974 Probate code--A Marriage of Convenience, Part 2

1975]

THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE

later time.475 Moreover, a second day in court on the same matter may have
been thought to be anomalous. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to reinstate
the provision for formal notice because the court is still charged with establishing the correct translation in the order admitting the will to probate 476 and
should therefore have the assistance of all interested parties. The provision for
a later redetermination of the correctness of the translation of the will, or of
any part of it, also seems justified because of the virtual impossibility of
anticipating at the time of probate all of the problems that may arise during
administration, the determination of which may depend upon an exact trans4
lation of a particular provision of the will. 77
Formal notice before probate of a lost or destroyed will continues to be
required,478 again, because the content and terms of the will must be established by the court. The 1974 Code479 also clarifies two ambiguities in subdivision (3) of the existing statute,48 0 thus obviating any basis for a contention
that a petitioner may choose either citation or proof by two disinterested
witnesses to satisfy the requirements of the section,48 1 or that the section re48
quires proof of execution of such a will to be by two disinterested witnesses. 2
Selection of PersonalRepresentative
With few substantive changes, the 1974 Code continues existing law concerning who may be appointed personal representative. 48 3 Provisions requiring
designation of a resident agent for both resident and nonresident personal
representatives have been eliminated from the Code, although they remain, at
least for the present, in the Rules. 4 4 Handling the matter as procedural,
475. FPC §733.204(2) (1974). See also FLA. STAT. §732.34(2) (1973).
476. FPC §733.204(2) (1974).
477. Such redetermination may also be considered equivalent to construction of a will,
which cannot be sought until after the will has been probated. FPC §733.211 (1974).
478. FPC §733.207(3) (1974).
479. Id.

480. FLA. STAT. §732.27(3) reads: "No probate of any lost or destroyed will shall be
granted until citation has issued and been served upon those who, but for such will, would
be entitled to the property thereby bequeathed or devised; or unless clearly and distinctly

proved by the testimony of at least two disinterested witnesses, a correct copy being the
equivalent of one witness." FPC §733.207(3) divides the subdivision into two sentences at the
semicolon and begins the second sentence "The content of the will must be" instead of the
phrase "or unless."
481. Credence is lent to this interpretation by the fact that until the general revision of
the 1933 Probate Code in Fla. Laws 1945, ch. 22783, the subdivision used the word "nor"
rather than "or."
482. Briefs of counsel show that this contention was made and rejected in In re Estate
of Maynard, 253 So. 2d 923 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
483. Compare FPC §733.302 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.45 (1973). Minors, nonresidents,
and trust companies and other corporations continue to be covered by separate statutes.
Compare FPC §§733.303, .304, .305 (1974), with FA. STAT. §§732.46, .47, .49 (1973). For a
discussion of the controversy over the disqualification of nonresidents and foreign trust
companies, see text accompanying notes 940-945 infra. A section of current law authorizing
a married woman to act as'an executor without the consent of her husband is understandably omitted from the 1974 Code. See FA. STAT. §732.48 (1973).
484. PGR 5.210.
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rather than jurisdictional,485 seems proper, but it would be undesirable to
eliminate from the Rules the requirement for either a resident or nonresident
s
personal representative.4 6
In the section disqualifying minors from acting as personal representatives,41 the age of 18 is substituted for 21 to accord with the changed general
statutory definition of "minor."488 The provision in the present statutes49 9 allowing a minor named as personal representative in a will to qualify when he
comes of age, thereby revoking any letters previously issued, has been omitted.
This seems desirable because a change in personal representatives would unnecessarily delay administration and place an entirely unjustified expense upon
the estate.
The new statutory provision 490 dealing with preferences in the selection of
the personal representative is one of the least desirable provisions of the 1974
Code. It attempts to combine the preferences in the case of both testate and
intestate estates491 and, in so doing, compounds the difficulties the courts have
485. In Tyler v. Huggins, 175 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1965), failure to file a designation of a
resident agent before the issuance of letters was held to invalidate the letters.
486. The failure of a resident personal representative leaving the state to appoint a
resident agent has been omitted as a cause for removal. FPC §733.504. See text accompanying
notes 575-580 infra. This may indicate an intent to eliminate the requirement entirely, but
for the purpose of protecting the parties dealing with the estate, a resident agent is as desirable in this situation as in the case of a foreign personal representative.
487. FPC §733.303 (1974).
488. FLA. STAT. §1.01(14) (1973).
489. FLA. STAT. §732A6 (1973).
490. FPC §733.301 (1974).
491. FPC §733.301 provides: "In the granting of letters, the following preference shall
be observed: (1)the personal representative, or his successor, nominated by the will. (2) The
surviving spouse. (3) The next of kin, at the time of the death of the decedent. (4) If there
are several next of kin equally near in degree, the one selected in writing by a majority in
interest of them who are sui juris shall be appointed. If no selection is thus made, the court
may exercise its discretion in selecting the one best qualified for the office. (5) If no application is made by the next of kin, the court may appoint some capable person, but no person
may be appointed under this subsection who works for the court or who holds public office
under the court, nor may any person who is employed by or holds office under any judge
exercising probate jurisdiction be appointed. (6) Those persons entitled to a majority interest
in the estate may select a disinterested person as personal representative and if he is otherwise qualified, he shall be appointed. (7) After letters have been granted if any person who
is entitled to preference over the person appointed and upon whom formal notice was not
served and who has not waived his preference seeks the appointment, letters granted may be
revoked, and the person may have letters granted to him after formal notice and hearing.
(8) After letters have been granted if any later discovered will is produced and probated, the
letters shall be revoked and letters granted to the personal representative named."
Despite the stated order of pseference, a convincing argument can be made that the person
selected under subsection (6) must be appointed even though the person chosen by the
testator, and thus entitled to subsection (1) preference, is ready and able to serve. The
argument is as follows: A statute must be construed so that each of its provisions is operative.
If subsection (6) is construed to be part of the order of preference set up by the statute, it
would be a nullity because the court always will have appointed "some capable person" under
subdivision (5). Therefore, the legislature intended to limit the order of preference to subsections (1) through (5) and subsection (6) considered in pari materia with subsections (7)
and (8), which clearly supersede the order of preference in particular fact situations. Thus,
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experienced under the present preference statutes. 492 Moreover, it seems to
violate the two basic tenets for the selection of personal representatives: first,
"that a testator has the right to name the person who, after his death, shall
have charge of his estate, provided that such person is not disqualified by
law;" 493 and, second, that where the decedent has not chosen his personal representative, the right to administer should follow the right to the property,
since self-interest is the best assurance of a careful and expeditious administration. 494 To give letters to the "next of kin" in the case of a testate estate where
both the named executor and the spouse cannot or do not desire to serve, will
frequently be to entrust the estate to persons who will not share in its distribution but who are attracted by the prospective fees. 495 The likelihood of this
occurring is enhanced under the new statute by its express terms49 6 and also by
the omission from subdivision (8) of a portion of the present statute from
which it was derived. 49 7 The deficiency of the new section becomes even more
apparent when it is compared with the new order of preference statute relating
to the appointment of ancillary personal representatives, 498 which carefully
given the fact situations of subsection (6), the legislature aptly expressed its intent that the
order of preference be superseded and the person selected by persons entitled to a majority
interest in the estate "shall be appointed" (emphasis added) even -if the executor named by
the testator seeks appointment.
492. FLA. STAT. §§732.43(3), .44, 734.31(1) (1973). See Littel v. Rucker, 266 So. 2d 171 (1st
D.C.A. Fla. 1972); In re Estate of Phillips, 190 So. 2d 15 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966); In re Estate
of Jose, 164 So. 2d 888 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964); Pryor v. First Nat'l Bank of Leesburg, 97 So.
2d 143 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1957), for difficulties encountered in connection with these statutes.
493. State v. North, 159 Fla. 351, 355, 32 So. 2d 14, 18 (1947); T. ATKINSON, supra note
.353, at 604. See also In re Estate of Jose, 164 So. 2d 888 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). For extreme
situations in which the testator's intent may not be followed, see In re Estate of Maxcy, 240
So. 2d 93 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970), cert. denied, 244 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1971); In re Estate of Sackett,
171 So. 2d 906 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1965). It is conceivable, however, that under the 1974 Code
such extreme cases would not be necessary and that persons with a majority interest in the
estate could avoid the testator's intent. See note 491 supra.
494. See In re Estate of Jose, 164 So. 2d 888 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
495. This can also occur in intestate estates where the persons entitled to the estate are
minors or are otherwise disqualified to act. See Littel v. Rucker, 266 So. 2d 171 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1972); In re Estate of Phillips, 190 So. 2d 15 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
496. It will be impossible for the courts to continue to hold §733.301 applicable only to
intestate estates and allow the appointment of an administrator c.t.a. to be governed by
common law rules, as was done in Pryor v. First Nat'l Bank of Leesburg, 97 So. 2d 143 (2d

D.C.A. Fa. 1957).
497. Compare FPC §733.301(8) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.44(7) (1973), which provides:
."After letters of administration have been granted, if any will is produced and probated, the
aforesaid letters shall be revoked and letters testamentary shall be granted to the executor of
said will, or letters of administration cum testamento annexo shall be granted, if there is no
-executor ready and willing to qualify, preference being given to the person, if otherwise
qualified, who is selected by the persons beneficially interested in the estate. No such will
shall be probated without citation to the administrator." "
498. FPC §734.102(1) reads: "If a nonresident of this state dies leaving assets in this
state, credits due him from residents in this state, or liens upon property in this state, then
any personal representative specifically designated in the decedent's will to administer the
Florida property shall be entitled upon petition to have ancillary letters issued to him if
qualified to act in Florida. Othenvise, the foreign personal representative of the decedent's
*estate shaH be entitled upon petition to have such letters issued to him if qualified to act in
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adheres to both basic tenets.49 The section is clearly unsatisfactory and should
be redrafted.500
Oath and Bond
The oath of the personal representative and any bond required are usually
filed with the petition for convenience and to expedite the issuance of letters.
It is surprising to find that the 1974 Code does not contain any provision for
an oathY01 Although difficult to justify functionally5 °2 the oath is such a

Florida; and if such foreign personal representative is not qualified to act in Florida and the
will names an alternate or successor who is qualified to act in Florida, then such alternate or
successor shall be entitled upon petition to have such letters issued to him. Otherwise, those
entitled to a majority interest of the Florida property may upon petition have such letters
issued to a personal representative selected by them who is qualified to act in Florida. If
the decedent dies intestate, the order of preference for appointment of personal representative
as prescribed in this Code shall be applicable. If ancillary letters are applied for by other
than the domiciliary personal representative, then prior notice of such petition shall be
given, as provided in this code, to the personal representative (if any) then serving in the
decedent's domicile."
499. See text accompanying notes 492-494 supra.
500. The following provision is suggested:
"733.031 Preference in appointment of personal representative. In the granting of letters
the following preferences shall be observed:
(1)Testate estates.
(a) The personal representative or his successor nominated by the will.
(b) The person selected by the persons entitled to a majority interest in the estate.
(c) A beneficiary under the will. If more than one beneficiary applies, the court may exercise its discretion in selecting the one best qualified for the office.
(2) Intestate estates.
(a) The surviving spouse.
(b) The person selected by a majority in interest of the next of kin who are sui juris.
(c) The next of kin. If more than one next of kin apply, the court may exercise its discretion in selecting the one best qualified for the office.
(3)In either a testate or an intestate estate, if no application is made by any of the persons
named in subsections (I) anti (2), as the case may be, the court in its discretion may appoint some capable person, but no person may be appointed under this subsection who
works for the court or holds public office under the court, or who is employed by or holds
office under any judge exercising probate jurisdiction.
(4) After letters have been granted in either a testate or an intestate estate, if any person
who is entitled to preference over the person appointed and upon whom formal notice was
not served and who has not waived his preference seeks the appointment, letters granted
may be revoked and such person may have letters granted to him after formal notice and
hearing.
(5) After letters have been granted in a testate or an intestate estate, if any later discovered
will is produced and probated, the aforesaid letters shall be revoked and letters granted
as provided in subsection (I) hereof."
501. Such an oath is currently required by FLA. STAT. §732.59 (1973).
502. If the oath were taken before the judge or the clerk, it might impress upon the
personal representative the importance of the obligations he is assuming, but, since it usually
is executed before a notary public in the office of the attorney at the time that the petition
is executed, the oath tends to be viewed as merely "another paper to be signed." Nor does
breach of his oath "that he will faithfully administer the estate" (PGR 5.240) appear as an
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traditional part of the qualification of a personal representative that its omission is instinctively offensive. Indeed, even the UPC requires an acceptance of
the office. 50 3 Hopefully, the PGR will continue to require the filing of an oath
50
when the new rules are promulgated. '
The provisions of the 1974 Code concerning bonds are, for the most part,
taken from existing law with only editorial changes.60 5 One is new in form, but
is actually only a simplified statement of material covered by several sections of
existing statutes.5 06 The testator is still allowed to waive bond, 07 but the 1974
Code rejects the recommendation of the draftsmen of the UPC that no bond be
0
required except in specified circumstances. sO
This seems regrettable because
bonds represent an unnecessary expense to both the public5°9 and to beneficiaries of estates. 610 Furthermore, the requirement may delay the beginning
of administration,1 1 and, in some instances, may encourage the use of nontestamentary dispositions in order to avoid publicity concerning the wealth of
a decedent. 1 2 Perhaps efforts to pass a comprehensive revision of probate law
should not be jeopardized by injecting the controversial issue of the need for

allegation in any proceeding to surcharge or otherwise hold the personal representative liable
for wrongful acts.

503. UPC §3-307.
504. This is currently required under PGR 5.240. See text accompanying notes 442-443
supra for a discussion of the effect of the PGR on procedural provisions omitted from the
1974 Code.
505. FPC §§733A02-.405 (1974). Compare FPC §733.402, with FLA. STAT. §§732.61, .67
(1973). Compare FPC §733.404, with FLA. STAT. §732.65 (1973). Compare FPC §733.405, with
FLA. STAT. §732.68 (1973). As to FPC §733A03, see FLA. STAT. §§732.61-.66, .69 (1973).
506. FPC §733.403 (1974); see note 505 supra.
507. FPC §733.402(1) (1974).
508. UPC §3-603_Bond is required in cases (1) where a special administrator (curator)
is appointed, (2) where a will contains an express requirement for bond, (3) where a bond
is demanded by a beneficiary or creditor having an interest in excess of $1,000.
509. The time spent by judges and clerks in setting the amount of bonds, releasing

sureties, et cetera, adds appreciably to the cost of judicial administration.
510. It has already been pointed out (see text accompanying note 16 supra, (part 1))
that "claims are rarely, if ever, made on bonds." The method of determining the amount of
bond varies considerably in different parts of the state, as does the cost of the bond if supplied by a surety company. If a bond in the amount of twice the value of the personal
property is set and the annual cost is $10 per $1,000, the beneficiaries of the estate are being
charged 2% per year for protection that is of little benefit to them. The discrepancy between the benefit and the cost is dramatically illustrated by statistics from the Insurance
Commissioner of Florida that show that for the years 1968 to 1972, the average premiums
per year amounted to $364,968, while payments on claims averaged $21,123 per year. J. Langford, How Necessary the Administration Bond?, May 1975 (unpublished research paper submitted for Estates and Trust Seminar, spring quarter 1975, University of Florida College of
Law).
511. The issuance of letters is delayed to the extent that additional time is needed (I) to
determine the value of the personal property of the estate so that sufficient information can
be stated in the petition to enable the court to fix the amount of the bond and (2) for a
surety company to investigate the financial status of its principal and to provide the bond.
512. A frequently suggested advantage of creating a revocable trust is that neither the
size of the trust nor the nature of its assets need be disclosed to the court by the petition for
probate or the inventory of the estate. See, e.g., T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 159-60, 162.
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a bond, but it is hoped that the UPC approach will be presented to the
legislature by way of a separate bill in the near future.
Notice of Administration
Once the preceding steps have been taken, the 1974 Code provides that the
will, if any, shall be admitted to probate, the personal representative appointed and letters issued to him. 1 3 Administration can then be said to have
begun, but the notice of administration properly may be considered a part of
beginning administration because it governs the future course of the administration. The notice of administration 61 4 is a new concept in Florida law,
although its various elements may call to mind existing procedures to be followed after the filing of a caveat,515 the notice of probate, 16 the notice to
creditors, 517 and the revocation of probate.,1S Since the notice affects several
matters discussed in other parts of this article, it seems best merely to describe
it generally here and to reserve analysis of its specific effects upon particular
matters until each is discussed. 519
The notice of administration provision is designed to avoid several recurrent criticisms of existing probate law: (1) the possibility that persons directly
affected may not know that administration has been started; (2) the expense
involved in publishing a variety of notices; and (3) the long period of uncertainty as to the ultimate validity of the will when probate is allowed by an
ex parte proceeding.520 Therefore, the new law requires the personal representative, "upon issuance of letters," to publish the notice and to serve a copy of it
"upon all beneficiaries."' 5 21 The provision for notice, which serves as a notice of
513.
514.

FPC §733.401 (1974).
FPC §733.210 (1974).

515.
516.
517.
518.

FLA.
FLA.
FLA.
FLA.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

§732.29
§732.28
§733.15
§732.30

(1973).
(1973).
(1973).
(1973).

519. The relationship of notice to challenges to jurisdiction and venue has already been
discussed. See text accompanying notes 399-410 supra. The contest of wills is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 525-574 infra; claims of creditors are dealt with at notes 745-793 infra.
520. In the text accompanying notes 456-457 supra it was previously noted that in the
usual case no notice is required before the probate of the will and the granting of letters.
The alternative of a formal proceeding, with all interested parties served with process before
the will is probated or the personal representative appointed, delays the beginning of administration for a minimum of a month (the time required to serve process plus the 20 days
allowed for response). It will also frequently require the appointment of a curator (see FPC
§733.501 (1974)) to take charge of the estate, thus increasing the costs of administration.
521. FPC §733.210 (1974). The full text of the provision reads:
"(I) Upon issuance of letters the personal representative shall publish a notice of administration. The personal representative shall also serve a copy of the notice upon all
beneficiaries according to the requirements of §731.301(l). The notice shall contain the name
of the decedent, the file number of the estate, the name and address of the personal representative, the name and address of the personal representative's attorney, the date of first
publication and the last day when claims or objections may be presented as well as require
all interested persons to file with the court, within four months of the first publication of
the notice: (a) All claims against the estate. (b) Any objection by an interested person that
challenges the validity of the will, qualifications of the personal representative, venue or
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probate as well as a notice to creditors, bars objections to the will not filed
within four months after the first publication. It also requires that any objection to the qualifications of the personal representative, to jurisdiction, or to
venue 522 be fied within the same time.
The phrases quoted above merit brief comment. "[U]pon the issuance of
letters" is a somewhat vague standard for determining the permissible time
within which publication must be begun and copies of the notice served upon
the beneficiaries. This vagueness is undoubtedly intentional. "Beneficiaries"
are defined 2 3 in the 1974 Code as heirs at law and devisees524 who have a
present interest in the estate. Although the time required to determine the
identity of such persons and obtain their addresses may vary considerably in
different estates, nevertheless, it is not a problem in most instances. Therefore,
to encourage prompt action, it would be preferable to state a definite time,
such as 15 days after the issuance of letters, within which the personal representative must begin publication of the notice, adding a provision that the
court may extend the time for good cause shown.
WILL CONTESTS (REvocATION OF PROBATE)

As indicated earlier,525 the 1974 Code attempts to achieve an early, yet final,
determination of the validity of a probated will without the expense and
initial delay involved in probate in solemn form. The extent to which this
objective has been, or can be, realized and at what detriment to possible inter-

ested persons, is the focal point of the following discussion.
Who May Contest
Existing law provides that any heir or distributee of a decedent, including
legatees and devisees under a prior will, may petition for revocation of probate
at any time before the final discharge of the personal representative.626 Despite
this seemingly dear statutory language, the courts have not treated this provision as excluding all other parties,627 nor even as including all of the heirs. 528
jurisdiction of the court or any other challenge to the legality of the proceeding.
"(2) The required publication shall be once a week for four consecutive weeks, four publications being sufficient, in a newspaper published in the county where the estate is administered, or if there is no newspaper published in the county, in a newspaper of general
circulation in that county. Proof of publication shall be filed.
"(3) Objections under subsection l(b) that are not filed within four months following the
date of first publication of the notice are forever barred. Claims under subsection l(a) are
barred as provided in §733.702."
522. See text accompanying notes 399-410 supra.
523. FPC §731.201(1) (1974).
524. "Devisee," in turn, is defined as one entitled to receive a testamentary disposition of
personal as well as real property. FPC §§731.201(6), (7) (1974).
525. See note 520 and text accompanying notes 456-457 supra.
526. FLA. STAT. §732.30 (1973).
527. The leading case under the 1933 Probate Act is In re Dana's Estate, 138 Fla. 676,
190 So. 52 (1939), which construed the similar provisions of that Act "to grant such a right
or authorization [to contest a will] to heirs, legatees, devisees, distributees, spouses, creditors,

or others having a property right or claim against the estate being administered." Id. at 678,
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Instead, they have preferred to follow the generally used s29 criterion that a
right to contest exists only where there is a pecuniary interest in having the
will set aside. 530
The 1974 Code eliminates the existing statutory provisions-31 and provides
for "objection by an interested person that challenges the validity of the
will." 5 32 While this provision apparently adopts the present case law test, care
should be taken not to repeat the mistake of In re Dana's Estate 33 when seeking the meaning of "interested person" in the Code's new definitional section. 534 Not every listed person has a pecuniary interest in having the will set
aside; nor does the section specifically include all of those who may have such
an interest. For instance, devisees under the will being offered for probate have
no such interest, while devisees under a prior will, even though no longer
defined as interested persons,5 35 may well have an interest adverse to the
probated will. Similarly, creditors of the decedent have no interest in having
the will set aside; their claims will receive the same treatment whether the
estate is administered as a testate or intestate estate. 536 The express recognition
of these variations in "interest" by the last sentence of the definition of "interested persons" 537 should prevent future courts from making the Dana mistake.
The provision also suggests that the precedential value of existing case law is
not affected by the failure to carry forward into the 1974 Code the express
5 38
statement that a devisee under a prior will may contest.
190 So. at 53. This list appears to have been taken from the Probate Act's general definition
of "interested persons" in FLA. STAT. §731.03(9). While unsatisfactory in certain respects (see
text accompanying notes 533-538 infra), it does show that the court considered that "interested
persons" other than heirs and legatees or devisees under a prior will could have sufficient
reason to be granted the right to contest probate. A recent case expressly adopts the test of
"interest adverse to the will" as the proper criterion in refusing to allow an heir cut off by
a prior will to contest the later will. In re Pfeiffer's Will, 34 Fla. Supp. 132 (Dade County J.
Ct.), dismissed without opinion, 240 So. 2d 211 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
528. In re Pfeiffer's Will, 34 Fla. Supp. 132 (Dade County J. Ct. 1970); In re True's
Will, 31 Fla. Supp. 1 (Dade County J. Ct. 1968). See note 527 supra.

529. T.

ATKINSON,

supra note 352, at 519.

530. E.g., In re Dana's Estate, 138 Fla. 676, 190 So. 52 (1939); In re Pfeiffer's Will, 34 Fla.
Supp. 132 (Dade County J. Ct. 1970).
531. Compare FPC §733.109 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.30 (1973).
532. FPC §733.210(1)(b) (1974).
533. See note 527 supra.
534. FPC §731.201(17) (1974) reads: "'Interested person' means heirs, devisees, spouse,
creditors, beneficiaries, sureties on a personal representative's bond, and any other person
having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, that
may be affected by the proceeding. It also includes persons having priority for appointment
as personal representative, and other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and must be determined
according to the particular purpose of, and matter involved in, any proceeding."
535. Compare FPC §§731.201(17), 733.210(l)(b) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§731.03(9), 732.30
(1973); see text accompanying notes 531-532 supra.
536. See text accompanying notes 374-382 supra; notes 745-793 infra for a discussion of
the rights of creditors.
537. See note 534 supra.
538. Compare FPC §§733.109, .210(l)(b) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §732.30 (1973). In re
Barret's Estate, 40 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1949) allowed a legatee under a prior will to contest
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Time for Contest
Currently, a will contest may occur before probate, 539 within six months of
the first publication of the notice of probate,540 or, if such notice is not published, at any time before the final discharge of the personal representative. 541
A contest prior to probate arises when a caveator answers the petition for
probate after receiving a citation.54 2 Once the will has been admitted to
543
probate, however, a contest is begun by a petition for revocation of probate.
Under the 1974 Code, the time for filing such a petition is reduced to four
months after first publication of the notice of administration.5 44 This shortened
period seems desirable in the usual case where one or more of the heirs is the
contestant, since they are served with a copy of the notice 45 and thus are aware
of the proceedings. On the other hand, it may be unfair to beneficiaries under
a prior will, who are not required to be served with a copy of the notice and
who, therefore, may be barred from contesting the later will before learning of
its probate. Indeed, such persons may not even become aware of the prior will
until the period allowed for contest of the later will has expired. Nevertheless,
the unfairness of barring a contest in such a case is probably outweighed by
the need for a prompt final determination of the validity of the probated will.
Where the proponent of a later will knows of the existence of a prior will,
however, he should not be allowed to rely upon publication of the notice as
affording due process to beneficiaries of the earlier will.546 Notice by publication is a notoriously ineffective mode of providing actual notice5 4 7 and should
be resorted to only in cases of necessity.5 48 When the proponent is aware that
others may have a pecuniary interest in the proceedings because of the exprobate of the later will, while denying that right to the personal representative named in
the first will. The right of a personal representative named in an earlier will is discussed
subsequently. See text accompanying notes 551-560 infra.
539.
540.

FLA. STAT. §732.29(4) (1973).
FLA. STAT. §732.28 (1973).
FLA. STAT. §732.30(1) (1973). Although a reading of subsection (1) seems to indicate

541.
that only those barred by the caveat provisions of §732.29 are precluded from contesting a
will at any time before final discharge, the Florida supreme court has construed the statute
to apply only if notice of probate is not published. State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 149 So.
2d 552 (Fla. 1962). The court's construction was based, in part, on its belief that the phrase
"or who are barred under §732.29" actually was intended to refer to §733.2&. Id. at 55 n.5.
542. FLA. STAT. §732.29(4) (1973).
543.

FLA. STAT. §732.30 (1973).

544. FPC §733.210 (1974). If the caveat procedure is continued in the PGR, see note 455
supra, a contest could also arise before probate.
545. See text accompanying notes 523-524 supra for a discussion of the persons upon
whom a copy of notice of administration must be served.
546. This was the unfortunate result reached in State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 149 So.
2d 552 (Fla. 1962).
547. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
548. In Mullane, the Court said: "As to known present beneficiaries of known place of
residence, however, notice by publication stands on a different footing. Exceptions in the
name of necessity do not sweep away the rule that within the limits of practicability notice
must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties. Where the names and
post office addresses of those affected by a proceeding are at hand, the reasons disappear for
resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise them of its pendency." Id. at 318.
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istence of a prior will, he should be required to serve a copy of the notice of
administration upon all those who have such an interest and possibly upon
the person named as personal representative in the earlier will.

49

The legislature should amend section 733.210 to so provide. Absent such a
change, the attempt to bar objections of such persons may be unconstitutional
under the concepts of due process enunciated in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.550
Fiduciariesas Contestants
The 1974 Code may have considerable effect upon the fine distinctions that
the courts have drawn concerning the status of personal representatives and
trustees as contestants of a decedent's will. As previously noted, 51 the validity
of a will may be challenged by an "interested person." In defining this term,
the Code specifically includes "persons having priority for appointment as
personal representative."5 52 Such language may change present law that a
person named as personal representative in a prior will may not contest a later
will. 55 3 The same sentence adds "and other fiduciaries representing interested

persons." This seems to resolve the unsettled question as to whether an administrator appointed in an apparently intestate estate can contest a will subsequently offered for probate. It also clarifies the status of an executor of an
heir who survived the decedent but died prior to the will being offered for
probate. 554 It should be noted, however, that a later section adopted from the
UPC555 seemingly prohibits a contest "for the primary purpose of enhancing
...[the fiduciary's] prospects for compensation."556
Although this limitation would apply, the new definition of "interested
person" appears to support the position taken by the First District Court of
Appeal in State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock 557 that a trustee under a prior will

may contest a later will. This view was rendered questionable by the supreme
court's statement that it "need not be evaluated" 558 because the holding was
being reversed on other grounds. In each of these situations, the ability of the
549. See text accompanying notes 551-560 infra.
550. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
551. See text accompanying notes 532-538 supra.
552. FPC §731.201(17) (1974), quoted in text accompanying note 532 supra.
553. In re Barret's Estate, 40 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1949); cf. Hopkins v. McClure, 45 So. 2d
656 (Fla. 1950).
554. Both issues were involved in In re Dana's Estate, 138 Fla. 676, 190 So. 52 (1939).
The county judge and the circuit judge disagreed on both issues. Nor were the issues resolved
by the supreme court, which held that no one was entitled to contest because "the will had
nothing to affect and was to all intents and purposes revoked." Id. at 679, 190 So. at 54.
555. Compare FPC §733.618 (1974), with UPC §3-720, concerning reimbursement of the
personal representative for expenses incurred in estate litigation entered into in good faith.
556. UPC §3-720, Comment states that such action would not be in good faith. Although
involving a different issue, this same good faith requirement should be read into the definitional clause quoted in the text.
557. 140 So. 2d 631 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962), rev'd. on other grounds, 149 So. 2d 552 (Fla.
1963).
558. State ex rel. Ashby v. Haddock, 149 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. 1962).
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fiduciary to contest the will seems strengthened by the final sentence of the
definition.55 9 If such fiduciaries are considered proper contestants, the due
process problems noted earlier 560 apply equally well to fiduciaries known to the
proponent and a further change should be made in section 733.210.
OtherMatters Concerning Contest
Three of the remaining four sections concerning contest have been brought
forward from current statutes with only slight changes. Nevertheless they
deserve mention because they present troublesome deviations from the theory
of probate and will contests under the new Code and therefore should be considered for revision.
Burden of Proof in Contests. The first section provides, inter alia, that: "In
all proceedings contesting the validity of a will, the burden of proof in the
first instance shall be upon the proponent of the will to establish prima facie
its formal execution and attestation. ' 561 Because the caveat section of the old
statutes 562 has been omitted from the 1974 Code, the only contest proceeding
envisioned in the 1974 Code is by way of revocation of probate. Under these
circumstances, it would seem that the probate record should establish the
proponent's prima fade case of due execution, but, if so, the statute becomes
56
meaningless. If more proof is required to establish a prima fade case 3 and
the proponent is unable to supply it (as would be the case if the attesting
witnesses were unavailable and there were no other secondary evidence beyond
that offered in the probate proceeding), the contestant would win by default.
Thus, merely filing a petition for revocation could nullify the statfitory provisions that the proponent had satisfied in obtaining probate. A statute that
requires such a result to avoid becoming meaningless is dearly in need of
revision.
After Discovered Wills. There are two sections dealing with after discovered wills that do not fit comfortably with the effort to obtain a final determination of the validity and effect of a will early in the administration of
the estate. In fact, they suggest the futility and undesirability of the entire
effort. The first provides that upon discovery of a later will or codicil "pending probate proceedings," any interested person may offer it for probate in
proceedings that "shall be similar to those for revocation of probate as nearly
as practicable." 564 The phrase "pending probate proceedings" cannot be read
559. See note 534 supra.
560. See text accompanying notes 546-550 supra.
561. FPC §733.107 (1974).
562. FLA. STAT. §732.29 (1973). See note 405 supra concerning the status of caveat under
the 1974 Code.
563. In Ferrell v. Minnifield, 275 Ala. 388, 155 So. 2d 345 (1963), the probate court record
was held not to establish a prima fade case where the will had been admitted to probate
upon the testimony of only one attesting witness. That case, however, involved the statutory"
procedure for contest, which required a suit in equity and the' testimony of two subscribing
witnesses.
564. FPC §733.208 (1974).
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literally without rendering the entire section substantially useless. 56 If it is
interpreted to cover the period of administration, however, its effect upon the
use of the notice of administration to obtain an early final determination of
the validity of the probated will is readily apparent. Moreover, such an interpretation raises the question whether beneficiaries under a later will deserve
more time in which they may set aside the probated will than either the heirs
or the beneficiaries under an earlier will. The instinctive reaction that the
later will should be probated because it is the last valid expression of the
testator's intent is no justification for the distinction; if the beneficiaries under
an earlier will are successful in setting aside the probated will, their will becomes the last valid expression of the testator's intent.
A similar problem arises upon the discovery of a will after the settlement of
the estate. In this event, the 1974 Code allows any interested person to "impress
a trust upon the funds or property received by a beneficiary in the administration recently terminated that he is not justly entitled to retain because of the
newly discovered will."566 Except for one substantive change,5 67 this section is
also derived from existing law but its operation is uncertain due to a dearth
of court interpretation of the current statute. A comparison with the section
concerning discovery of a later will during administration5s6 suggests that
probate of the later will is not contemplated if it is discovered after administration. Nevertheless, some means of establishing its validity must be available.
To allow it to be introduced in evidence and its witnesses called to testify as to
its due execution in an action to impress a trust would be contrary to the basic
9
concept that probate is necessary before a will may be used to prove title.6
It seems likely, therefore, that the courts would allow the will to be probated
despite the seemingly contrary intent of the statute.
In any event, the question recurs whether the beneficiaries of this will
should be accorded more time to protect their interests than is allowed for the
protection of the interests of the heirs or beneficiaries of other wills. The
authors submit that there is no satisfactory reason for such distinctions and the
570
1974 Code should be amended to eliminate them.
565. Because "probate" is defined in
(1973)) as "all steps necessary to establish
will to probate including the proof of a
ceedings" would cover such a short period
effect.
566.

FPC §731.201(22) (compare FLA. STAT. §731.03(14)
the validity of the will and the admitting of the
will," a literal reading of "pending probate proof time that the section would have practically no

FPC §733.902 (1974).

567. The period allowed for impressing the trust is reduced from three years to one year
after discharge of the personal representative. Compare FPC §733.902(2) (1974), with FLA.
STAT.

§732.33 (1973).

568. FPC §733.208 (1974); see note 565 supra.
569. See text accompanying notes 352-360 supra.
570. One method of accomplishing this would be to amend §733.210(3) to limit its bar
to persons served with a copy of the notice of administration, to repeal §733.902, and to
substitute a section similar to the following:
Time limitation for probate of will or petition for revocation of probate.
(1) After the termination of administration and the discharge of the personal representative no will may be probated nor may a proceeding be brought for revocation of
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Compromise of Will Contests. Another provision of the 1974 Code that
may have a bearing on will contests is simply a codification of the common
law principle that competent successors of the decedent may compromise

disputes5 71 or otherwise agree to alter the amounts to which they are entitled
under the will or the laws of intestacy.572 Adopted from the UPC,"7 the section also provides that the personal representative must abide by the agreement, subject to the rights of creditors, taxing authorities, or any successors of
the decedent who are not parties to the agreement. The effect is to clarify

what already may have been obvious: "[T]he successors of an estate have
residual control over the way it is to be distributed... [and] may compel the
personal representative to administer and distribute as they may agree and
direct."57 '

CURATORS, SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND REMOVAL

Following the format of the UPC, 57 5 the 1974 Code groups the provisions

of existing law concerning curators576 with those relating to resignation 577 and
removal 78 of personal representatives and the appointment of their successors.579 The only substantive changes in the rearrangement are an increase
from twenty to thirty days in the time allowed for a removed personal representative to file an accounting 8 0 and the elimination as a ground for removal of the failure of a resident personal representative leaving the state to
designate a resident agent. 581 As already discussed,582 the latter change seems
undesirable. It also seems unfortunate that the 1974 Code does not require the
curator to proceed with the publication of a notice to creditors and the
probate of a will previously probated; provided that, if because of fraud the will was not
probated or the proceeding for revocation of probate not brought prior to the termination
of administration and the discharge of the personal representative, any person injured
thereby may obtain appropriate relief against the perpetrator of, or a participant in, the
fraud within two years after discovery of the fraud. A person otherwise innocent shall
not be considered a participant in the fraud merely because he received a benefit from
the fraud.
(2) A proceeding for fraud shall not invalidate any acts of the personal representative
theretofore performed in good faith nor affect the rights of bona fide purchasers for value
of any of the property of the estate.
571. E.g., Hendrick v. Redfearn, 88 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 1956); Wells v. Menn, 158 Fla. 228,
28 So. 2d 881 (1946).
572. E.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 128 Fla. 759, 175 So. 518 (1937) (agreement to alter
will); Youngelson v. Youngelson's Estate, 114 So. 2d 642 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959) (agreement to
settle intestate estate).
573. CompareFPC §733.815 (1974), with UPC §3-912.
574. UPC §3-912, Comment.
575. Compare UPC art. III, pt. 6, with FPC ch. 733, pt. 5 (1974).
576. FLA. STAT. §732.21 (1973); see FPC §733.501 (1974).
577. FLA. STAT. §734.09 (1973); see FPC §733.502 (1974).
578. FLA. STAT. §§734.11-.16 (1973); see FFC §§733.504-.509 (1974).
579. FLA. STAT. §734.10 (1973); see FPC §733.503 (1974).
580. Compare FPC §733.508 (1974), with FL.A. STAT. §734.15 (1973).
581. CompareFPC §733.504 (1974), with FI.A. STAT. §734.11 (1973).
582. See text accompanying notes 484-486 supra.
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processing of claims against the estate without special order of the court. 5 83

There is every reason why this portion of the administration should proceed
promptly in every estate; but where a special order has been entered, confusion
has resulted, 8s which would have been avoided had this been a regular duty
of every curator.
The provisions regarding the powers and duties of successor 5

s5

5

joint, 86

7

and surviving personal representativess are taken from the UPC with only
one omission. In the section concerning joint personal representatives, the final
sentence of the UPC section that expressly protects a person dealing in good
faith with one of the joint representatives has been omitted. 588 Perhaps it was
felt to be unnecessary in view of the adoption of section 733.611, 519 which
accords broad protection to parties dealing with the personal representative.
The UPC draftsmen, however, did not think so, and this omission may considerably limit the willingness of third parties to accept action by one of two
or more joint personal representatives. 59° Nor should a joint personal representative be misled concerning the extent of his power to delegate authority
to his co-representative by a too-broad reading of the provision's second
sentence, which provides: "This restriction does not apply . . . when a joint

personal representative has been delegated to act for the others." 5 01 The comment to its UPC counterpart section reads in part: "A co-representative who
abdicates his responsibility to co-administer the estate by a blanket delegation
breaches his duties to interested persons."

592

DUTIES OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

GeneralDuties
It was noted previously that early in the development of the law of estates,
it became the practice to designate one or more persons as personal representative to settle the conflicting claims that arise upon the death of an owner of
property.59 3 The general duties of this personal representative - whether an
583. See FPC §733.501(3) (1974).
584. See In re Estate of Sale, 227 So. 2d 199 (Fla. 1969).
585. Compare FPC §733.614 (1974), with UPC §3-716.
586. Compare FPC §733.615 (1974), with UPC §3-717.
587. Compare FPC §733.616 (1974), with UPC §3-718.
588. Compare FPC §733.615 (1974), with UPC §3-717.
589. See text accompanying notes 712-723 infra.
590. Such deliberate omissions are always subject to the interpretation that the draftsmen did not desire the result dictated by the omitted material - here the protection of the
person dealing with a co-representative, even though the third party was actually unaware of
the other representative or was advised by the co-representative that he had authority to act
alone. See UPC §3-717.
591. FPG §733.615 (1974). For a discussion of the power of the personal representative to
delegate authority to persons other than his co-representative, see text accompanying notes
675-682 infra.
592. UPC §3-717, Comment.
593. See note 352 and text accompanying notes 352-354 supra. At common law, and today
in the absence of statutory change, a decedent's estate was not recognized as a legal entity
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executor selected by the testator or an administrator chosen pursuant to
statutory preference594 -are to collect the assets,6 95 including debts owed the
decedent; 96 maintain and protect the estate from loss; 597 pay debts, funeral
expenses and other claims against the estate; 9 8 and, finally, distribute the
balance of the estate to the proper parties.5 99 If the personal representative
fails to discharge these duties properly, he is subject to being held personally
liable to those damaged by his breach of duty, even though he has acted in
good faith600 or upon advice of counsel.601
The 1974 Code does not enumerate the duties of the personal representative, but, like the UPC, 60 2 states them in a more generalized fashion:
A personal representative is a fiduciary who shall observe the standards of care applicable to trustees as described by Section 737.302, F.S.
A personal representative is under a duty to settle and distribute the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of his will and this
code as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred upon him by this
code, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings 6to
03
which he is party for the best interests of beneficiaries of the estate.
and therefore the office of the personal representative was accorded special importance.
T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 576. Initially the personal representative was viewed as the
absolute owner of the personal property, subject to an obligation to satisfy the next of kin
or legatees; creditors of the decedent sought satisfaction from the next of kin or legatees.
See Holmes, Executors, 9 HAv. L. Rnv. 42 (1895). This view gradually evolved to where the
personal representative took the place of the next of kin and legatees and was therefore
subject to the claims of creditors as well, and finally to the point where the representative
was considered to hold the assets of the estate in a fiduciary capacity, similar to that of a
trustee. Id. at 42-47. As in a trust, the personal property was divided into legal and equitable
ownership interests, but in contrast to ownership of the trust corpus, the equitable owners of
the decedents property included the creditors of the decedent as well as the next of kin or
legatees. Thus the personal representative was considered to be appointed for the benefit and
protection of both. E.g., Pyle v. Pyle, 53 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1951); May v. May, 7 Fla. 207 (1857).
594. See text accompanying notes 483-500 supra, for preferences in appointment of the
office of personal representative. Aside from the distinction that the executor distributes the
estate to the beneficiaries named in the will and an administrator distributes it to the heirs,
there is little difference in the duties of the two. T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 577; see
May v. May, 7 Fla. 207 (1857). Because the executor is more likely to have had the personal
confidence of the decedent, he was allowed somewhat broader powers. T. ATKINSON, supra
note 353, at 577.
595. E.g., Williams v. Howard Cole & Co., 159 Fla. 151, 31 So. 2d 914 (1947); Glidden v.
Gutelius, 96 Fla. 834, 119 So. 140 (1928). Currently, this duty is statutorily imposed by FLA.
STAT. §733.01 (1973).
596. E.g., Mills v. Hamilton, 121 Fla. 435, 163 So. 857 (1935); Sherrell v. Shepard, 19

Fla. 300 (1882).
597. In re Francis' Estate, 153 Fla. 360, 14 So. 2d 803 (1943).
598. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Macy, 101 Fla. 140, 133 So. 876 (1931).
599. E.g., Williams v .Howard Cole & Co., 159 Fla. 151, 31 So. 2d 914 (1947); Glidden v.
Gutelius, 96 Fla. 834, 119 So. 140 (1928).
600. See, e.g., Furniss v. Zimmerman, 90 Misc. 138, 154 N.Y.S. 272 (Sup. Ct. 1915);
Lesesne v. Cheves, 105 S.C. 482, 90 S.E. 37 (1916).
601. Laramore v. Laramore, 64 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1953).
602. Compare FPC §733.602 (1974), with UPC §3-703.
603. FPC §733.602(1) (1974).
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The second and third sentences are simply codifications of existing case law,60°
but the first sentence substantially changes existing law and creates an obvious
conflict with other statutory provisions. Section 518.11 of Florida Statutes
places a duty on both personal representatives and trustees to exercise the
judgment and care that "men of prudence

. . .

exercise in the management of

their own affairs."605 The 1974 Code, however, requires the trustee to observe
the standards of "a prudent man dealing with the property of another." 606
This latter language is taken directly from the UPC607 and is designed to make

clear "the idea that a trustee must comply with an external, rather than with
a personal, standard of care."600 Thus section 733.602 places this same external
standard of care upon the personal representative, creating an obvious conflict with current section 518.11, which was not amended by the 1974 Code.609
In addition to raising the standard of care by which the future acts of all
personal representatives are to be measured, the 1974 Code takes cognizance of
the increased use of corporate fiduciaries and their well advertised special
qualifications. The same section provides: "[l]f the trustee has special skills or
is named trustee on the basis of representations of special skills or expertise, he
is under a duty to use those skills."610 This seems a highly desirable addition to
the law of fiduciary administration,11 but it presents still another conflict with
604. E.g., Sewell Properties, Inc. v. Sewell, 45 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1950); Fowler v. Hartridge,
156 Fla. 585, 24 So. 2d 306 (1945); Bedenbaugh v. Lawrence, 141 Fla. 341, 193 So. 74 (1940).
In the third sentence, the reference to "beneficiaries," (which are defined as "heirs at
law and devisees" in FPC §731.201(1) (1974)), and omission of any reference to "creditors"
could be viewed as indicating a departure from the existing rule that a personal representative has fiduciary obligations to creditors as well as beneficiaries (see note 593 supra). The
view gains credence when it is noted that UPC §3-703(a) uses the term "successors" rather
than "beneficiaries" and UPC §1-201(42) defines "successors" as "those persons, other than
(emphasis added). It is clear,
creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent .......
however, that a creditor whose legitimate claim was not satisfied because of the improper
acts of the personal representative would still have a cause of action against the personal
representative. FPC §731.201(17) defines "interested persons" to include creditors and FPC
§733.609 provides, inter alia, that "if the exercise of power concerning the estate is improper,
the personal representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss ...
605. FLA. STAT. §518.11 (1973).
606. FPC §737.302 (1974).
607. UPC §7-302. This standard of care is not original with the UPC, but has been
adopted in numerous cases involving the care required of a trustee making investments of
trust property. See, e.g., Miller v. Pender, 93 N.H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943); Marshall v. Frazier,
159 Ore. 491, 80 P.2d 42 (1938); In re Hart's Estate, 203 Pa. 480, 53 A. 364 (1902). See generally G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST AND TRusTEES §§541, 612, 706 (2d ed. 1960); A. SCOTT,
supra note 425, §§227-31.
608. UPC §7-302, Comment. While beyond the scope of this article, it may be noted that
the 1974 Code imposes this same standard of care upon guardians of the property of minors
and incompetents. FPC §744.314(2) (1974).
609. Fla. Laws 1974, ch. 106.
610. FPC §737.302 (1974).
611. This follows the view of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §174 (1959). The courts
apparently have been reluctant to follow this view if the trustee is an individual, despite its
general acceptance in the law of agency. A. ScoTr, supra note 425, at 1411. When corporate
trustees are involved, however, the courts have often recognized that the institutions have, or
hold themselves out as having, special skills. E.g., In re Sullenger's Estate, 2 Ariz. App. 326,
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section 518.11 of the present law. To resolve these conflicts, section 518.11
should be amended to conform to the standard of care stated in section 737.302
of the 1974 Code.
The 1974 Code makes one further important change in the general duties
of the personal representative. After codifying existing case law6 12 that imposes a duty to proceed expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of
the estate6 13 and to "take all steps reasonably necessary for the management,
protection and preservation of the estate until distribution,"614 the Code adds:
".... and, except as otherwise specified by this law or order by the court, [to]
' 16
This is a
do so without adjudication, order, or direction of the court."6
heartening step toward reducing the paternalism that has permeated the
probate laws of this country 6 a and complements the increased powers given
the personal representative to act without court direction.617
While his general duties can be broadly stated, the specific duties of the
personal representative are legion and can vary considerably from estate to
estate. Only those that are affected by the passage of the 1974 Code are discussed in this article. The duty to advise the beneficiaries of the opening of
administration has already been discussed.618 Duties of management can best
be treated in connection with the powers given the personal representative.619
His duties in regard to the claims of creditors 620 and accountings to beneficiaries021 are also discussed in later sections.
Inventory and Appraisal
Because the inventory is the basis of the personal representative's accountability for the assets of the estate, 622 the law has refused to allow a testator to
dispense with its preparation and filing.623 Despite the importance of the
inventory, the need for accuracy, and the time and effort necessarily involved
in its preparation, the 1974 Code reduces the time allowed the personal rep4
resentative to file the inventory from 60 to 30 days after his appointment.62
408 P.2d 846 (1966); In re Estate of Busby, 288 I1. App. 500, 6 N.E.2d 451 (1937); Liberty
Title & Trust Co. v. Plews, 142 N.J. Eq. 493, 60 A.2d 630 (Ch. 1948); Villard v. Villard, 219
N.Y. 482, 114 N.E. 789 (1916).
612. See cases cited notes 595-597 supra.
613. FPC §733.603 (1974).
614. FPC §733.607 (1974).
615. FPC §733.603 (1974).
616. See text accompanying notes 12-34 supra (part 1).
617. See text accompanying notes 656-711 infra for a discussion of the powers of the
personal representative.
618. See text accompanying notes 142-152 supra.
619. See text accompanying notes 656-711 infra.
620. See text accompanying notes 745-793 infra.
621. See text accompanying notes 794-846 infra.
622. T. ATKINSON, supra note 352, at 630.
623. Parker v. Robertson, 205 Ala. 434, 88 So. 418 (1921); Potter v. McAlpine, 3 Dem.
108 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. 1885); T. ATKlNSON, supra note 352, at 630. The UPC allows the personal
representative to send a copy of the inventory to interested persons who request it, in lieu
of filing the original in court. UPC §3-706(2).
624. Compare FFC §733.604 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.03 (1973). The UPC would al-

low the personal representative 3 months. UPC §7-706.
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This may be justified, however, by the addition of a section permitting a
supplemental inventory to revise the original if additional property becomes
known to the personal representative, or if he learns that values stated in the
inventory are erroneous.625 In addition to filing the originals with the court,
the personal representative is also required to send copies of the inventory and
any supplemental inventory to interested persons who request them.626 The
2
contents of the inventory will generally be the same as under existing law.6 7
The appraisal of the estate, and particularly the traditional requirement
of court-appointed appraisers, has long been a favorite topic for critics of
probate. 628 For example, the Cleveland study noted:
Dissatisfaction with the appraisal system was expressed concerning the
procedure for appointing the appraiser; his qualifications; the belief
that appraising the estate was unnecessary or, if it had to be done, that
and the belief that
not more than one appraiser should have been used;
6 29
the estate was overcharged for the work performed.
The authors concluded:
It would appear that the complaints levied against appraisers were not
directly related to the expense involved.... What was being questioned0
was the whole appraisal system - its current structure and function.63
Most, if not all, of these objections appear to be met by the 1974 legislature's
adoption of a modified UPC: proposal that provides:
The personal representative may employ a qualified and disinterested
appraiser to assist him in ascertaining the fair market value at the date
of the decedent's death or any other date which may be appropriate of
any asset the value of which may be subject to reasonable doubt. Different persons may be employed to appraise different kinds of assets
included in the estate. 631
This is a marked change from existing law, for appraisers will not be appointed by the court, need not be employed if they are unneeded, and may be
employed by the personal representative only if they are "qualified" to appraise particular items.632

625. FPC §733.606 (1974).
626. Compare FPC §§733.604(2), .606 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.03 (1973). This requirement could add substantially to the cost of administration if creditors and other "interested persons" (see FPC §731.201(17) (1974)) should request copies.
627. Compare FPC §733.604 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.03 (1973). The current conflict
between PGR 5.250 and §733.03, concerning the inclusion of homestead in the inventory, will
not arise because FPC §733.604 contains no exception similar to that in §733.03.
628. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra (part I).
629. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATFs & I). SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INERITANCE 258 (1970).
630. Id. at 242.
631. FPC §733.605 (1974). See UPC §3-707.
632. Compare FPC §733.605 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.04 (1973).
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Duty To Take Possession of Assets
Currently, there is an unqualified requirement that the personal representa-

tive "shall take possession" of the decedent's personal property and "real
estate (except homestead)."63s This requirement is considerably relaxed by
the 1974 Code's adoption of a section from the UPC634 providing that any real
or tangible personal property "may be left with or surrendered to the person
presumptively entitled to it unless possession of the property by the personal
representative will be necessary for purposes of administration. 635 Foreseeing
that such persons may disagree with the personal representative as to when
possession is necessary for administration, the section continues:
The request by a personal representative for delivery of any property
possessed by a beneficiary is conclusive evidence that the possession of
the property by the personal representative is necessary for the purposes
of administration. 63
While eminently desirable in most situations, these provisions could cause
difficulty in the case of homestead property, because the new statute makes no
exception for homestead. 637 It is unlikely that the personal representative
would request possession of homestead property unless he is ill-disposed toward
the surviving spouse or doubtful concerning whether the property actually
qualifies as homestead. Clearly the personal representative should not be allowed to oust the surviving spouse of possession out of personal feelings.
Where the issue is whether the property is homestead, it would seem preferable
to allow the spouse to retain possession until the matter is resolved. Although
it might be possible for the spouse to defeat the request upon constitutional
grounds,0s to avoid litigation and possibly undesirable results, the new
statute should be amended to except homestead property from its provisions.
A similar amendment should be made to the following section of the

Code639 in order to rectify the same oversight made in its adaptation from
existing law. 640 Despite its separation from the right of possession statute, discussed in the preceding paragraph, this section continues to provide simply
that "all real and personal property of the decedent... shall be assets in the
hands of the personal representative" for the purposes of administration.64

633. FLA. STAT. §733.01(l) (1973).
634. UPC §3-709.

635. FPC §733.607 (1974).
636. Id.
637. No exception was needed in the UPC section because homestead was to be a dollar
amount rather than spedfic real property. See text accompanying note 226 supra (part 1).
638. See text accompanying notes 228-230 supra (part I).
639. FP0 §733.608 (1974).
640. FLA. STAT. §733.01(1) (1973). The phrase "all such property" in the last sentence
referred to personal property and "real estate (except homestead)" mentioned in the preceding sentences; the phrase was changed to: "All real and personal property" in the new
statute.
641. FPC §733.608 (1974); see FLA. STAT. §733.01(1) (1973).
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The personal representative's other duties involving the collection of
assets, such as the investigation of joint bank accounts, 642 the consideration of
possible liability of Totten trust accounts for debts of the decedent,64 3 the
collection of life insurance proceeds44 and other death benefits, 6 4 5 and the
prosecution of suits for wrongful death 64 6 are beyond the scope of this article

because they are not affected by the enactment of the 1974 Code. One Code
provision that does deserve mention, however, concerns the collection of a
debt owed the decedent by the person appointed personal representative.
Florida law currently provides:
The appointment of a debtor or of a creditor as personal representative
shall not, either in law or in equity, be construed to operate as a release
or extinguishment of the debt due to or by the decedent. This section
prevent a testator from releasing a debtor by
shall not be construed 6to
7
last will and testament.
Similar statutes are quite common in this country 48 and were designed to
negate the possible applicability of the rule of the English common law courts
that the appointment of a person named as executor, who is indebted to the
testator discharges the debt. 649 Because it was based entirely upon the testator's
presumed intent, this rule had no application to the appointment of a creditor
of the testator as executor, or to the appointment of a debtor as administrator
of an intestate estate or as an administrator c.t.a. of a testate estate.6 50 Therefore, the 1974 Code quite properly changes the provision to read:
642. See Note, Survivorship Rights in Joint Accounts, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 476 (1972). The
failure of the Commission to consider the adoption of article VI of the UPG dealing with
multiple-party accounts seems regrettable, but perhaps it was beyond the scope of its charge
because Fla. H.R. 997 did not include this article of the UPC. See Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 307.
643. See In re Reich's Estate, 146 Misc. 616, 262 N.Y.S. 623 (Sur. Ct. 1933). The issue has
not arisen in Florida, but it is covered by article VI of the UPC. See note 642 supra.

644. See

FLA. STAT.

§222.13 (1973).

645. FPC §733.808 (1974) is merely a reenactment of FLA. STAT. §736.172 (1973) with
editorial changes.
646. See FLA. STAT. §§768.20, .22 (1973).
647. FLA. STAT. §732.51 (1973).
648. T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 644. Other instances of sections designed to negate
common law rules are §§733.807, .309 of the 1974 Code. At common law, the executor of a
deceased executor continued to administer the estate of the first testator, T. ATKINSON, supra
note 353, at 611, and a creditor of the decedent could recover on the theory of executor
de son tort from anyone who intermeddled with the personal property of the decedent before
or after the appointment of a personal representative. Id. at 570-571. The UPC omits any
reference to these doctrines, but the omission may create problems in states such as Florida
where similar provisions appear in existing law (see FLA. STAT. §§732.52, .53 (1973)), because
such omission could give rise to contentions that these common law rules have been reinstated.
649. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 644. The common law courts seem to have
reasoned somewhat as follows: a person cannot sue himself, so by appointing the debtor as
his executor, the testator destroyed the ability to collect the debt; by this voluntary destruction of the remedy the testator must have intended the debt to be discharged. See P. WILLIAMS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 1123-27 (4th Am. ed. 1855).
650. See P. WILLIAMS, supra note 649, at 1123-27.
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The appointment of a debtor as executor shall not operate as a release
or extinguishment of the debt due to the decedent. This section shall
not prevent a testator from releasing a debtor by will.651
There remains, however, the question of how the debt can be collected if the
personal representative, whether executor or administrator, refuses to pay
voluntarily. If the issue arises7 prior to the final accounting of the personal
representative, an appropriate procedure for a creditor or beneficiary to pursue
would be to petition the court to appoint an administrator ad litem to sue on
behalf of the estate. 65 2 In the alternative, or in the case of a co-representative,
a petition to institute removal proceedings could be used.653 Either procedure
would entail undesirable expense and delay and neither would seem appropriate where the personal representative's failure to pay does not become
known until the time of his final accounting. A simpler method would be to

utilize a fiction of payment 654 and hold him accountable in his fiduciary
capacity. A disadvantage of the fiction becomes apparent when the personal
representative is insolvent throughout the administration and factually cannot
pay the debt; in such cases his bondsman may be held liable. If, however, the
Florida courts would agree that "[ilt cannot be held to be a breach of trust for
the executor not to do what is beyond his power and control to perform...
[and that] the extension of the legal fiction of payment... would often work
great injustice to the surety," 65 5 the adoption of this simple method would be
desirable.
POWERS OF THE PERSONAL REPREPENTATIVE

Having imposed a duty upon the personal representative to proceed with
administration without "adjudication, order or direction of the court," 656 it
was necessary for the 1974 Code to increase his powers materially. This has
651. FPC §733.306. The continuation of the phrase "or creditor" in the title seems dearly

inadvertent and a technical error that could be corrected by the Statutory Revision Department. See FLA. STAT. §16.44(6)(i) (1973).
652. See FPC §733.308 (1974).
653. See FPC §§733.504-507 (1974).
654. The fiction of payment was applied in somewhat different circumstances in Dacus v.
Blackwell, 90 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1956). It was first developed by the English courts of chancery
as a means of holding the executor-debtor accountable for his debt even though he could
not sue himself. Having rejected the common law courts' conclusion that the testator intended
to discharge the debt, see note 649 supra, the chancery courts reasoned as follows: although
unable to sue himself, he ought to pay the debt; because of the equitable maxim that equity
regards as done that which ought to be done, equity regards the personal repersentative as
having voluntarily paid the debt; therefore, he is accountable in his fiduciary capacity for the
amount of the debt just as he is for any other money he has collected as personal representative. The fiction has been so frequently applied by the courts of this country that it is
frequently referred to as the American rule. See In re Jones' Estate, 115 Cal. App. 664, 667, 2
P.2d 483, 484 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931), where it is noted that this rule places the debtor-executor
"in a position almost as excessively burdensome as formerly it had been advantageous."
655. Lyon v. Osgood, 58 Vt. 707, 710, 7 A. 5, 7-8 (1886). Contra, In re Jones' Estate, 115
Cal. App. 664,2 P.2d 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
656. FPC §733.603 (1974). See text accompanying notes 614-617 supra.
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been accomplished by section 733.612,357 which gives powers to the personal
representative that substantially parallel those of the trustee.658 There are some
important variations, however, both from the recommendations of the UPC
and the powers given the trustee by the 1974 Code.
The most obvious, and perhaps most important, difference is that the 1974
Code does not allow a personal representative the freedom to deal with real
property without court intervention. Indeed, several UPC provisions were revised to exclude real property from the scope of their operations;659 in their
place, a separate section was inserted, entitled "Personal representative's right
to sell real property."6 60 Subsection (1) of this statute is simply an edited
version of existing law concerning sales where no power is conferred by will. 661
Similarly, subsection (2) was apparently intended to continue the present law
that allows sales pursuant to a testamentary power to be accomplished without
court order.6

62

The new statute, 663 however, does not clearly address the title

difficulties engendered by In re Estate of Smith,6 which limited such sales to
those actually necessary for administration. 665 Any contribution to a contention
657. FPC §733.612 (1974). The section enumerates in 27 subsections the specific actions
that will be considered proper if performed reasonably for the benefit of interested persons,
unless "otherwise provided by the will or by order of court and subject to the priorities
stated in section 733.707." Id. The referenced section seems erroneous, for it refers to the
order of payment of expenses and claims. The similar UPC provision refers to the order of
abatement section, §733.805 of the 1974 Code. The priorities of abatement make sense in the
context of powers given the personal representative, whereas the priorities of the claims of
creditors seem to be irrelevant.
658. Compare FPC §733.612 (1974), with FPC §737.402 (1974). The language of the two
sections differs somewhat; the former is derived from UPC §3-715, while §737.402 is taken
from §3 of the Uniform Trustees Powers Act.
659. Compare UPC §§3-715(6), (9), [and] (23), with FPC §§733.612(5) (1974) ("excluding
land" added), (7) (option to "purchase" omitted), (20) ("real or" deleted from "real or
personal property").
660. FPC §733.613 (1974).
661. Compare FPC §733.613(1) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.23 (1973). Both statutes provide that a sale of realty by a personal representative of an intestate decedent, or of a
testator who did not grant a sufficient power of sale, does not pass title until approved by
the court.
662. Compare FPC §733.613(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§733.22, .225 (1973).
663. The new provision reads: "(2) When a decedent's will confers specific power to sell
or mortgage real property or a general power to sell any asset of the estate, the personal
representative may sell, mortgage or lease without authorization or confirmation of court, any
real property of the estate or any interest therein for cash, credit or for part cash and part
credit, and with or without security for unpaid balances." FPC §733.613(2) (1974).
664. 200 So. 2d 547 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
665. The court invalidated a sale by the personal representative pursuant to a seemingly
general power of sale given in the will, stating: "Where a power of sale is conferred by the
Will and it is necessary for purpose of administration that assets of the estate be liquidated,
the Executor may properly exercise his power to sell without resort to the Probate Court.
But where it is not necessary to make such liquidation in order to administer the estate, even
under a general power of sale, the Probate Court should sanction the sale." (emphasis in
original). Id. at 554.
After this decision, title examiners and insurers demanded a court determination of the
"necessity" of sales pursuant to a testamentary power. After several attempts to alleviate this
problem, the legislature enacted Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 9, codified as FLA. STAT. §733.225 (1973):
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that Smith continues viable seems most unfortunate and therefore the new
statute should be amended to include a statement that such a sale of real property need not be justified by any necessity. 668
When transactions in personal property are considered, it would seem that
the broad powers given the personal representative in this area would eliminate
any questions concerning necessity. It is important to keep in mind, however,
that a subsequent section of the 1974 Code667 adopts the language of the UPG
that establishes a "preference for distribution in kind."668 Thus, a personal
representative is directed "to make distribution in kind whenever feasible and
to convert assets to cash only where there is a special reason for doing so,"669
or where "a contrary intention is indicated by the will." 670 Therefore, despite

the broad grant of statutory powers, the draftsman should realize the importance of a well-drafted and comprehensive will clause concerning the power
to sell or otherwise dispose of personal property, both to offset the statutory
preference for distribution in kind and to avoid litigation similar to that in
67
Smith. '

Because section 733.612 adopted the great majority of the powers recommended by UPC section 3-715, a convincing argument can be made that any
omitted powers were specifically rejected by the legislature and, therefore, that
the personal representative does not have such powers. One such omission is
the power to satisfy written charitable pledges of the decedent if, in the judgment of the personal representative, the decedent would have wanted the
pledges completed.72 The power to dedicate land to public use 673 was also

"(1) No court order is required to authorize or confirm a sale made pursuant to a general
power of sale contained in a will, and such a sale need not be justified by any necessity.
(2) Conveyances or transfers of property heretofore made pursuant to a general power of
sale contained in a will may not be invalidated as not being justified by necessity." Thereafter, at least some title examiners accepted titles involving sales under testamentary powers
without a court determination. (See THE FUND CONCERT, Sept. 1973, at 47.)
666. The position of the authors concerning amendment of §733.613(2) may be summarized as follows: Section 733.613(2) refers to sales made pursuant to a general power. Smith
limits sales under a general power to those that are "necessary." The key clause in §733.225,
which nullifies Smith, is "and such sale need not be justified by any necessity." Without a
similar provision in §733.613(2), a court antagonistic to sales without court approval could
apply the Smith reasoning to the new statute. (The Smith court was clearly antagonistic to
such sales and there are undoubtedly other judges who feel the same way.) Legislative support
for this argument can be found in §733.810, which shows a marked preference for distribution in kind and thus an implicit antagonism to unnecessary sales. The mere threat of Smith's
revival could cloud titles again. Therefore, a sentence should be added to §733.613(2) to the
effect that such a sale need not be justified by any necessity.
667. FPC §733.810 (1974). For further discussion of this section and criticism that it
seems inordinately preoccupied with distribution in kind, see text accompanying notes 823829 infra.

668.
669.
670.
671.
672.
673.

UPC §3-906, Comment.
Id.
FPC §733.810 (1974); UPC §3-906.
See text accompanying notes 663-666 supra.
UPC §3-715(4).
UPC §3-715(8).
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omitted. Both powers could be useful in post-mortem estate planning, 674 but
they involve giving away property that would otherwise be received by the
beneficiaries. It seems unlikely, therefore, that the personal representative
would exercise such powers, even if given, without the full concurrence of the
beneficiaries.
An omission of greater significance appears in the section specifically
authorizing the personal representative to employ persons to assist him. 75
The 1974 Code deletes the following language from the similar UPC provision:
[Personal representatives may properly] act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; and instead of acting personally, employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, whether or not discretionary. 676
The omitted language would eliminate the need for drawing distinctions between "ministerial" powers that can be delegated and "discretionary" ones
that cannot, 677 and would even appear to reject the more functional, though
vague, test that a fiduciary may delegate "acts which he cannot reasonably be
required personally to perform."6 78 This language goes far beyond existing
law,679 and because the problem of proper or improper delegation is a sensitive

one in fiduciary law, involving a multitude of factual variations and policy
considerations,6s0 the decision to omit the UPC language could be accepted as
a proper value judgment. This explanation is negated, however, by the fact
that the same language is included in the powers given trustees by the 1974
Code.681 The law has not previously distinguished between personal representatives and trustees in cases involving proper delegation, 68 2 nor does there seem
to be any proper basis for such a distinction. Therefore, the two sections
should be harmonized, preferably by eliminating the same language from the
trustees' powers.
Another discrepancy between the powers of a personal representative and
those of a trustee occurs because section 733.612 omits two provisions of the
674. The transfers in either instance would qualify for the charitable deduction provided
by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §2055. If made to a charitable remainder trust, they would reduce
the federal estate tax and thereby increase the aftertax property available to earn income for
the income beneficiary. Especially in the case of older couples, such provisions are often used
in planning the estate; in a post-mortem situation, they would provide the same benefits.

675. FPC §733.612(19) (1974).
676. UPC §3-715(21).
677.

Currently, such distinctions probably are required under the rule established by

Thomas v. Carlton, 106 Fla. 648, 143 So. 780 (1932).
678. 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 425, §171, at 1388. See also RFSrATEIENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§171.
679. See Laramore v. Laramore, 64 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1953); Thomas v. Carlton, 106 Fla.
648, 143 So. 780 (1932); In re Estate of Rosenthal, 189 So. 2d 507 (3d D.C.A. Fla., 1966), cert.

denied, 196 So. 2d 923 (1967).
680. For detailed discussions of these factors, see G.
A. SCOTT,supra note 425, §§171-171.4.
681. FPG §737.402(2)(y) (1974).
682. See cases cited note 679 supra.
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UPC that would allow the personal representative to incorporate a decedent's
business and, when so incorporated, to continue the business. 683 While the 1974
Code does allow the personal representative to continue the business for four
months without court order, 68 4 only the trustee is permitted to incorporate and
continue the business without court approval. 685 Because a trustee would
rarely receive an unincorporated business as a trust asset except from a
decedent's estate, this power is virtually meaningless unless the personal representative is allowed to continue the business throughout the administration.
If this is to be allowed, then it would seem advantageous to allow incorporation as promptly as possible in order to limit the liability of beneficiaries of
the estate, as well as that of the personal representative, for acts involved in
continuation of the business. The proposed UPC provisions are not entirely
satisfactory, however, because they can be construed to give the personal representative the sole discretion to incorporate. 68 6 Only after incorporation are
the probable distributees of the business to be consulted. 687 It would seem
desirable, therefore, to add to the 1974 Code provisions reading substantially
as follows:
(22) ....
(c) Throughout the period of administration if the business is incorporated by the personal representative.
(23) Incorporate any business or venture in which the decedent was engaged
at the time of his death if none of the probable distributees of the business who are competent adults objects to its incorporation and retention in the estate.
One other power given the personal representative merits mention because
of recent developments in the transferability of stock certificates and other
683. Compare UPC §§3-715(24), (25), with FPC §733.612(22) (1974) [and]
§733.08 (1973). Had the UPC been followed the statute would have read:

FLA. STAT.

"(22) Continue any unincorporated business or venture in which the decedent was engaged at the time of his death;
"(a) In the same business form for a period of not more than four months from the
date of his appointment if continuation is a reasonable means of preserving the value of
the business including good will;
"(b) In the same business form for any additional period of time that may be approved
by order of court; or
"(c) Throughout the period of administration if the business is incorporated by the
personal representative and if none of the probable distributees of the business who are
competent adults object to its incorporation and retention in the estate;
"(23) Incorporate any business or venture in which the decedent was engaged at the
time of his death .... The 1974 Code omits § §22(c), 23.
684. FPC §733.612(22)(a) (1974).
685. Compare FPC §737.402(2)(d) (1974), with FPC §733.612(22)(b) (1974). Neither the
UPC nor the 1974 Code contains any specific provision regarding partnership property similar
to FLA. STAT. §733.37 (1973), although both require the inclusion of such property in the
inventory. The reasons for this omission are stated in UPC §3-709, Comment.
686. See note 683 supra.
687. It is recognized that the UPC provisions probably were intended to be read together,
but there seems no reason to resort to litigation to decide the matter.
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securities registered in the name of a fiduciary. The 1974 Code continues
existing law that allows personal representatives 88 and trustees68 9 to hold
estate securities in their individual names or in the name of a nominee. In the
past this power was needed in order to allow a prompt sale of the security. 690
Although the rules of both the New York and American Stock Exchanges were
amended in 1971 to accepi securities registered in the name of a fiduciary as
"good delivery,"6 91 it was not until July 1, 1974, that a similar rule was
adopted for "over-the-counter" transactions. 92 These changes apply only to
"domestic individual" fiduciaries and do not change the need for nominee
registration by corporate fiduciaries. 693 It is when individual fiduciaries are involved, however, that the relaxation of the "earmarking" rule694 is most likely
to be detrimental to the estate; so detrimental that New York law for many
years declared nominee registration a misdemeanor.695 Even today, New York
allows individual fiduciaries to use only bank or trust company nominees, with
the added direction that "[s]uch bank shall not redeliver such securities to the
individual fiduciary ... without first registering the securities in the name of
the individual fiduciary, as such." 6 96 While no reported case has been found in
Florida indicating abuse of nominee registration by individual fiduciaries, the
potential for such abuse does exist. Because nominee registration is no longer
needed to allow prompt sale of the securities,697 the 1974 Code should be
amended to allow such registration only in the case of corporate fiduciaries.
688. Compare FPC §733.612(12) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.361 (1973).
689. Compare FPC *737.402(2)(g) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §691.03(13) (1973).
690. See Fleming, Simplification of Stock Exchange "Good Delivery" Rules on Regular
Transfers, 6 REaL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 137, 138 (1971). The requirement originally grew out
of "an unfortunate statement of Chief Justice Taney in Lowery v. Commercial Bank ... that
a corporation is a trustee for its shareholders and, wills fare] public records, [requiring] notice
of them in corporate stock transactions ....
" Id. at 137. Thus, "the rule developed that
corporations were liable for participation in breaches of trust if they registered transfers of
their stock without investigating as to the extent of the authority of the fiduciary, if such an
investigation would have disclosed a breach of trust." Id. Although all fifty states enacted
legislation to alter this rule except where the security was listed in the name of another,
such as the decedent, a broker, or a transfer agent, they "failed to differentiate between
securities registered in the name of the fiduciary which may be transferred without documentation and securities registered in the name of another which require papers to be attached ....
As a result [of this confusion], rules were adopted by the several stock exchanges
and over-the-counter dealers . . . to the effect that a fiduciary security, even though it had
all necessary papers attached, would not be regarded as 'good delivery.'" Id. at 138.
691. Special Committee on Simplification of Security Transfers to and by Fiduciaries,
Developments in Simplification of Fiduciary Securities, 9 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 611
(1974). See note 690 supra.
692. Id. at 612-13.
693. Id. at 614-15.
694. "Earmarking" refers to the trustee's duty to attach the trust label to all trust property. For a discussion of the development and reasons for the rule, see G. BOGERT, supra note
607, §596.
695. See Matter of Simon, 61 Misc. 2d 550, 306 N.Y.S. 232 (Sur. Ct. 1969) for a description of the development of New York law.
696. N.Y. EsT., POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 11-1.6 (McKinney 1969).
697. See text accompanying notes 690-693 supra.
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Another recent development in the law relating to the transfer of securities
may make the nominee provisions of the 1974 Code inadequate for both individual and corporate fiduciaries. The Uniform Commercial Code698 codifies
the "clearing corporation" 699 device originated by the New York Stock Exchange to cut down on paperwork and the risk of loss on delivery of securities. 700 The nominee registration provisions of the 1974 Code 701 are probably
not broad enough to allow fiduciaries to surrender possession of securities to
either a brokerage house 702 or directly to a clearing corporation or custodian
bank. Therefore, consideration should be given to following the lead of several
other states703 and adding sections to the 1974 Code to permit personal representatives and trustees to utilize the "clearing corporation."
698. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §8-320, adopted as FLA. STAT. §678.320 (1973). The Official Comment to the UCC states the purpose as follows: "Consistent with the underlying
purposes and policies of this Act 'to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties'- subsection (2)(b) of Section 1-102 -this
Section expressly authorizes a newly developing and commercially useful method of transferring or pledging securities on the organized securities markets, particularly among brokers
and banks but not necessarily so limited."
699. FLA. STAT. §§678.102(3), (4) (1973) reads: "(3) A 'clearing corporation' is a corporation all of the capital stock of which is held by or for a national securities exchange or
association registered under a statute of the United States such as the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. (4) A 'custodian bank' is any bank or trust company which is supervised and
examined by state or federal authority having supervision over banks and which is acting as
custodian for a clearing corporation."
700. See the introductory statement to N.J. Laws 1973, ch. 359, quoted in note 703 infra.
701. FP0 §§733.612(12), 737.402(2)(q) (1974).
702. See Matter of Simons, 61 Misc. 2d 550, 306 N.Y.S. 232 (Sur. Ct. 1969).
703. The NEw YORK EST. Pow.Rs &TRusTs LAW reads:
"§11-1.9 Power of fiduciary or custodian to deposit securities in a central depository.
"(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any fiduciary . . .holding securities in
its fiduciary capacity, any bank, trust company or private banker holding securities as a
custodian or managing agent, and any bank, trust company or private banker holding securities as custodian for a fiduciary pursuant to section 11-1.1(b)(9), is authorized to deposit
or arrange for the deposit of such securities in a clearing corporation (as defined in article
eight of the Uniform Commercial Code). When such securities are so deposited, certificates
representing securities of the same class of the same issuer may be merged and held in bulk
in the name of the nominee of such clearing corporation with any other such securities deposited in such clearing corporation by any person regardless of the ownership of such
securities, and certificates of small denomination may be merged into one or more certificates
of larger denomination. The records of such fiduciary and the records of such bank, trust
company or private banker acting as custodian, as managing agent or as custodian for a
fiduciary shall at all times show the name of the party for whose account the securities are
so deposited. Ownership of, and other interests in, such securities may be transferred by
bookkeeping entry on the books of such clearing corporation without physical delivery of
certificates representing such securities. A bank, trust company or private banker so depositing
securities pursuant to this section shall be subject to such rules and regulations as, in the
case of state chartered institutions, the state banking board and, in the case of national banking associations, the comptroller of the currency may from time to time issue. A bank, trust
company or private banker acting as custodian for a fiduciary shall, on demand by the
fiduciary, certify in writing to the fiduciary the securities so deposited by such bank, trust
company or private banker in such clearing corporation for the account of such fiduciary. A
fiduciary shall on demand by any party to a judicial proceeding for the settlement of such
fiduciary's account or on demand by the attorney for such party, certify in writing to such
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The remaining powers enumerated by section 733.612 are generally modifications of the UPC7°4 and, in several instances, are similar to existing law,
except that court approval is not required70 5 Most require no comment, for
party the securities deposited by such fiduciary in such clearing corporation for its account
as such fiduciary.
(b) This section shall apply to any fiduciary holding securities in its fiduciary capacity,
and to any bank, trust company or private banker holding securities as a custodian, managing agent or custodian for a fiduciary, acting on the effective date of this section or who
thereafter may act regardless of the date of the agreement, instrument or court order by
which it is appointed and regardless of whether or not such fiduciary, custodian, managing
agent or custodian for a fiduciary owns capital stock of such clearing corporation."
Other states with similar statutes are: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§6-189 et seq. (1974); CAL.
FIN. CODE §1563 (West Supp. 1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§45-100f(16)(a)-(b) (Supp. 1975);
GA. CODE ANN. §108-452 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, §§304.11-.12 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1974). See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §1096 (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 3A §§15-31,
32 (Supp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §53-159 (1975); ORE.REv. STAT. §709.170 (1973).
The introductory statement attached to N.J. LAws 1973, ch. 359, explains the purposes of
such statutes as follows:
"This bill would permit fiduciaries, including individuals and banks qualified to act as
fiduciaries, to deposit securities held by them in a clearing corporation, as defined in companion bills to this bill, Senate Bills Nos. 2082 and 2083.
"Although the technical aspects of a clearing corporation's operations are complex, the
essence of clearing corporation transfers is quite simple. Depositors maintain quantities of
eligible securities on deposit with a clearing corporation. Their accounts are credited with
the securities deposited and certificates representing these securities are then registered in the
name of the clearing corporation's nominee. The clearing corporation does not acquire any
beneficial interest in these shares.
"To make delivery, a selling depositor instructs the clearing corporation to debit its account in the amount of the securities sold and to credit the buying depositor's account at
the clearing corporation in the same amount. Title to the securities is transferred by computerized bookkeeping entry while the certificates themselves remain immobilized. At the end
of each day, the clearing corporation computes the amounts owed by or owing to each depositor for the day's transactions and receives and issues checks from and to such depositors
in settlement of the transactions.
"Use of a clearing corporation depository eliminates a vast amount of physical handling
and consequent opportunity for error, loss and theft. A brokerage firm executing a sale not
handled by a clearing corporation must obtain a relevant certificate, ensure that it is signed,
checked, stamped, counted and otherwise processed, and then make physical delivery. The
buying brokerage firm, similarly. must receive the certificate, examine it, log it in, check it,
stamp it and otherwise process it- a reciprocal sequence of time-consuming steps.
"Studies indicate that if this proposed legislation is enacted, a system of regional depositories, with banks and brokers throughout the county participating, is expected to reduce
such stock certificate movements by about 75%.
"This bill has been patterned after a law presently in force in New York."
704. E.g., FPC §§733.612(l), (6), (9), (13) (1974), which give the personal representative
the power to retain assets owned by the decedent pending distribution, to make repairs or
alterations in buildings, to abandon property that is of no value to the estate, and to insure
the assets against loss and himself against third party liability.
705. Compare, e.g., FPC §§733.612(2), (8), (14) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§733.32, .38, .39
(1973). Although subsection (2) concerns performance of the decedent's contracts, the Comment to the UPC makes it clear that the provision "is not intended to affect the right to
performance or to damages of any person who contracted with the decedent. To do so would
constitute an unreasonable interference with private rights. The intention of the subsection
is simply to give a personal representative who is obligated to carry out a decedent's contracts
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they are generally self-explanatory. There are two additions, however, that
merit brief mention. The first allows the personal representative to waive the
statute of limitations concerning assessment and collection of federal taxes, 70 6
an action that is often necessary in settlement proceedings. The other permits
partial distribution of any part of the estate that is not needed for claims, expenses, et cetera. 707 Its inclusion in the 1974 Code should reduce the need to
utilize non-probate assets to provide sufficient income for the decedent's family
during administration.
In addition to the specific powers granted by section 733.612, the 1974 Code
contains several other provisions governing the powers of the personal representative. As noted earlier,71 section 733.608 provides that all of the
decedent's real and personal property within Florida are assets in the hands
of the personal representative for purposes of administration. It is interesting
to note, however, that although the section is entitled "General Power of The
Personal Representative," it does not grant the type of general power envisioned by the UPC:
Until termination of his appointment a personal representative has the
same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute
owner would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and
others interested in the estate. This
power may be exercised without
709
notice, hearing, or order of court.
The reason for the omission seems clear; as noted earlier, 710 the draftsmen of
the 1974 Code were unwilling to give the personal representative the power
to deal with real property without court supervision, or to grant several of the
other powers provided by the UPC. Nevertheless, the provision would be very
beneficial in clarifying the personal representative's powers to engage in transactions that are not enumerated in section 733.612. Therefore, the section
should be added to the 1974 Code, changing it, if necessary, to make it subject
to the limitations of section 733.613.711
TRaNSACrIONS wrrH THmD PARTEs
Regardless of how broad the statutory powers of a personal representative
the same alternatives in regard to the contractual duties which the decedent had prior to his

death." UPC §8-715, Comment.
706. FPC §733.612(25) (1974).
707. FPC §733.612(26) (1974). In this situation, under existing law the beneficiaries must
file a petition with the court asking for a partial distribution. FLA. STAT. §734.03(1) (1973).
708. See text accompanying notes 640-641 supra.

709. UPC §-711. Thus, the UPC intended that "[t]he personal representative be given
the broadest possible 'power over title.'" UPC §-711, Comment.
710. See text accompanying notes 659-666, 672-674 supra.
711. Without such a general provision, transactions not specifically enumerated in §733.612
would probably be forbidden under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius. On the
other hand, if the provision were adopted, it is unlikely that it would require a specific
clause applying the limitations of §733.613, for the same result should be reached by application of the principle ejusdem generis. Of course, a specific limitation would avoid the
question entirely.
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may be, a de facto limitation upon them is the willingness of third parties to
accept a title from a personal representative or otherwise deal with him. To
state the matter more concretely, unless third parties are adequately protected
in their dealings with a personal representative, the administration of the
estate may be seriously hampered. Similarly, if third parties are reluctant to
deal with heirs or devisees after an estate has been distributed, a primary objective of administration is thwarted. This section discusses the extent to which
the 1974 Code affords the protection needed to assure a willingness by third
parties to deal freely and without hesitation with the personal representative
and the beneficiaries of the estate.
Protection of Third PartiesActing in Good Faith Transactionswith the
PersonalRepresentative
Traditionally, third parties dealing with a fiduciary have had the burden
712
If no
of ascertaining whether the fiduciary has the power to make the deal.

power exists, the fiduciary need not perform, and if he has performed, the
agreement can be set aside. Existing law, while generally adhering to the
traditional view, 713 protects good faith purchasers for value from a personal
representative when the probate of the will is revoked,7'1 or when a later will
is found after the termination of administration and the discharge of the
personal representative.7 15
The 1974 Code not only retains these protections,716 but also includes a
section that nullifies the traditional view by providing that "[a] person who in
good faith either assists a personal representative or deals with him for value
717
is protected as if the personal representative properly exercised his power."
Moreover, the section provides that "[t]he fact that a person knowingly deals
with the personal representative does not alone require the person to inquire
into the existence of a power or the propriety of its exercise."718 These provisions are taken from the UPC and are designed to protect the third party
712. 4 A. ScoTr, supra note 425, §497. For an application of the rule to a trustee of a
passive trust, see Baum v. Corn, 167 So. 2d 740 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964).
713. See Id.
714. FLA. STAT. §732.30 (1973).
715. FLA. STAT. §732.33 (1973).
716. FPC §§733.109(2), .902 (1974). For a discussion of the desirability of §733.902 in
other respects, see text accompanying notes 566-570 supra.
717. FPC §733.611 (1974). A similar provision regarding third persons dealing with
trustees is found in §737.405. The nonsensical second sentence of the latter statute is due to
a transposition of the phrase "a third person" that will undoubtedly be corrected. Section 7
of the Uniform Trustees Powers Act, from which the section is taken, reads: "§7. [Third
Persons Protected in Dealing with Trustee]- With respect to a third person dealing with a
trustee or assisting a trustee in ihe conduct of a transaction, the existence of trust powers
and their proper exercise by the trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person
is not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or is properly exercising the
power; and a third person, without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his
powers or improperly exercising them, is fully protected in dealing with the trustee possessed
and properly exercising the powers he purports to exercise. A third person is not bound to
assure the proper application of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee."
718. FPC §733.611 (1974).
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unless he has actual knowledge of the personal representative's lack of power. 71 9
If the courts give the new section its intended effect, the other provisions designed to protect good faith purchasers for value will be unnecessary.720 Nevertheless, until the new section has been applied by the courts and third persons
are assured that it does furnish full protection, 721 it seems desirable not only to
2
retain the specific provisions, but even add to them.72
There is one other addition to this provision that should be made. Quite
clearly, the 1974 Code does not intend this section to protect a purchaser of
real property from a personal representative without a court order, unless the
personal representative is acting pursuant to a specific or general testamentary
power of sale.7 23 To avoid a third party being misled by the broad language of
the new section, it should be amended to begin: "Except as provided in section
733.613(1) ....
Transactions with Beneficiaries. As noted earlier,724 the 1974 Code con-

templates distribution of assets in kind whenever possibleMr and also requires
the personal representative to deliver an instrument proving distribution to the
distributee. 26 A purchaser for value from a distributee "who has received ' 727
such an instrument is protected whether or not the distribution was proper.
The quoted phrase indicates that the purchaser would be protected whenever
the distributee had received such an instrument, even though the purchaser
had not relied upon it. In addition to this protection, the 1974 Code continues
existing law that an order directing the surrender of real property or delivery
of personal property by the personal representative is conclusive in favor of
bona fide purchasers for value from the beneficiary or distributee.728
Liability for Contracts and Torts

In the absence of statute, the personal representative or trustee is personally

719. UPC §3-714, Comment.
720. Only in the case of a sale or mortgage of real property by the personal representative of an intestate estate could it be argued that the statutory ban on such transactions, FPC
§733.613(1), discussed note 661 supra, constitutes actual knowledge of the personal representa-

tive's lack of power. If the purchase was from the personal representative of a testate estate,
the purchaser would be justified under this section in assuming that the personal representative was acting pursuant to a general testamentary power.
721. Because this section represents a marked change in Florida law, the courts may not
receive it with open arms. Recall the Smith court's interpretation of a seemingly clear
statutory provision, discussed in notes 662-666 supra and accompanying text.
722. Such an addition was made at the end of §733.613(1). Because of the doubt con-

cerning the effectiveness of §733.613(2) (see text accompanying notes 662-666 supra), it would
seem appropriate to add a provision to that subsection protecting the good faith purchaser

for value in that situation.
723. See text accompanying notes 662-666 supra.
724. See text accompanying notes 667-671 supra.
725. FPC §733.810 (1974).
726. FPC §733.811 (1974).

727. FPC §733.813 (1974).
728.

CompareFPC §733.802(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.03(2) (1973).
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liable on contracts signed in his fiduciary capacity 29 and for torts committed
by him or his agents during his administration.730 The third party must sue the
fiduciary in his individual capacity and cannot proceed in the first instance
32
against the estate or trust. 31 These rules have led to much circuity of action;
73
73 3
The UPC
and occasional injustice to the third party or to the fiduciary.
5
a
"quasi-corporaestate
or
trust,3
would remedy this by making the decedent's
tion,"736 against which the third party could proceed by suing the personal
representative or trustee in his fiduciary capacity.737 Whether the ultimate
liability rests with the estate or trust, or with the fiduciary individually, would
be determined in the accounting or other appropriate proceeding.38
The UPC procedure reflects the trend in statutory and case law in recent
years. 139 It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the desirability of
these developments7 40 other than to state the writers' approval of the UPC
position. The 1974 Code followed the UPC in the case of trustees (although
the final subparagraph was omitted),'7 4 1 but there is no similar provision concerning personal representatives. Perhaps this was inadvertent;742 there seems
no reason for distinguishing between personal representatives and trustees in
this regard. Therefore a similar provision for personal representatives should
743
be added to the 1974 Code.
CLAIMS OF CREDITORS

Many of the UPC provisions for probate and administration were designed
to allow certain variations from state to state.744 The draftsmen of the UPC,
however, made a special plea for uniformity of law regarding creditors'
claims.7 45 Despite this request, the 1974 Code substantially continues existing
729. T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 650-51; 3 A. Sco'r, supra note 425, §262.
730. T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 649-50; 3 A. Scorr, supra note 425, §264.
731. G. BOaERT, supra note 607, §712.
732. Thus, the third party must sue the fiduciary, who, if he acted within his powers,
could then receive reimbursement in an action against the beneficiaries. Id.
733. E.g., Auxier v. Aetna Ins. Co., 222 Ky. 243, 300 S.W. 617 (1928); Gates v. Avery, 112
Wis. 270, 87 N.W. 1091 (1901).
784. E.g., In re Gibbon's Estate, 132 Neb. 538, 272 N.W. 553 (1937); East River Say.
Bank v. 245 Broadway Corp., 170 Misc. 779, 10 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1939).
735. UPC §§3-808, 7-306.
736. UPC §3-808, Comment.
737. UPC §§3-808(c), 7-306(c).
738. UPC §§3-808(d), 7-306(d).
739. See G. BOGERT, supra note 607, §§712, 715, 716, 732; 3 A. ScoTr, supra note 425,
§§266-271A.3., for a description of these changes.
740. For discussion of desirability, see citations in note 739 supra, particularly 3 A. ScoTT,
supra note 425, §§267, 271A-A2.
741. Compare FPC §737.306, with UPC §7-306.
742. UPC §3-808 may have been overlooked because it is in the claims of creditors provisions that the 1974 Code rejects in favor of following existing statutory provisions.
743. See discussion in text accompanying notes 882-884 infra for a modification in the
section if it is to be adopted.
744. UPC art. 3, General Comment.
745. UPC art. 3, part 8, General Comment reads in part:
"The need for uniformity of law regarding creditors' claims against estates is especially
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law in this area,7 46 occasionally adopting UPC language to clarify or simplify
existing provisions.
Procedure
As noted earlier, the notice to creditors normally will be published as a part
of the notice of administration. 747 As at present, claims must be presented
within four months of the first publication to avoid the statutory bar to en-

forcement. 74s The claim must still be filed with the court, and a copy delivered
to the clerk, who must then "furnish" it to the personal representative.7 49 The

time for filing an objection to a properly filed claim, however, has been reduced from six to five months after first publication of notice- 00 and a copy of

the objection must be served within ten days after filing, rather than the
existing thirty days7 51 The 1974 Code also changes the time allowed the
claimant for bringing suit from "one calendar month" to "30 days" from the
02
date of service of the notice.
In addition to reducing these periods, the 1974 Code makes several other
procedural changes. First, the alternative of bringing suit, rather than filing a
claim, has been omitted.753 As a result, neither a suit nor the filing of a motion
to substitute the personal representative as defendant in a suit pending against
strong. Commercial and consumer credit depends upon efficient collection procedures. The
cost of credit is pushed up by the cost of credit life insurance which becomes a practical
necessity for lenders unwilling to bear the expense of understanding or using the cumbersome
and provincial collection procedures found in 50 codes of probate.
"The sections which follow facilitate collection of claims against decedents in several ways.
First, a simple written statement mailed to the personal representative is a sufficient 'claim.'
Allowance of claims is handled by the personal representative and is assumed if a claimant is
not advised of disallowance. Also, a personal repersentative may pay any just claims without
presentation and at any time, if he is willing to assume risks which will be minimal in many
cases .. .. "
746. Compare FPC §§733.701-.709 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§733.15-.22 (1973).
747. FPC §733.701 (1974). See text accompanying notes 513-524 supra for a discussion of
the notice of administration.
748. Compare FPC §733.702(l)(a) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.16(1) (1973). The fourmonth nonclaim period contains an exception that allows the personal representative to
"settle" any claim without necessity of filing, if the beneficiaries approve the "settlement."
FPC §733.702(l)(a) (1974). The use of the quoted words may be misleading, because they
connote a compromise. Section 733.708, however, prevents any compromise until after the
nonclaim period has expired. To avoid any misunderstanding, the words "settle" and "settlement" should be changed to their intended meanings, "pay" and "payment."
If no notice is published, claims are barred three years after the decedent's death. FPC
§§733.108, .702(1)(a) (1974). A claim that is filed will be barred if no further action is taken
for a period of three years after the date of filing. FPC §733.709 (1974).
749. Compare FPC §733.703 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.16(1) (1973). Because §733.703
also provides that "[t]he claim is presented when filed," the failure of the clerk to furnish
the copy to the personal representative would not seem to affect the validity of presentation.
750. Compare FP §733.705(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.18(2) (1973).
751. Id.
752. Compare FPC §733.705(3) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.18(2) (1973).
753. Compare FP0 §733.702(2) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.16(1)(a) (1973). The UPC

would permit this alternative, UPC §3-804.
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the decedent at the time of his death75 4 will be treated as the equivalent of
filing a claim. Moreover, several requirements have been added to the form of
the claim by the adoption of UPC language. 75 5 Failure to comply with these
new requirements, however, does not invalidate the presentation made, except
756
in the case of a failure to indicate the basis of the claim.
These statutory provisions for payment and objection to claims also include a new subsection, which provides that "[t]he court may determine all
questions concerning either liquidated claims or matters not requiring trial by
jury." 757 This ambiguous language has no counterpart in either the UPC or in
existing law; its possible meaning has already been discussed.7 58
Claims Not Required To Be Filed
Although it is phrased in the terminology of the UPC, the 1974 Code continues existing law that allows payment of certain liabilities even though no
claim has been filed, 59 Thus, proceedings to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or
7 60
other lien upon property of the estate are not subject to the nonclaim period.
Similarly excluded is any proceeding to establish liability of the decedent, or
the personal representative, that is covered by casualty insurance, but only to
7 61

the extent of such insurance.

The express exemptions7 62 from filing a claim for a legatee's, devisee's, or
heir's share of the estate, or for administration expenses, preferred funeral expenses, or family allowance were not continued in the 1974 Code. Presumably
such exemptions were felt to be unnecessary because they do not concern a
"claim or demand . . . that arose before the death of the decedent."7 63 Some

confusion could result, however, concerning a claim for funeral expenses, because the 1974 Code defines "claims" as "liabilities of the decedent . . .and

liabilities of the estate that arise at or after the death of the decedent, includ754.

See Kornblum v. Heflin, 183 So. 2d 843 (2d D.G.A. Fla.), cert. denied, 189 So. 2d

632 (1966). UPC §3-804(2) provides that "[n]o presentation of claim is required in regard to
matters claimed in proceedings against the decedent which were pending at the time of his
death."
755. Compare FPC §733.703 (1947), with UPC §3-804(1). As under existing law, the
claim must be in writing and contain the place of residence and post office address of the
claimant. FLA. STAT. §733.16(1) (1973). See also Fields v. Fields, 140 Fla. 269, 191 So. 512 (1939).
In addition, the new statute requires the claim to indicate its basis and, if not due, the date
when it will become due, or, if contingent or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty, or,
if secured, a description of the security.
756. FPC §733.703 (1974).
757. FPC §733.705(5) (1974).
758. See text accompanying notes 378-381 supra.
759. Compare FPC §733.702(3) (1974), with UPC §3-803(c) [and] FLA. STAT. §733.16(1)(b)
(1973).
760. FPC §733.702(3)(a) (1974).
761. FPC §733.702(3)(b) (1974). The phrase "or the personal representative" seems unnecessary because the 1974 Code did not adopt the UPC requirement that a claim arising
after death be filed within four months after it arises or after performance by the personal
representative is due. UPC §3-803(b).
762. FLA. STAT. §733.16(2) (1973).
763. FPC §733.702 (1974).
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ing funeral expenses."7 64 Especially when considered in conjunction with the
decision in Twomey v. Clausohm,765 it would be desirable either to amend the
definition of "claims," or to include an express exception for preferred funeral

expenses.
As a result of the Twomey decision, a subsection was
in 1971 that, unfortunately, is omitted from the new
allows any person who pays, or a personal representative
to pay, any funeral expenses or debt for which no claim

added to existing law
Code. The provision
who pays or proposes
has been filed, to file

a claim or statement concerning such payments.7 68 While ill-conceived in one
respect, 767 this subsection afforded additional flexibility in paying routine
claims against the estate, and, with appropriate revision, 768 should be reinstated
in the law.
Allowance and Payment of Claims

Under existing law, it is not entirely clear whether a failure to object to a
claim is equivalent to allowing it.769 This uncertainty is not clarified by the
1974 Code, which continues a provision that limits objections to five months
from the first publication of notice, 77 0 without placing a limit on the time this
can be extended by the court for good cause. 771 Moreover, the Code did not
adopt a UPC provision providing that "[f]ailure of the personal representative
to mail notice to a claimant of action on his claim for 60 days after the time
for original presentation of the claim has expired has the effect of a notice of

764. FPC §731.201(2) (1974).
765. 234 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 1970). In Twomey, the administratix was held not entitled to
credit for payment of funeral expenses where the claim was presented to her, but never filed
in the probate court.
766. FLA. STAT. §733.16(l)(e) (1973). The 1974 Code does continue a provision of existing
law that allows the personal representative to pay claims approved by the beneficiaries "without the necessity of the claim being filed by the creditor." FPC §733.702(I)(a) (1974). At
first glance, the provision seems superfluous, because the agreement of the beneficiaries would
prevent any surcharge of the personal representative. Nonetheless, its continuation will prevent claims paid in this manner from being denied deductibility on the federal estate tax
return. See Rev. Rul. 75-177, 1975-19 INT. RFv. BuLL.21.

767. The provision that if an objection is filed to the personal representative's statement, he "shall be deemed to have an interest adverse to the estate," seems unduly burdensome to the estate. FLA. STAT. §733.16(l)(e)(2) (1973) (requiring the appointment of an administrator ad litem). The objection could equally well be raised in connection with the
personal representative's accounting.
768. The sentence could be changed to read: "If the propriety of the personal representative's acts as herein contemplated is questioned, the matter shall be determined upon
the final accounting of the personal representative."
769. See Goggin v. Shanley, 81 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1955).
770. FPC §733.705(2) reads in part: "(2) On or before the expiration of five months from
the first publication of notice to creditors a personal representative or other interested person
may fie a written objection to any claim filed in the clerk's office." Currently, FLA. STAT.
§733.18(2) (1973) allows 6 months.
771. Compare FPC §733.705(3) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.18(2) (1973). In re Jeffries'
Estate, 136 Fla. 410, 181 So. 833 (1938), established the rule that the court may grant extensions after the time limit has expired.
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allowance." ' 77 2 This would be a desirable addition to the 1974 Code, for, without it, the uncertainty continues.
From the point of view of the creditor, this uncertainty may be critical. The
1974 Code omitted an existing section entitled "Suspension of statute of limitations in favor of claimants, ' 77 but continued a companion provision that
suspends the statute of limitations in favor of the personal representative.74
Although the omitted provision is not a model of clarity, it probably was intended that the nonclaim procedure supersede the general statute of limitations
when a claim is filed.77T It has been so construed, 776 but unfortunately a later
case reached the opposite result, without mentioning the statute or the earlier
case.7 77 If the omission of the section is intended to indicate acceptance of the
later decision, it seems most unfair to the creditor. He no longer can bring
7
suit as an alternative to filing his claim.~
7 Having filed the claim, he should
be entitled to expect "like proceedings had as in other claims against the
estate"' 771 and not be required to devise some method of expediting or avoiding
the nonclaim procedure in order to establish his rights prior to the running of
the regular statute of limitations.7s0 Therefore, a provision appropriately
worded to effect this objective should be included in the 1974 Code.78'

772. UPC §3-806(a).
773. FLA. STAT. §734.28 (1973). The provision reads: "If a person against whom a cause
of action exists dies before the expiration of the time limited for commencement thereof and
the cause of action survives, claim shall be filed thereon and like proceedings had as in the
case of other claims against the estate."
774. Compare FPC §733.104 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.27 (1973).
775. See note 773 supra. The intent could be clarified by adding to the provision a
sentence reading: "The filing of the claim shall suspend the running of any other statute of
limitations relating to the cause of action."
776. Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. Borbiro, 201 So. 2d 571 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). In
that case, the debtor died and the creditor filed his claim prior to the expiration of the
general statute of limitations. Thereafter, the personal representative filed an objection to the
claim and claimant brought suit. The court held that because the claimant had complied
with §734.28, that statute "governs these proceedings" and "the one-year Statute of Limitations [relating to wage claims] would not bar her claim ..
" Id. at 573. See also Toney v.
Adair, 120 So. 2d 622 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960), holding that a failure to file a claim for
wrongful death within the nonclaim period bars the claim even though suit is brought
within the two years statute of limitations for wrongful death suits.
777. Azaroglu v. Jordan, 270 So. 2d 422 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), cert. denied, 275 So. 2d
12 (1973). In that case the claim was filed, then the special statute of limitations on wage
claims expired. Subsequently, an objection was filed and suit was brought pursuant to the
nonclaim procedure. The court held the suit was barred. Relying upon a federal circuit
court of appeals decision, which (lid not involve the nonclaim statute, the court said: "[W]hen
two statutes of limitations are applicable to a particular situation, both statutes limit the
time in which an action may be brought and the dilatory litigant is caught by whichever
runs first." Id. at 424.
778. See text accompanying notes 753-754 supra.

779.

FLA. STAT.

§734.28 (1973).

780. UPC §3-802 provides in part: "For purposes of any statute of limitations, the proper
presentation of a claim . . . is equivalent to commencement of a proceeding on the claim."
781. See notes 775, 780 supra.
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Order of Payment of Claims

The 1974 Code considerably reduces the number of claims that are given
preferred status. 78 2 Costs and expenses of administration, including compensadon of the personal representative and attorneys' fees, continue to be given
first priority. Class two claims for reasonable funeral expenses now expressly
include interment expenses, and the amount preferred is raised from $1,000 to
$1,500. Preferred expenses of the last illness are limited to "[r]easonable and
necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last sixty (60) days of the last
illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending him," 78 3
thus apparently eliminating debts for board and lodging. The family allowance
continues to be given class four preference, contrary to the recommendation
of the UPC that it be "exempt from and [have] priority over all claims .... ,,84
A new provision grants fifth priority to debts incurred in continuing a decedent's business, but only to the extent of the assets of the business. 78 5 All
other debts are given equal priority, thus eliminating present preferences for
wage claims, judgments obtained against the decedent during his lifetime, and
liens of various types.78 6 The supplementary family allowance and allowance
for dependent minor children 7 7 are also omitted.
By giving expenses of the last illness preference over the family allowance,
and by omitting any preference for claims of the federal government, such as
income taxes, the section remains a potential source of litigation. The federal
preference statute78 8 defers federal claims to expenses of administration,789
funeral expenses, 790 and family allowance,791 but gives them preference over
expenses of the last illness.79 2 The Joint Editorial Board of the UPC has
recognized this problem and recommends a reordering of the UPC to give third
preference to federal debts and taxes.7 93 Section 733.707 of the 1974 Code
should similarly be changed in order to avoid further depletion of an insolvent
estate by litigation on this point.
AccournG AND DISTRUBUTION

Although the 1974 Code adopts the UPC headings for Parts Eight and Nine
of Chapter 733 - "Special Provisions for Distribution" and "Closing Estates" the more familiar title is used here because the Code continues to require a
court accounting, 794 instead of following the UPC design for informal distribu782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.

Compare FPC §733.707 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §733.20 (1973).

FPC §733.707(1)(c) (1974).
UPC §2-403.
FPC §733.707(1)(e) (1974).
FLA. STAT. §§733.20(e)-(g) (1973).
Id. at (i), (j).
31 U.S.C. §191.
United States v. Weisburn, 48 F. Supp. 393 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
Id.; In re Carl's Estate, 43 Ohio Op. 52, 94 N.E.2d 239 (P. Ct. 1950).
In re Carl's Estate, 43 Ohio Op. 52, 94 N.E.2d 239 (P. Ct. 1950).
Id.
See UPC 331 (Official Text, 1974 ed.).
FPC §733.901 (1974).
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tion and the closing of estates without court intervention. 95 Thus, section
733.901 follows existing law to a certain extent, by providing that, when a
personal representative has completed administration except for distribution,
lie shall file a final accounting and a petition for discharge.7 96 The remainder
of the section, however, is new to Florida law. The petition is required to set
forth the proposed plan of distribution and a copy of the petition must be
given to all interested parties. 797 If no objection is filed within 30 days, 798 the
personal representative may distribute according to the plan of distribution
and, upon receipt of evidence of proper distribution, the court will enter an
order of discharge. 799 Presumably the discharge is final immediately, since the
order also releases any surety and there is no provision, as in existing law,
permitting a suit after the date of the discharge s° This procedure is a desirable streamlining of existing law, for it does not require the court to examine the accounting and eliminates a separate order of distribution. 801
Unfortunately, the other provisions concerning distribution 02 are such a
mixture of existing law and the UPC that, in certain instances, they do not
seem properly synthesized. The confusion is most evident in the provisions
governing the adjustment of the beneficiaries' rights in making distribution exoneration, 8 3 the order in which assets are appropriated, 804 advancements,1 5
abatement and contribution, 80r retainer,8 07 and the apportionment of estate
taxes 80 8 - which are, for the most part, merely continuations of existing law.
Perhaps the most glaring example of the uncoordinated union of the UPC
and existing law is section 733.804. Adopted from another area of the UPC,s o9
the section substantially duplicates section 733.803, concerning the right to

795. UPC §3-1003.
796. Compare FPC §733.901(1) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.22 (1973).
797. This appears to satisfy the objection that by simply requiring publication of the
petition, FLA. STAT. §734.22(1) (1973), may not meet the requirements of due process. See
discussion in text accompanying notes 546-550 supra.
798. The 30-day period may be waived upon the written consent of all interested persons.
FPC §733.901(4) (1974).
799. If an objection is filed, the court determines the plan of distribution and proceeds
as in the case of no objection, upon receipt of evidence of proper distribution. FPC §733.901(3)
(1974).
800. FLA. STAT. §734.23 (1973) permits the bringing of suit within one year of discharge.
801. Currently, even if no objection is filed, the order of distribution may be entered
only "if it appears to the circuit judge that said applicant has faithfully administered the
estate." FLA. STAT. §734.22(1) (1973). After entry of the order, the personal representative
must furnish satisfactory evidence that the distribution has been made as ordered, before the
circuit judge will enter an order of discharge. FLA. STAT. §734.23 (1973).
802. FPC §§733.801-.817 (1974).
803. FPC §§733.803, .804 (1974).
804. FPC §733.805 (1974).
805. FPC §733.806 (1974). This section has already been discussed in text accompanying
notes 323-337 supra (part I).
806. FPC §733.807 (1974).
807. FPC §733.809 (1974).
808. FPC §733.817 (1974).
809. UPC §2-609.
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exoneration.8 10 Its only addition is an express statement that an intent to

exonerate is not shown by a general directive in the will to pay debts. If such
an express statement is thought desirable, it could be added as a separate
sentence at the end of section 733.803.
Sections 733.805 and 733.807 are further examples of the lack of coordination in the distribution provisions. Although they are both found in the current statutes, 11 it seems redundant and confusing to continue the "two sides
of the same coin" treatment of abatement. This repetition led to the unfortunate decision of In re Estate of George8 12 and could lead to other disparities, depending on which section is applied.81 3 The two sections could
easily be combined, and should be.814 If this is not done, at least the
parenthetical exception of section 788.805 - "(except as otherwise provided in
section 733.817 with respect to estate, inheritance and other death taxes)"should be inserted after the words "intent appears" of the second sentence of

section 733.807, to ensure that the George decision will not still be viable.
810.

CompareFPC §733.803 (1974), with FPC §733.804 (1974).
§§733.05, .06 (1973).
812. 200 So. 2d 256 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967). For a detailed discussion of this case, see
Riggs, FloridaEstate Tax Apportionment, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 719,725-27 (1973).
813. Section 733.807 does not mention property undisposed of by will, although §733.805
does. Similarly, there is no mention in §733.807 of funds needed to raise the share of a
pretermitted spouse or child. On the other hand, §733.805 does not cover the treatment of a
demonstrative legacy where the fund from which it is to be paid fails or is insufficient. It is
the authors' position that because the two sections need to be read together, they should be
combined.
814. By omitting the first two sentences of §733.807 and substituting the remainder of
the section for subsection (2) of §733.805 the combined statute would read:
811.

FLA. STAT.

(1) If a testator makes provision by his will or designates the funds or property to be
used for the payment of debts, estate and inheritance taxes, family allowance, exempt
property, charges and expenses of administration and devises, they shall be paid out of
the funds or from the property or proceeds as provided by the will so far as sufficient. If
no provision is made, nor any fund designated, or if it is insufficient, the property of the
estate shall be used for such purposes (except as otherwise provided in §733.817 with
respect to estate, inheritance and other death taxes) and to raise the shares of a pretermitted spouse and children in the following order:
(a) Property not disposed of by the will.
(b) Property devised to the residuary devisee or devisees.
(c) Property not specifically or demonstratively devised.
(d) Property specifically or demonstratively devised.
(2) Demonstrative devises shall be classed as general devises, upon the failure or insufficiency of fund or property out of which payment should be made to the extent of the
insufficiency. Devises to the decedent's surviving spouse given in satisfaction of or instead
of his statutory rights in the estate shall not abate until other devises of the same class
are exhausted. Devises given for a valuable consideration shall abate with other devises
of the same class only to the extent of the excess over the amount of value of the consideration until all others of the same class are exhausted. Except as herein provided,
devises shall abate equally and ratably and without preference or priority as between real
and personal property. When property that has been specifically devised or charged with
a devise is sold or taken by the personal repersentative, other devisees shall contribute
according to their respective interests to the devisee whose devise has been sold or taken,
and before distribution the court shall determine the amounts of the respective contributions, and they shall be paid or withheld before distribution is made....
....
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A new section dealing with the right of retainer has been adopted from the
UPC. 815 While the question does not seem to have been litigated in Florida,
the section represents standard law8s 6 and its codification could prevent future
litigation.
The provisions for apportionment of estate taxes are taken from present
law, 81" with several clarifying changes, and two other changes that seem of
considerable importance. Present law allows the order of apportionment to be
entered after notice of publication, but makes such apportionment only prima
facie correct in any proceedings to collect the tax that was apportioned to an
interest not within the control of the personal representative. 81 The 1974
Code requires formal notice s' 9 to all interested persons and omits any reference
to the apportionment being only prima facie correct. 820 The intent seems to be
to give notice in a form that will finalize the order of apportionment by binding all parties. This is a desirable change and will result in less delay than the
currently required publication for four consecutive weeks. Moreover, it will
eliminate the cost of publication and reduce future litigation to collect the tax
apportioned. The omission of the final sentence of the present subdivision
(5)821 also seems desirable; the sentence might encourage a personal representa-

tive not to take the prompt action needed to prevent an inter vivos transferee
from removing assets from the state that might be needed to satisfy his share
of the tax.

822

A second series of sections, all derived from the UPC, seems to indicate an
inordinate preoccupation with distribution in kind. For example, after estab823
lishing the general preference for distribution in kind noted previously,
section 733.810 has separate provisions concerning specifically devised and
exempt property, 824 the family allowance and general devises, 825 and the
residuary estate. 826 Specific devises and exempt property would be so distributed in any event and it is difficult to envision a situation in which the person
entitled to the family allowance would not demand cash, as he is allowed to
do.8 2 ' The general devisee may also defeat distribution in kind by demanding

cash; if he does not do so, the property used to satisfy his devise must be agreed

815.

Compare FPC §733.809 (1974), with UPC §3-903.

816. See T. ATKINSON, supra note 353, at 787.
817. Compare FPC §733.817 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.041 (1973).
818. FLA. STAT. §734.041(5) (1973). Presumably this was done to avoid constitutional
problems. See Riggs, supra note 812, at 735-37.
819. See the discussion of formal notice in the text accompanying notes 412-418 supra.
820. FPC §733.817(5) (1973).
821. FLA. STAT. §734.041(5) (1973) reads: "The fiduciary shall not be required to seek
collection of any portion of tax attributable to any interest not within his control until after
the entry of such order of apportionment."
822. See Riggs, supra note 812, at 736 8cn.123.
823. See text accompanying notes 667-670 supra.
824. FPC §733.810(1) (1974).
825. FPC §§733.810(2), (3) (1974).
826. FPC §733.810(4) (1974).
827. FPG §733.810(2)(a) (1974).
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upon by him, the personal representative, and the residuary devisees8 25 Even
in the case of the residuary estate, distribution in kind may not occur if there
is an objection or if it is impracticable to distribute undivided interests. 8 29 The
possible effect of the preference for distribution in kind upon the powers
given the personal representative has already been discussed.130 Because of the
combination of this effect with the redundancy noted here, it appears desirable
to omit section 783.810 from the 1974 Code.
The sections concerning distribution are better suited to the informal distributions and closing of estates envisioned by the UPC831 than to the 1974 Code's
formal procedures for accounting and distribution.8 s 2 Although they will be
inapplicable to the final distribution, these sections should be retained because
they will be of value when partial distributions are made in kind. For instance,
section 733.811 provides:
Proof that a distributee has received an instrument transferring assets in
kind or payment in distribution or possession of specific property from a
personal representative is conclusive evidence that the distributee has
succeeded to the interest of the estate in the distributed assets, as against
all persons interested in the estate, but the personal representative may
recover the assets or their value if the distribution was improper.
It is clear that the section can apply only to partial distributions, and not to
those made pursuant to final accounting and discharge. Similarly, the sections
concerning improper distribution 33 and protection of purchasers from distributees8 34 are not needed after final accounting and discharge, but will be of
value in partial distributions. It is unfortunate, however, that the UPC section8 35 clarifying the references to "instruments transferring assets ... or possession" was not included in the 1974 Code.
Section 733.814 allows partition proceedings to be used for the purpose of
distribution. This seems a valuable addition to Florida law, because it removes any doubt that partition may be had as a part of the administration of
an estate. 38 If made in connection with the final accounting proceeding, the
partition should save expense and delay to the parties entitled to the property.
828. FPC §733.810(2)(c) (1974) allows any residuary devisee to request that a particular

asset remain a part of the residue. It is not clear whether the personal representative is
obligated to comply with such request if he can do so.
829. FPC §733.810(4) (1974).
830. See text accompanying notes 667-670 supra.
831. See UPC §3-1003 and Comment.
832. See text accompanying notes 794-801 supra.
833. FPC §733.812 (1974).
834. FPC §733.813 (1974).
835. UPC §3-907 reads: "If distribution in kind is made, the personal representative shall
execute an instrument or deed of distribution assigning, transferring or releasing the assets
to the distributee as evidence of the distributee's title to the property."
836. See Leonard v. Brown, 134 So. 2d 872 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961): "There is no statutory
provision vesting the probate court with jurisdiction to partition the property of an estate
between the heirs or devisees, or authorizing the circuit court to partition such property
while it remains under the jurisdiction of the probate court incident to administration of
the estate." Id. at 874. See also Nedd v. Starry, 143 So. 2d 522 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1962).
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There is, however, an inconsistency between the formal notice required by
this section and the informal notice required for the final accounting. 837 The
section also poses the recurrent problem of whether the probate judge or another judge of the circuit court is to make the partition.8 3
The last distribution section adopted from the UPC provides that private
agreements among distributees are binding on the personal representative,
except as they affect his duties to creditors, taxing authorities, or other beneficiaries not parties to the agreement. 39 As the UPC draftsmen observe, this
section may be "only a restatement of the obvious" 8

40

but its purpose "is to

make it clear that the successors to an estate have residual control over the way
it is to be distributed."' It may well serve the added function of making the
court more willing to allow incorporation of the terms of the agreement into
the proposed plan of distribution, even though all interested persons are not
parties to the agreement.
The section dealing with the disposition of unclaimed funds held by the
personal representative makes two changes in the current statute. After receiving the funds from the personal representative, the clerk is required to hold
them for six months, rather than the present thirty days, before they are
deposited with the state treasurer.8 4 2 Once so deposited, however, the time allowed for the person entitled to the funds to claim them is reduced from
8
twenty to ten years.

43

One final point concerning distribution should be mentioned. It is no
longer necessary for a testamentary trustee to qualify before he can receive a
distribution from the personal representative. The provisions of current law
that require qualification, 4 and that impose penalties upon a personal representative who distributes to a trustee who has not qualified 45 have been
omitted from the 1974 Code. In the case of nonresident trustees, a provision is
added that "local qualification by a foreign trustee is not required in order for
8 46
the trustee to receive distribution from a local estate."
TiE

COST OF ADMINISTRATION

The principal expenses of administration in the average estate are attorney's fees and the comissions of the personal representative. Court costs,
costs of publication of notices, and even appraisers' fees add to this burden,
but they are of greater significance in small estates, where they can amount to
a substantial percentage of the estate. These expenses of administration form a
837. FPC §733.901(1)(c) requires that a copy of the petition be given to all interested
persons "in accordance with the provisions of section 731.301(2)'" - that is, informal notice.

838. See text accompanying notes 370-382 supra.
839. FPC §733.815 (1974).
840. UPC §3-912, Comment. Apparently, it is not obvious in Wisconsin, however. See
cases cited in Annot., 97 ALR 468 (1940).
841. UPC §3-912, Comment.
842. Compare FPC §733.816(1) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.221(1) (1973).
843. Compare FPC §733.816(3) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.221(3) (1973).
844. FLA. STAT. §§734.22(1), 737.02 (1973).
845. FLA. STAT. §737.21 (1973).
846. FPC §737.105 (1974).
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primary basis for criticism of present probate laws and are a chief motivation
for avoidance of probate.147 Some of the efforts of the draftsmen of the 1974
Code to reduce these costs have already been examined, 4 and others will be
discussed subsequently in connection with family administration and small
estates. 8 49 Court costs are not changed by the 1974 Code8s ° and therefore only

the provisions concerning compensation of the personal representative and attorney's fees are discussed here.
Compensation of the PersonalRepresentative
American law has long since rejected the English view concerning compensation of fiduciaries that is exemplified by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke's statement: "In general this court looks upon trusts as honorary, and a burden upon
the honor and conscience of the person entrusted, and not undertaken upon
mercenary views."8 51 The American view seems predicated upon the hypothesis
847. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text (part I).
848. Inclusion of the notice to creditors in the notice of administration is discussed in
the text accompanying notes 513-521 supra; the avoidance of unnecessary appraisers is noted
in the text accompanying notes 628-632 supra.
849. See text accompanying notes 953-969, 982-988 infra.
850. Effective October 1, 1972, uniform filing fees were adopted for probate matters. Fla.
Laws 1972, ch. 397, §1. When jurisdiction of probate matters was transferred to the circuit
courts on January 1, 1973, (see text accompanying notes 370-371 supra) the fee schedule for
probate matters was transferred to chapter 28 of the Florida Statutes as §28.2401. It now reads:
"(1) Except when otherwise provided, the fees to be charged for the following services
shall be:
(a) For the opening of any estate of one document or more, but not to include issuance of

$10.00
letters or orders of no administration
(b) For the filing of all documents in an administration unnecessary or no further ad$25.00
ministration required
(c) For filing of all documents in any estate having an inventory value not exceeding
$60.00
$60,000.00
$75.00
(d) For filing of all documents in all other estates
(2) The filing fees in the above-mentioned classifications include all documents filed in an
estate, except that all certified copies shall be a separate item and the following charges shall
be imposed for making and certifying copies of the record:
$1.50
(a) First page
$1.00
(b) Each additional page
(3) Recording shall be required for all petitions opening and closing an estate, and regarding real estate and all orders, letters, bonds, oaths, wills, proofs of wills, returns and
such other papers as the judge shall deem advisable to record, or that shall be required to be
recorded under the Florida probate law."
851. Ayliffe v. Murray, 26 Eng. Rep. 433 (1740) (footnotes omitted). A few years earlier,
another Lord Chancellor offered more pragmatic reasons for the English rule: "It is an
established rule that a trustee, executor, or administrator, shall have no allowance for his
care and trouble: the reason of which seems to be, for that on these pretences, if allowed,
the trust estate might be loaded, and rendered of little value. Besides, the great difficulty
there might be in settling and adjusting the quantum of such allowance, especially as one
man's time may be more valuable than that of another; and there can be no hardship in
this respect upon any trustee, who may chose whether he will accept the trust, or not"
Robinson v. Pett, 24 Eng. Rep. 1049 (1734). (footnotes omitted). The view is still applicable
in England, except that compensation provisions in wills and trust agreements are given
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that it benefits the beneficiaries of the estate or trust to have part of the property used in the payment of compensation because of the higher caliber of
service that will be obtained.8 5 2 There are undoubtedly some disinterested
persons who would serve well without compensation, but they are probably
rare. Thus, the legislatures in most states, including Florida, 53 have established methods for providing the personal representative with reasonable
compensation. The prevailing method in the past was to measure reasonable
compensation by a statutory percentage of the estate,8 54 but such a measure has
been subject to constant criticism as providing inadequate compensation in
small estates and overcompensation in large estates. 855
In response to this criticism, the 1974 Code adopts a modified UPC provision that eliminates the existing statutory percentage and simply provides
that the personal representative is "entitled to reasonable compensation. "' 6
This accords with existing law concerning compensation of the trustee, 5 7 as
well as the similar 1974 Code provision.858 Whether this somewhat dramatic
shift in the method of measuring compensation for the personal representative
will result in an equally dramatic change in the amount of his compensation is
problematical. It should be noted, however, that the existing case law concerning reasonable compensation for trustees 5 9 and the allowance of compensation for extraordinary services of the personal representative8 0 will have
relevance to all estates in the future.
Although the personal representative is equated with the trustee in determining the method of measuring his compensation, the 1974 Code refuses to
allow him the same freedom as the trustee in calculating and paying the
actual amount deemed reasonable. The trustee may determine his compensation and pay himself, subject only to a court review of the reasonableness of the
amount upon petition of an interested person.8 61 On the other hand, the 1974
Code provides:
No compensation shall be paid to the personal representative
unless prior to payment.. . all persons bearing the impact of the payeffect and the court will award compensation to corporate fiduciaries. See generally G. BOGERT,
supra note 607, §975; 3 A. Scor, supra note 425, §242.
852. For a collection of the American decisions and statutes, see 3 A. Sco-r, supra note
425, §242, at 2108-09 nn.3 &4.
853. FLA. STAT. §734.01 (1973).
854. See P-H EST. PLAN. 1114,601 for statutes governing compensation of personal representatives. Trustees' commissions are usually similarly based, either by statute or custom.
G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §975, at 55-69 (1962, Supp. 1974). See FLA. STAT. §784.01

(1973).
Compare Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the 70's,
PROBATE (1965).
856. Compare FPC §738.617(l) (1974), with UPC §8-719.
857. FLA. STAT. §787.22 (1973).
858. FPC §787.204 (1974).
859. E.g., West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 100 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1958); Osius
v. First Nat'l Bank, 74 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1954).
860. In re Lieber's Estate, 103 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 1958).
861. FPC §737.204 (1973).
855.

2 CONN. L. REV. 453, 454 (1970), with N. DACEY, How To AVOID
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ment have consented to the compensation in a signed writing filed in the
proceeding, or . . . the court has ordered the payment following informal notice... to [such] persons .... 12
While the statute is not explicit, the italicized phrases seem to require that the
consent must be to a definite amount - the amount to be paid. No similar
provision appears in the UPC section from which the first two subsections are
taken630 The inclusion of the restrictions in the 1974 Code suggests that the
draftsmen felt that abuses had occurred under present procedures and that the
affected beneficiaries had not been sufficiently aware of the amounts involved
before payment. If this is true, it would justify the additional restrictions; if
not, they seem undesirable since the greater freedom for the trustee is more in
accord with the other relaxations of court control over the personal representative.864
Under existing law, a personal representative may renounce any compensation provided in the will and thereby receive the statutory compensation.8 5
This is continued by the 1974 Code,8 66 but, by adopting the language of the
UPC,867 an undesirable change has been made in an already unsatisfactory provision. Provisions almost identical with those of existing law are found in the
laws of approximately twenty jurisdictions. 868 Their only justification appears
to be a legislative belief that beneficiaries fare better where the personal representative is allowed reasonable compensation 0 9 and a legislative determination to protect them against the misguided attempts of a testator to provide
otherwise. 70° If so, the UPC qualification- that "[ilf a will provision concerning a fee is framed as a condition on the nomination as personal representative,
it could not be renounced,"8 71 - is contrary to legislative policy and also undesirable because it places an undue premium on the expertise of the draftsman.872 Acceptance of this position could even encourage the type of strained
862. FPC §733.617(3) (1973) (emphasis added). Generally, the persons bearing the impact
of the payment will be the residuary devisees.
863.

UPC §3-719.

864. See text accompanying notes 657-658 supra.
865. FLA. STAT. §734.01(l)(c) (1973).
866. FPC §733.617(2) (1974) reads: "(2) If a will provides for compensation of the personal
representative and there is no contract with the decedent regarding compensation, he may
renounce the provisions before qualifying and be entitled to reasonable compensation. A
personal representative also may renounce his right to all or any part of the compensation.
A renunciation of the fee shall be filed with the court."
867. UPC §3-719.
868. See P-H EsT. PLAN. 1114,604 for statutes of each state concerning renunciation of the
compensation provided by will.

869. See text accompanying note 852 supra.
870. The alternative reason, that these provisions represent efforts of personal representatives to further their own financial interest, is no justification and, if accepted, should lead
to the elimination of such provisions from statutory law.
871. UPC §3-719, Comment. This statement seems to be an acceptance of the decision in
Butler University v. Danner, 114 Ind. App. 236, 50 N.E.2d 928 (1943). Cf. Suverkrup v.
Suverkrup, 106 Ind. App. 406, 18 N.E.2d 488 (1939). See also Matter of Roth, 291 N.Y. 1, 50

N.E.2d 281 (1943).
872. For example, a testamentary provision reading "I appoint X as my executor, and I
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construction placed on a similar statute by lower New York courts, to the effect
that if the will provides for no compensation, the personal representative cannot renounce.8 73 Reaching a contrary result, a California appellate court exhibited a far greater understanding of the legislative intention when it reasoned:
It is the plain and mandatory purpose of those sections that executors
should receive the statutory compensation therein provided unless the
will makes other provision for compensation, and even then the executor
is given the right, in spite of the desire of the testator as expressed in the
will, to renounce the compensation provided for by will, and claim the
statutory fees. Estate of Shaw, 85 Cal. App. 518, 260 P. 351. It cannot
be that the Legislature intended that, if the testator provided by will
that the executor should receive $1 as compensation for his services, he
could renounce the $1 and demand the statutory fees, but that, if the
will provided that he receive nothing for his services, he would not be
entitled to the statutory fees. To permit such a result would be to defeat
the clear legislative intent that under any circumstances an executor
should8 7 4be entitled to receive the statutory compensation if he elected to
do So.

To avoid these problems, the authors submit that the legislature should
either eliminate the provision entirely or amend it to prevent legal machinations by knowledgeable testators and draftsmen that thwart its obvious intent.17 5 If the latter choice is made, the phrase adopted from the UPC requir-

ing the renunciation to be filed "before qualifying,"876 should also be omitted.
Not only is it contrary to the usual interpretation, allowing renunciation
within a reasonable time after qualification,77 but in many instances, the personal representative's decision whether to accept the specified compensation
will depend on facts concerning the size of the estate and the complexities of
the administration that cannot be determined before qualification without substantially delaying the opening of the administration.

direct that he serve for $1,000" would allow X to renounce and receive reasonable compensa-

tion. See Suverkrup v. Suverkrup, 106 Ind. App. 406, 18 N.E.2d 488 (1939). On the other
hand, a provision reading, "I appoint X as my executor on the condition that he serve for
$1,000," would prevent X from renouncing and force him to choose between accepting the
limited compensation or refusing the appointment. See Butler University v. Danner, 114 Ind.
App. 236, 50 N.E.2d 928 (1943).

873. Secor v. Sentis, 5 Redf. Sur. 570 (N.Y. 1882); Matter of Flagg, 192 Misc. 397, 81 N.Y.S.
2d 514 (Sur. Ct., 1948).
874. In re Fritz' Estate, 130 Cal. App. 725, 729, 20 P.2d 361, 364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933)
(emphasis added).
875. Such an amendment could read: If a will provides that the personal representative
serve for specified compensation or for no compensation, whether such provision purports to
be a condition to his appointment or not, and there is no contract. ...
876. UPC §3-719.
877. Suverkrup v. Suverkrup, 106 Ill. App. 406, 18 N.E.2d 488 (1939); see Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 520, 551-53 (1968). See also N.Y. SUR. CT. PRO. Acr §2307(5) (1967); OHo REV. CODE
ANN. §2113.36 (Page 1970), both allowing the personal representative four months after
qualifying in which to renounce.
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Attorney's Fees
While the 1974 Code contains several sections dealing with attorney's fees,
it omits two sections of the present law that should have been retainedp78 l In
addition, several of the provisions that are included overlap and must be read
together for proper understanding.
The power of the personal representative to employ, without court order,
an attorney to assist him in the administration is merely a continuation of
existing law.8 79 Payment for these services, however, is now subject to the same
restrictions as is payment of his own fees, 8 0° presumably for the reasons previously discussed.8 81 These restrictions are consistent with the theory that the
contract with the attorney is a personal obligation of the personal representative and that he is only entitled to reimbursement from the estate for what
the court finds to be a reasonable fee. 8 2 There would be a marked effect on
this theory, however, if the legislature were to follow an earlier recommendation of the authors and adopt the UPC section that makes the estate a "quasicorporation" for the purpose of suits on contracts made by the personal representative.8 8 3 To avoid this problem, the "quasi-corporation" concept should
88 4
be modified to exclude attorney's fees from its scope.
In another example of the occasionally uncoordinated union of the UPC
and existing law,88 5 two sections of the 1974 Code seem to overlap where at878. See text accompanying notes 895-910 infra.
879. Compare FPC §733.612(19) (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§734.01(1), (3)-(4), (1973) [and]
In re Payne's Estate, 128 Fla. 151, 174 So. 430 (1937).
880. FPC §733.617 (1974). Thus, before payment is allowed in either case, the persons
"bearing the impact of the payment" must have consented in a signed writing or the court
inust have given informal notice to such persons before ordering payment.
881. See text accompanying notes 861-864 supra.
882. In re Payne's Estate, 128 Fla. 151, 174 So. 430 (1937); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 518, 522
(1967).
883. UPC §3-808 (discussed in text accompanying notes 729-744 supra).
884. The modification could be made by adding the italicized words so that the statute
would read:
(a) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a personal representative is not individually liable on a contract except a contract for attorney's fees properly entered into
in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he fails to
reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract.
(b) A personal representative is individually liable for obligations arising from ownership or control of the estate or for torts committed in the course of administration of the
estate only if he is personally at fault.
(c) Claims based on contracts except contracts for attorney's fees entered into by a
personal representative in his fiduciary capacity, on obligations arising from ownership or
control of the estate or on torts committed in the course of estate administration may be
asserted against the estate by proceeding against the personal representative in his
fiduciary capacity, whether or not the personal representative is individually liable therefor.
(d) Issues of liability as between the estate and the personal representative individually
may be determined in a proceeding for accounting, surcharge or indemnification or other
appropriate proceeding
885. Other examples of this lack of proper synthesization are discussed in the text accompanying notes 802-841 supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

63

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

torney's fees are concerned. The first is taken from the UPC886 and deals in
broad terms with attorney's fees as an expense in estate litigation. 8 7 The
second, entitled "Costs," is derived mainly from existing law,888 and concerns
attorney's fees in a single situation. It reads:
(1) In all probate proceedings costs may be awarded as in chancery
actions.
(2) When costs are to be paid out of the estate, the court may direct
from what part of the estate they shall be paid.
(3) A personal representative of the last know will, being prima fade
justified in offering a will in due form for probate, shall receive his costs
and attorney's fees out of the estate even though he is unsuccessful. 8 9
The 1974 Code inserts a phrase limiting in both sections their operation to
personal representatives "of the last known will" of the decedent. This is in
accord with the recent admonition of the Supreme Court of Florida that "the
probate court should be very cautious in determining that special circumstances and situations exist that justify the unsuccessful attempt to probate a
will made prior to the last will and testament."190 Nonetheless, these two sections could come into conflict, because "offering a will in due form for
probate"8' 91 could well be considered an instance where the personal representative "prosecutes any proceeding."8' 92 In the first instance, however, he need
only be "prima facie justified,"8 3 whereas under the second statute he must be
acting "in good faith."8' 94 Because two sections seem unnecessary to deal with
attorney's fees in this situation, the two sections should be combined into a
single consistent section to avoid any conflict.
It seems unfortunate that the 1974 Code omits the existing section that
allows a personal representative, if he is a practicing Florida attorney, to receive, in addition to his compensation as personal representative, reasonable
compensation for legal services rendered to the estate. 895 The provision may
have been thought unnecessary because the personal representative is given the
power to employ attorneys "even if they are associated with [him]."196 On the
other hand, it may have been felt that because the personal representative is to
receive "reasonable compensation,"89 7 any legal services he rendered would be
886.

UPC §3-720.

887. FPC §733.618 (1974) provides: "If any personal representative or person nominated
as personal representative of the last known will defends or prosecutes any proceeding in
good faith, whether successful or not, he is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary
expenses and disbursements including reasonable attorney's fees incurred."
888. FLA. STAT. § §732.14(2), (3)(1973).
889. FPC §733.106 (1974).
890. In re Estate of Whitehead, 287 So. 2d 9,12 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis in original).
891. FPC §733.106(3) (1974).
892. FPC §733.618 (1974).
893. FPC §733.106(3) (1974).
894. FPC §733.618 (1974); see In re Estate of Whitehead, 287 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973).
895. FLA. STAT. §734.01(4) (1973). The UPC contains no similar provision.
896. FPC §733.612(19) (1974).
897. FPC §733.617(l) (1974). See text accompanying notes 856-860 supra for a discussion
of the change in method of compensating the personal representative.
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included in the measure of this reasonable compensation. The general rule is
well established, however, that, although a personal representative who is him-

self an attorney may properly employ another attorney to render necessary
legal services for the estate, if he elects to act as his own attorney, he will not
be entitled to an allowance for his legal services in the absence of statutory
authorization8s 8 Because the general rule encourages easy but unethical eva-

sion,

99 and

because performance of legal services by the personal representative

may result in increased efficiency of administration at a decreased over-all cost
to the estate, 00 it seems undesirable to cast any doubt upon the prevailing
practice. Therefore, the provision of the present law should be inserted into
the 1974 Code.

Another unfortunate omission from the 1974 Code is the present section
allowing any attorney who has "rendered services to an estate" to apply for
an allowance of fees payable from the estate.90' This is the only statutory provision that recognizes the power of the probate court to authorize the personal
representative to pay the fees of an attorney not employed by him. Instances
may occur in the administration of an estate - for example, a will construction

0
proceeding requiring interpretation to the court of alternative interpretations9 2

898. T. ATKINSON, supra note 358, at 656; Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 809 (1959).
899. For example, the rule has been held to allow the personal representative-attorney
to retain his own firm "if it was agreed between him and his partners that he is not to
share in the moneys to be received by the firm for its services." Matter of Parker, 200 Cal.
132, 251 P. 907 (1926). See also Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 809, 827 (1959). The effect such an
agreement could have upon the division of other fees when the partnership agreement is next
revised is obvious.
900. The personal representative-attorney will, in most cases, have been the attorney for
the decedent. The time involved in familiarizing another attorney with the affairs of the
decedent can result in a double charge to the estate-both the time of the personal representative and that of the other attorney.
901. FLA. STAT. §734.01(2) (1973).
902. In re Atwood's Trust, 227 Minn. 495, 35 N.W.2d 736 (1949), presents an excellent
discussion of the problem of attorney's fees in trust interpretation proceedings:
"Appellants contend that costs such as attorneys' fees and other expenses incurred in
litigation by a beneficiary of a trust may in no event be allowed and paid out of the trust
fund corpus unless such beneficiary thereby confers a benefit upon the trust as a whole by
either preserving it from dissipation or by increasing its corpus ....

Although respondent

failed in having his interpretation of the trust instrument adopted, he was not an interloper,
but an essential party to a proceeding in which he was joined as a defendant. All parties
recognized that the trust settlor's language was ambiguous, and all parties requested the
court's aid in determining its meaning. An intricate and involved question of law was presented. Substantial interests and issues were at stake. The trustees were in no position to
carry on the administration of the trust until the intent of the settlor, as revealed by his
chosen language, could be finally determined. Obviously, a benefit to the entire trust, aside
from benefits conferred by acts which protect or increase the trust corpus may, in exceptional
cases, also be conferred by litigation which is unquestionably essential to a judicial determination of the meaning of ambiguous language employed by the settlor, where the administration of the trust has broken down because the rights of the beneficiaries and the duties and
powers of the trustees cannot with reasonable safety be ascertained without a judicial determination....
"Costs and reasonable counsel fees may be allowed to the trustees where instructions have
been properly sought. 2 Perry, Trusts and Trustees, 7th Ed., §476a; City of St. Louis v.
McAllister, 302 Mo. 152, 257 S.W, 425; Laughlin v. Page, 108 Me. 307, 80 A. 753. It is also
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or an effort by a beneficiary to set aside a charitable bequest 9°

where

the personal representative is in effect a stakeholder and neither he nor

his attorney is justified in taking any position in litigation affecting the estate.
In other situations, the personal representative's interest may be adverse to
that of the estate or a beneficiary, as in a proceeding to surcharge the personal
recognized that costs and attorneys' fees may be allowed out of the trust estate to any necessary party who is acting primarily for the benefit of the estate in securing a clarification of
ambiguous trust-instrument language where a reasonable doubt as to its meaning exists ....
In such cases, the litigation is indispensable to the proper administration of the trust and is
a proper charge thereon. If the issues are immaterial or trifling, or if the conduct of a party
is vexatious and litigious, or if he raises improper points, or in any way creates unnecessary
delay or expense, the court will not only refuse him costs and counsel fees but will order
him to pay costs .... The situation in the instant case clearly indicates that the adjudication was primarily for the benefit of the entire trust, although as an incident thereof respondent and plaintiff both asserted rights which if recognized would have redounded to their
sole benefit.
"A similar rule is applied in the analogous situation where there is a necessity for the
judicial construction of ambiguous language used by a testator in his will. In Straw v.
Trustees of East Maine Conference of Methodist Episcopal Church Societies, 67 Me. 493,
495, the court held:
" 'The costs of this suit, including counsel fees on both sides, are to be paid from the
general assets of the estate; as having been occasioned by the want of care and precaution
on the part of the testatrix herself.'
"This rule has been followed in many pior and subsequent cases.
"A reasonable allowance for counsel fees to be paid out of the trust corpus may be made
to necessary parties to a proceeding for the construction of ambiguous trust provisions, regardless of whether their interests are promoted or defeated by the final result. Obviously,
the necessary parties will have divergent views as to the legal effect of the trust instrument;
otherwise there would be no need for a judicial construction. Under such circumstances, a
bona fide clash of divergent views, coupled with the production of evidence and a presentation of oral and written argument pro and con, is of great value to any genuine adjudication
and is of benefit to the entire trust, although the court may not completely adopt the views
of any party. The value of counsel's services rendered in good faith is not to be measured in
terms of the success or nonsuccess of any necessary party."
903. In re Blankenship's Estate, 136 So. 2d 21 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961). The court in that
case seems to have overlooked the stakeholder position of the personal representative when
it stated:
"The record in this case establishes the fact that there was a most difficult legal question
involved in the litigation, and all parties concede that there is no question here concerning
the good faith nor ability of the attorneys. Their employment was not on a contingent fee
basis. There appears in the record the uncontroverted statement of the attorney for the
executor to the effect that neither the executor nor his attorneys withdrew from the matter,
but because they considered the attorneys for the charitable devisees able counsel, the executor and his attorneys did not attempt to duplicate the services. The legal services rendered
by the attorneys for the charitable devisees produced no benefit to the estate and they were
not necessary because of the failure of the personal representative to perform his duties, and,
therefore, the attorneys are not entitled to payment of their fees from the assets of this
estate."
Compare In re McCune's Estate, 223 So. 2d 787 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1969), where a beneficiary
was successful in validating certain bequests of income to individuals. As a result, a large
additional estate tax was incurred by the estate. In allowing the beneficiary's attorney's fees
to be paid from the estate, the court said: "The validating of the bequest rights was carrying
out the testator's intent. This is decidedly rendering service to an estate regardless of how
the tax assessment falls." Id. at 789.
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representative on his accounting, or to revoke the probate of the will under
Which the personal representative is acting.904 In such cases, the beneficiary or

other person who retains an attorney should not be obligated to proceed at his
own expense, nor should his rights against the estate be determined solely by
his success or failure in the litigation. The probate court should be given
power to award attorney's fees from the estate where the attorney's services

were necessary for its proper administration. While not capable of automatic
application, this test is preferable to the current tests, embodied in the ambigu-

ous phrase "has rendered services to an estate."Oa° This phrase is susceptible of
various interpretations, 9 6 including the interpretation that the services must
financially benefit the estate by enhancing its value9 07 Such an interpretation

would automatically preclude an award for services in a will construction
proceeding, although statutes in at least three states have made awards in such

proceedings available to attorneys for all parties.0 08 Therefore, it would seem

highly desirable to include in the 1974 Code a revised version of the existing
statute,909 which, to avoid misinterpretation, should also contain a statement of

legislative recognition of the need for the services of additional attorneys in
will construction proceedings. 910
FOREIGN PERSONAL REPREsENTATIVES AND ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION

In the beginning of this article, it was noted that the administration of
estates of decedents with property in two or more states - the so-called "multi-

904. In re Estate of Whitehead, 287 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1973); In re Estate of MacPhee, 216
So. 2d 489 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
905. FLA. STAT. §734.01(2) (1973).
906. CompareIn re Blankenship's Estate, 136 So. 2d 21 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1961), with In re
McCune's Estate, 223 So. 2d 787 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1969). See alsa Watts v. Newport, 149 Fla.
181, 23 So. 2d 485 (1945), where, after quoting what is now FLA. STAT. §734.01(2) !(1973),
the court stated: "This seems to be a declaration of the equitable principle that an attorney
who had been employed to obtain or create a fund for the joint benefit of all parties or
whose efforts have enhanced the value of or resulted in preserving such a fund may if successful in his efforts have the right to be compensated from the fund for his services. Lewis,
as-Executor, etc. et al. v. Gaillard, 70 Fla. 172, 69 So. 797. And in order for attorneys to recover under this Section the services rendered must have benefited the estate." Id. at 487.
907. See Watts v. Newport, 149 Fla. 181, 23 So. 2d 485 (1945); In re Blankenship's Estate,
136 So. 2d 21 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
908. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-251 (1958); MAss. GEN. LAWS, ch. 215, §39B (1951); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW §8303 (McKinney 1963). The Connecticut statute reads: "In any action
brought to a court of equitable jurisdiction for the construction of a will or for the advice of
the court as to the administration of an estate or trust under a will or trust instrument, by
any person acting in a fiduciary capacity thereunder, there shall be allowed to each of the
parties to such proceeding such reasonable sum for expenses and counsel fees as such court,
in its discretion, deems equitable; which allowance shall be taxed as costs in the cause, to be
paid out of such estate." (emphasis added).
909. The revision could begin:
The attorney for the personal representative or any attorney who has rendered services
that were necessary for the proper administration of the estate may apply, etc.
910. See note 908 supra.
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state estates '911 or "multiple-state estates" 912 - illustrates the parochialism of
the American probate laws and constitutes a main area of criticism of such
laws. 913 In response to this criticism, article IV of the UPC attempts to simplify
the handling of assets outside the domiciliary jurisdiction, to unify administration by avoiding separate personal representatives, and to centralize all of the
problems in the domiciliary administration. 914 Its draftsmen recognized, however, that the UPC does not eliminate all of the complexities of such administration.9' 5 Although the problems of multi-state estates are of great importance
in Florida because of its large number of retirement residents, any detailed
comparison of the UPC and the 1974 Code provisions would involve revisiting
many of the provisions previously discussed9 - and is unwarranted in this
article. Nevertheless, the major similarities and differences deserve mention in
order to evaluate any charge of undue parochialism in the 1974 Code.
Powers of ForeignPersonalRepresentative
The 1974 Code continues existing law that allows foreign personal representatives to perform several activities without instituting ancillary administration. Foreign personal representatives are allowed (1) to maintain actions
in the Florida courts, (2) to be sued in this state in actions concerning Florida
property, (3) to defend any such actions, and (4) if no demand has been made
by a local personal representative or curator within sixty days of the foreign
personal representative's appointment, to receive payment of debts due the
decedent, or delivery of personal property belonging to the estate, from local
debtors and persons in possession of the decedent's property. 9 7 These provisions are in accord with the UPC;918 in fact, they seem to be a prototype for
the UPC provisions. 919 It should be noted, however, that under the UPC, local
creditors can require local administration by notifying a local debtor or person
in possession of personal property not to pay the debt or deliver the property
to the domiciliary foreign personal representative. 920 This is less clear under
the 1974 Code, which speaks only of a "written demand ... from a personal
representative or curator appointed in this state."921 Adoption of the UPC
provision would have a desirable clarifying effect and would remove from the
911.

5 REAL

Wellman, How the Uniform Probate Code Deals with Estates That Cross State Lines,
PROP. PROB. & TR.J. 159 (1970).

912. Vestal, Multiple-State Estates Under the Uniform Probate Code, 27 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 70 (1970).
913. See text accompanying note 12 supra (part I).
914. Vestal, supra note 912, at 90.
915. Wellman, supra note 911, at 166.
916. "Approximately 50 of the 301 sections of the Uniform Probate Code contain
language having a direct bearing on multi-state estates." Wellman, supra note 911, at 159.
See also UPC, art. IV, General Comment.
917. Compare FPC §734.101 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §734.30 (1973). The 60-days provision of the 1974 Code is a change from the three-months limitation of existing law.
918. UPC §§4-201, -204, -206.
919. Vestal, supra note 912, at 75-76.
920. UPC §4-203.
921. FPC §§734.101(3), (4) (1974).
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local creditor the burden of instituting ancillary proceedings within 60 days of
the appointment of the foreign personal representative in order to preserve
local assets for payment of his claim.
As under existing law, ancillary administration is avoided if the foreign
personal representative files a certified transcript of the domiciliary proceeding
with the circuit court and thereafter publishes a notice to creditors. By following this procedure, he may process any claims filed in the same manner as a
local personal representative. 922 This, of course, adds somewhat to the cost of
over-all administration and is not in accord with the UPC, which would bar
923
Florida creditors by the nonclaim proceedings at the domicile.
A further deviation from the UPC involves the disposition of real property
situated in this state that is devised by a nonresident decedent. If the domiciliary personal representative is able to collect any personal property of the
estate in the manner just discussed, and the interested parties do not desire an
immediate transfer of title to the real property, nor a reduction in the period
for creditors' claims, 924 they may wait until three years after the death of the
decedent, or perhaps until "any time after the domiciliary personal representative has been discharged." 925 They may then file a duly certified copy of the
will and its domiciliary probate. If the will conforms to Florida law regarding
execution, it may be admitted to probate and, when so admitted, is effective to
92 1
pass title to real property in the state.
There is one final difference between the UPC and the 1974 Code, that, unlike the others, may support a charge of undue parochialism on the part of the
legislature. Under the UPC, a domiciliary foreign personal representative who
has filed copies of his appointment is granted all the powers of a local personal
representative . 27 The 1974 Code rejects this and, as in existing law, grants such
2
powers only to a duly appointed ancillary personal representative.9 8
JurisdictionOver ForeignPersonalRepresentatives
A section of the 1974 Code, substantially adopted from the UPC,929 provides that the foreign personal representative submits personally to the jurisdiction of the "courts of this state" if he either elects to use the claims procedure
just described 930 or receives money or personal property from Florida debtors
922.
923.

Compare FPC §734.103 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §§734.29(2)-(5) (1973).

UPC §3-803(a)(1).

924. The three-year statute of limitations may be reduced only upon the publication of
the notice to creditors. FPC 733.702(1) (1974). See text accompanying notes 747-756 supra.
925. FPC §734.104(1) (1974). The quoted language indicates that the will could be filed
within three years of death if the domiciliary personal representative has been discharged. It
seems unlikely that this is the intent of the statute, because claims of creditors against unadministered estates are not barred until three years after the decedent's death. FPC §733.108

(1974).
926.
(1973).
927.
928.
929.
930.

FPC §734.104 (1974). This is essentially a modified version of FLA.

STAT.

§736.06

UPC §4-205.
FPC §734.102(6) (1974).
UPC §4-301.
See text accompanying notes 922-923 supra.
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or holders of the decedent's property. 931 In the latter case, the UPC would
932
limit jurisdiction to "the money or the value of personal property collected."
The 1974 Code omits this limitation,9 33 thereby converting the quasi in rem
jurisdiction envisioned by the UPC into a much broader in personam jurisdiction. Jurisdiction "over the person" is also achieved if the personal representative does "any act as a personal representative in this state that would have
934
given the state jurisdiction over him as an individual."
In each of these provisions, the question of whether a foreign personal
representative is subject to the jurisdiction of the Florida courts is determined
by his own actions. No choice is permitted, however, by another section of the
1974 Code that purports to subject the foreign personal representative to the
jurisdiction of "the courts of this state" to the same extent that the decedent
was subject immediately before his death.9 39 Sections of the UPC complementing this section 936 have been omitted from the 1974 Code, possibly because
937
their content was considered covered by the Florida "long-arm" statutes.
The interrelationship of these statutes and the 1974 Code provision requires
much greater analysis than can be given in this article. 93s It may be noted,
however, that the phrase "the courts of this state" is considered by the UPC
939
draftsmen to include a federal court having jurisdiction in Florida.
Ancillary Administration
In addition to continuing existing law concerning the powers of the
ancillary personal representative, 94 0 the 1974 Code clarifies the order of preference of appointment and permits the court to order the ancillary personal
representative to distribute the property directly to the heirs or devisees rather
than merely directing that the property be transferred to the domiciliary per941
sonal representative. The clearly stated order of preference for appointment
is a desirable change because it eliminates the possibility of future litigation
such as that of In re Jose's Estate.942 Less desirable is the continued limitation
that the preferred person can only be appointed "if qualified to act in Flor-

931. FPC §734.201 (1974). See text accompanying notes 917-921 supra.
932. UPC §4-301.

933.
934.
935.
936.
937.

Compare UPC §4-301, with FPC §734.201(2) (1974).
FPC §734.201(3) (1974).
FPC §734.202 (1974).
UPC §§3-703(c), 4-303.

FLA. STAT. §§48.171-.193 (1973).
938. See generally Note, In Personam jurisdiction -Due
"Long-Arm," 23 U. FLA. L. REV. 336 (1971).

Process and Florida's Short

939. UPC §4-301, Comment.
940. See text accompanying notes 927-928 supra.
941. FPC §734.102(1) (1974). See FLA. STAT. §734.31(1) (1973).
942. 164 So. 2d 888 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964). The primary executors named in the will
were disqualified to act, but the alternatively named executors met the Florida requirements.
The widow claimed priority because §734.31(1) provided that if the domiciliary personal representative were not qualified to act "the preference of appointment prescribed in this law
shall be applicable." The court rejected the contention as "plausible but not tenable." Id. at
890.
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ida." 94s This is a requirement of the law of many states9 44 that is frequently
criticized but tenaciously retained. An expose of the underlying conflicts involved in the appointment of nonresidents as either ancillary or primary
personal representatives is found in a recent opinion of a New York Surrogate

and the response it elicited. 945
943. FPC §734.102(1) (1974).
944. See Ancillary Administration and the Uniform Probate Code, 4

REAL

PROP. PROB. &

TR. J. 242, 244-45 (1969).
945. Estate of Harrison, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 1974 (not yet otherwise reported). The opinion
is of sufficient interest to reproduce in its entirety:
"ESTATE OF ESTELLE F. HARRISON, deceased. - In this proceeding to judicially settle
the account of ancillary executors of a decedent who died a resident of Florida, all issues
have been disposed of by previous decision, except the fee of the attorney for the executor.
This fee is fixed and allowed in the amount requested.
"The court is constrained in comment upon the unfortunate fact pattern present in this
matter as a result of the laws of the State of Florida. Decedent was a woman of mature yeari.
She had resided for most of her life in the State of New York. At the time of her death, the
bulk of her estate was located in New York, although decedent herself had become a resident
of the State of Florida.
"Decedent's last will and testament which was executed on October 19, 1967 dearly reflects an intent to have her husband, her attorney and her accountant all act as primary coexecutors of her estate to the maximum extent possible under the applicable laws of each
jurisdiction which would be involved in the administration of her estate.
"As indicated in an earlier decision rendered with reference to this estate, this court would
have entertained an application for original probate pursuant to SCPA 1605, if the proponent
had chosen to so proceed (Matter of Harrison, N.Y.L.J. June 12, 1974, p. 19, col. 2-33.
"It appears that the decedent's relationship with both her attorney and her accountant was
one of long standing and represented the type of trusted relationship upon which people
normally seek to depend for the administration of their estates. The duties of an executor do
not involve the practice of any profession that is ordinarily subject to state licensing provisions. It is a personal responsibility which individuals confer on those they trust without
regard to any fixed professional training. The only disqualification to serve as executors under
the Florida statute imposed upon the attorney and the accountant is their lack of residence
in that State, coupled with their lack of required blood relationship to the decedent. The
injustice of this restriction to executors who are neither related to a decedent or residents
of Florida is exceeded by the inequitable restriction it imposes upon residents of Florida.
"The right to choose one's own executors represents a fundamental property right of a
competent adult having testamentary capacity. There is no logical basis for imposing upon a
party seeking to become a resident of the State of Florida a forfeiture of their freedom of
choice in naming an executor as a pre-condition to residence. It is difficult to distinguish the
ight of a party to do business with whom they choose in their lifetime from their right to
designate the same parties to handle their affairs after death. In the instant matter the desire
of the decedent to circumvent the statutory restriction placed upon her in selecting her executors resulted in burdening her will with circuitous provisions otherwise unnecessary which
rendered the administration of her estate unduly complex.
"At best, the Florida statute is inequitable. It is the opinion of this court that the residency
restrictions it places upon its citizens in naming executors is not only inequitable but is
offensive to the spirit and letter of the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United
States has looked with disfavor upon states imposing preconditions to residency that constitute a restriction on the free movement of parties from state to state. In Sugarman v.
Dougall (413 U.S. 634), the court held prohibitions against aliens holding competitive civil
service jobs to be constitutionally offensive. It is difficult to conceive that prohibiting an
alien from taking a competitive civil service examination is constitutionally offensive and
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The change permitting the court to direct the ancillary personal representative to distribute the property in his hands directly to the heirs or distributees 9-6 seems fully justified as a means of expediting distribution and reducing
the costs of duplicate administration. 9 4 7 It could result, however, in cutting off
domiciliary creditors in the rare situation where the domiciliary estate is insufficient to meet such claims. Clearly the court should not exercise its new
discretion to accomplish a result so undesirable.

prohibiting a non-resident from serving as an executor would not also be unconstitutional.
"In Shapiro v. Thomson (394 U.S. 618), in striking down state residency requirements
with reference to receiving welfare benefits, the court stated at page 630, 631:
"'We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision. It suffices that, as Mr. Justice Stewart said for the Court in
United States v. Guest, 393 U.S. 745, 757-758 (1966):
"'The constitutional right to travel from one state to another . . . occupies a position
fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.
"'... The right finds no explicit mention in the Constitution. The reason it has been
suggested, is that a right so elementary was conceived from the beginning to be a necessary
concomitant of the stronger Union the Constitution created. In any event, freedom to travel
throughout the United States has long been recognized as a basic right tinder the Constitution.'
"The understandable desire of the State of Florida to promote its economy by insuring
the maximum of business for both its banking institutions and attorneys should not be enhanced by interference with the right of new residents who migrate to seek the benefit of its
gentle climate to select the execulors of their choice. It is hoped that legislative wisdom will
correct these unfortunate restrictions without the necessity for some estate to assume the
burden of a search for judicial relief that may extend from the courts of Florida into our
Federal system. Decree signed. Surrogate Gelfand"
The desire to "insure the maximum business for . . . banking institutions and attorneys"
is not limited to Florida, however, as illustrated in the following letter to the editor elicited
by the opinion:
"TO THE EDITOR:
"My compliments to Surrogate Bertram R. Gelfand of Bronx County for his opinion in
the matter of Estate of Estelle F. Harrison (N.Y.L.J. Dec. 20).
"His criticism of the Florida statute which makes it impossible for any nonresidents there,
even a close relative, to act as a fiduciary of Florida estates is more than justified.
"I would like to call attention to the Surrogate's note that he would have entertained application for original probate pursuant to SCPA section 1605 if the proponent had chosen so
to proceed.
"Being painfully aware of the Florida statutes for some years, we have made it a practice
to arrange for clients, who migrated to the south to retain one bank account in New York.
On that basis we have not had any difficulty in probating wills here.
"I need not point out that where an attorney, a resident of New York, is named executor,
this procedure results in his not losing out either as executor or as attorney for the estate."
Harry N. Newman
New York, N.Y.
(N.Y.L.J. Dec. 30, 1974).
946. FPC §734.102(5) (1974).
947. It can also be viewed as a new move in the conflict described in note 945 supra.
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ALTERNATVES TO REGULAR ADMINISTRATION

Under existing law, the only alternatives to regular administration are the
special procedures governing small estates 948 and administration unnecessary. 949
Because of their limited applicability, however, these procedures have done
little to assuage the demand for reducing the costs and delays of regular administration. Although they rejected the UPC's "flexible system of administration" - which does offer interested parties a way of reducing such costs and delays - the draftsmen of the 1974 Code seem to have felt compelled to make
obeisance to the concept. This was done by introducing a new concept of "family administration," 95° and modifying the administration unnecessary provisions of existing law, which are continued under a new title, "summary administration." 951 In addition, they included an existing procedure for dispensing
with administration in estates that contain only homestead, exempt property,
and additional property sufficient to meet the preferred claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last illness. 952 Each of these alternatives will be examined separately to determine the extent to which they meet the demand for
reducting the costs and delays of regular administration.
Family Administration
If the value of a decedent's estate, exclusive of income, is less than
$60,000, 95 3 and the will, if any, does not direct regular administration, 954 then
family administration is available where the only heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate are the surviving spouse or lineal descendants, or both. 9 5 If these requirements are met, the personal representative is not required to file annual
accountings or file a copy of the inventory in court (provided a copy has been
furnished to all beneficiaries who have requested it); nor is he required to
comply with any other procedural duties that may be dispensed with by the
court 9 6 Otherwise, the personal representative is to proceed as he would in
regular administration.957
Apparently, the 60,000 limitation was chosen because estates under that
amount are not required to file a federal estate tax return 9 8 and the draftsmen
of the Code had the entirely justifiable belief that if a federal estate tax return
must be filed, little can be done to expedite the final settlement of the estate.95 9
948. FLA.
949.
950.
951.
952.
953.

STAT.

§§735.01-.03 (1973).

FLA. STAT. §§735.04-.12 (1973).
FPC §§735.101-.106 (1974).
FPC §§735.201-.209 (1974).
FPC §735.301 (1974).
FPC §735.103(2) (1974).

954. FPC §735.103(3) (1974).
955. FPC §§735.101, .103(1) (1974). The personal representative may elect, however, to
administer in the same manner as other estates, rPC §735.102. Moreover, any interested person
may petition the court to require administration, FPC §735.106.
956. FPC §735.104 (1974).
957. FPC §735.105 (1974).
958.

INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §6018(a).

959. The return must be filed within nine months of the decedents date of death. INT.
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If this is the reason, the limitation should be phrased in terms of the gross
estate for federal estate tax purposes, rather than merely "the value of the
estate exclusive of income."' 6° "Estate" is defined by the 1974 Code as "property ... subject to administration"; 61 this definition does not include homestead property, 962 insurance payable to named beneficiaries,93 property passing
to a surviving joint tenant or by the entireties, or inter vivos transfers that the
decedent may have made - yet all of these items may be part of the gross estate
964
for tax purposes.
The limitation of family administration to estates in which only the surviving spouse and lineal descendants share, appears to be based upon the premise
that these members of a decedent's immediate family are more likely to be a
small group having common objectives in the estate. 965 On this basis it would
be desirable to include the decedent's parents in the permitted class; they
would not share in an intestate estate, 66 but might well be included in the
decedent's will. It seems unfortunate to eliminate the estate from family administration merely because the parents of the decedent are to share in the
estate. For similar reasons, the statute should also be amended to allow small
testamentary provisions for friends and long-time employees.
The above discussion assumes that a system of family administration can
be developed to offer greater benefits than those presently offered. It seems unlikely that the new concept will be frequently used as it stands at present. A
small gift to a parent, friend, or servant automatically prevents its use, and
even when available, the incentives to use it are slight. Nowhere in the 1974
Code is there a requirement that any personal representative file an annual
accounting and, even if such a requirement is continued in the Rules, 967 the
preparation of an annual accounting in an estate of less than $60,000 is hardly
burdensome. Moreover, even though an inventory need not be filed with the
court, the personal representative must prepare one for his own protection, and
to enable him to furnish a copy to any beneficiary who may request it. Finally,
while the court may dispense with other procedural duties, 968 it seems unlikely
that most courts will be willing to waive the truly expensive and delaying procedures, such as the notice to creditors or the final accounting.
1954, §6075. The Service then generally has three years to review the return
and assess any deficiency. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6501(a). Only after the Service has had
time to audit the return and is satisfied the full tax has been paid will it grant a general
REV. CODE OF

certificate of release.

INT. REV. CODE OF

1954, §6325.

960. FPC §735.103(2) (1974).
961. FPC §731.201(9) (1974).
962. FPC §732.401 (1974); Spitzer v. Branning, 135 Fla. 49, 184 So. 770 (1938).

963.

FLA. STAT.

§22.13 (1973).

964. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§2035-42.
965. Of the 74 cases in the Cleveland wills study in which the spouse and lineal
descendants or ascendants were the surviviors, the surviving spouse received all of the estate
or at least more than her intestate share in 57, "most often because others who had claims
to the estate signed over their shares." M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SNirr, supra note 629, at
126.
966. See text accompanying note 57 supra (part I).
967. PGR 5.310 (1972).
968. FPC §735.104(3) (1973).
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On the other hand, the concept of family administration contains the
germ of an idea that could go far toward meeting the public's demand for
expeditious administration. If the legislature seriously wishes to meet this
demand, it could do so by continuing the present conditions, with the modifications previously suggested, and where such conditions are met, allowing the
parties to proceed as in summary administration 969 to settle the estate immediately.
Summary Administration
As previously noted,97° this is the old wine of administration unnecessary in
a new bottle; unfortunately, in making the transfer, much of the body has
been lost. The existing statute has received differing, interpretations by courts
dealing with difficult fact situations, 971 but it does set forth a comprehensive
statement of legislative intent concerning how the order is obtained, its effect,
and the remedies of parties who may be aggrieved by its issuance.972 Regrettably, the 1974 Code 973 blurs this intent by omissions that leave the Code much
969. See note 972 and text accompanying notes 975-980 infra.
970. See text accompanying note 951 supra.
971. Compare Laramore v. Laramore, 49 So. 2d 517 .(Fla. 1950), with In re Estate of
Bernard, 183 So. 2d 715 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1966), [and] Mudarri v. Gillespie, 226 So. 2d 808
(Fla. 1969).
972. Existing law may be summarized as follows: Administration unnecssary may be
granted if the estate (1) consists entirely of property exempt from creditors (§735.04(l)); or
(2) is an estate that is not indebted and does not exceed $10,000 in value, exclusive of exempt
property, and the parties entitled to it agree upon its disposition (§735.04(2)); or (3) is an
estate of any size where the decedent has been dead three years and no letters have been
issued or the will probated either in this state or elsewhere, and the parties entitled to the
estate agree upon its disposition (§735.04(3)). In this third instance creditors have been
barred by lapse of time. FLA. STAT. §733.211 (1973). The petition must disclose these facts,
as well as a detailed schedule of all the decedent's property, the cash value of each item and
a statement of the agreed distribution among the takers (§735.05). After a hearing, if the
judge is satisfied that the estate is entitled to the special benefits of this law, he may enter
an order that administration is unnecessary and, in the order, direct what particular properties shall be distributed to each taker (§§735.07(2)(b), (3)(b)). The legal effect of the order
is to give each person to whom specified items of the estate have been assigned the 'ight to
receive and collect such items (§735.09(1)) and to authorize debtors and those holding property of the decedent to pay or deliver the specified items to the assignee, providing that they
"shall not be accountable to anyone else for such property" (§735.09(2)). Bona fide purchasers for value from the assignee take the items assigned him free and clear of all claims
(§735.09(3)), but items remaining in his hands continue to be liable for claims (735.09(4)).
Each assignee becomes jointly and severally liable for all claims up to the aggregate gross
value of the estate, exclusive of exempt"roperty (§735.09(5)), for three years after the death
of the decedent (§735.09(6)). Should a claimant appear during the three year period, his only
remedy (§735.09(7)) is to impress a trust upon the nonexempt property remaining in the
hands of the assignees and to require the assignees to account for the value of any items not
still in their hands (§735.11(1)). If one or more of the assignees desires to shorten the time
during which he remains liable for claims, he may publish a notice of the entry of the order,
thereby barring all claims after six months from the first publication of the notice (§735.10).
Finally, any heir, legatee, or devisee lawfully entitled to share in the estate, who was excluded by the order, "may enforce his rights against those who procured such order in the
manner hereinabove presecribed for creditors and claimants" (§735.11(3)).
973. FPC §§735.201-.209 (1974).
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too vague. Detailed analysis of the effect of these omissions requires a crisscrossing of sections of the old and new statutes that is in itself confusing; it is
97 4
set forth in a footnote for readers sufficiently interested to pursue it.
What
is clear is that the entire part of the new statute concerning summary adminis-

tration needs revising to make it a viable procedure. This could be done by
developing a new method for handling these estates or by returning to the
more clearly delineated structure of existing law. The authors suggest the
latter approach with two modifications: the optional notice of entry of the
order should not be continued, 975 and the omitted heir or devisee should be
given a separate remedy and not be required to enforce his rights "in the
9

manner prescribed for creditors." 76

The first modification is suggested because it seems undesirable and unnecessary to encumber summary administration with an optional procedure to
bar creditorsY7 7 Since such creditors rarely appear, 978 setting up the separate

procedure needed for processing their claims 979 seems unjustified. If the takers
desire early protection, they should be required to proceed under regular administration until claims of creditors are barred and then petition for sum974. Section 735.206 authorizes the entry of an order of summary administration "allowing disbursement and distribution of the assets to the persons entitled to them." There is no
provision similar to FLA. STAT. §735.07(2)(b), (3)(b) (1973) requiring the order to state the
particular items to be distributed to each taker. Neither does §735.203(2) require the petition
to include any statement of agreed distribution, as does FLA. STAT. §735.05(1) (1973). Yet
§735.207(1) provides that only "[t,]hose to whom specified parts of the decedent's estate are
assigned by the order siall be entitled to receive and collect the parts ...." and §735.207(2)
authorizes debtors and those holding property of the decedent to pay or transfer only "to
those specified in the order the parts ... assigned to them by the order ...."
The omission of FLA. STAT. §§735.09(7), .11(1), (2) (1973) leaves no form of remedy prescribed for either creditors or omitted heirs or devisees. Section 735.207(7) speaks of the
omitted heir or devisee enforcing his rights "in the manner prescribed for creditors," but no
manner is prescribed. Section 735.207(5) seems to contemplate a suit by the creditor against
one or more of the petitioners for the order, but §735.208(2) seems to indicate that claims
should be filed in the manner prescribed by §§733.702, .703. In such a case, it is not clear to
whom the clerk must deliver copies of the claims - to all of the petitioners or only to one of
them. If the claim is not admitted to be valid, there is no provision for processing the claim
- that is, objection and ultimate suit by the claimant. A mere reference to §733.705 would
not be satisfactory, because there is no personal representative to be sued. Nor does §735.208
provide a time period after which unfiled claims are forever barred. Presumably the intention would be to allow four months after the first publication of the notice of entry of the
order, as is provided in FLA. STAT. §735.10 (1973) but §§733.702, .703 refer to four months
after the publication of the notice of administration and in summary administration there
is no notice of administration.
The intent of §735.208(2) is to bar claims of heirs and devisees as well as creditors, but
the bar against them would be based on §733.210(3) and the requirement that they file their
objections as stipulated in §733.210(l)(b). In other words, the reference to §§733.702, .703 is
not appropriate for the claims of excluded heirs or devisees.
975. Only one case has been found in which the optional notice was used and in that
instance it was held ineffective. In re Bernard's Estate, 183 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1966).
976. FPC §735.207(7) (1974); FLA. STAT. §735.11(3) (1973).
977. FPC §735.208 (1974); FA. STAT. §735.10 (1973).
978. See note 975 supra.
979. See note 974 supra.
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mary administration, a procedure allowed by both the old and the new law.9 80
The second modification is called for because the position of a creditor is
quite distinct from that of an heir or devisee. Quite correctly, the creditor is
given no right against exempt property,981 but the heir or devisee may well
have a proper interest in sharing in such property. An appropriate remedy for
him, therefore, might be quite different from that prescribed for creditors.
Dispositionof PersonalProperty Without Administration
As a third alternative to regular administration, chapter 785 of the 1974
Code adopts one section directly from existing law,91 2 and a second that is
essentially new,98 3 although it encompasses the situation under the existing
administration unnecessary statute where the entire estate is exempt from the
claims of creditors. 9s The latter section allows the court to authorize the transfer of personal property of the decedent to the successors without administration or an order of summary administration. 98 5 Such authority is limited, however, to estates consisting only of personal property whose entire value, less
liens and encumbrances, does not exceed homestead property, 986 exempt prop987
erty, and the preferred funeral expenses and expenses of the last illness.
This procedure has been utilized to a limited extent without specific statutory authority. Its statutory recognition by the 1974 Code could constitute one
of the major reforms in the probate law of Florida. Because its availability and
procedures are little known, the authors are grateful for the permission of the
Honorable Frank B. Dowling, senior probate judge of Dade County, to include
as a footnote his clear and comprehensive statement of the history and procedures of the section, made before the Florida Conference of Circuit Court
Clerks on February 26, 1975.988
980.

FPC §735.205 (1974); FLA. STAT. §735.051 (1973).

981. FPC §735.207(5) (1974); FLA. STAT. §735.09(5) (1973).
982. Compare FPC §735.302 (1974), with FLA. STAT. §735.14 (1973).
983. FPC §735.301 (1974).
984. FLA. STAT. §735.04(1) (1973).
985. The authorization must be made "by letter or other writing under the seal of the
court." FPC §735.301(2) (1974).
986. The reference to homestead property may be confusing because, if homestead is a
part of the estate, the decedent could never die "leaving only personal property." However,
since "estate" is defined as "property ... subject to administration" (see text accompanying
notes 961-962 supra) the existence of the homestead should not preclude use of the procedure allowed by this section. It might, however, enlarge its use beyond that intended because it can be argued that the value of personal property that can be disposed of without
administration is to be measured by the value of the homestead, the exempt property, and
the preferred funeral expenses and expenses of the last illness.
987. FPC §735.301(1) (1974). For discussion of the preferences of funeral expenses and
expenses of the last illness, see text accompanying notes 782-793 supra.
988. Address by Honorable Frank B. Dowling, senior probate judge of Dade County,
Florida, before the Florida Conference of Circuit Court Clerks, Feb. 26, 1975.
DISPOSrrbON OF PERSONAL PROPERTY WITHOUT ADMINISTRATION: SMALL ESTATES

DEPARTMENT OF THE PROBATE DIVIsION OF THE CIRcurr COURT

"History. Before the consolidation of the courts of Florida under Article V of the Constitution which became effective January 1, 1973, the administration of decedents estates was
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handled exclusively in the County Judge's Court. Over 30 years ago the County Judge's
Court in Dade County created a Small Estates Department and a clerk of the court was given
the specific duty of interviewing persons coming to the court seeking assistance in releasing a
small bank account, transferring stock certificates, and disposing of other tangible and intangible assets of a deceased person where the aggregate value of the estate was so small
that formal administrative procedures were impractical and burdensome from the cost
standpoint. This practice of handling these very small estates has been continued in Dade
County since the consolidation of the courts and is a very important function of the
Probate Division of the Circuit Court in Dade County.
"During all these years there has been no specific statutory authority for the procedures
that we have followed in disposing of these small estates and many judges have refused to
adopt procedures followed by the Dade County court because of a lack of Florida law
specifically authorizing such procedures. Over the years thousands of decedents estates have
been closed in Dade County by a simple letter from the Judge addressed to a bank, a savings
and loan association, the transfer agent of a corporation, and other like entities. I have no
knowledge that there has ever been an instance where a complaint has been made by any
one that he was harmed by the procedure. In fact, many complimentary letters have been
received from people who were given immediate relief by this simple procedure. In order
that this procedure may be specifically authorized for all of the circuit courts in the handling
of probate matters, Section 735.301 of the new Florida Probate Code was enacted in 1974.
"Procedure. The purpose of this procedure is to give immediate relief to the family or
friends of the decedent in securing the turnover to those entitled to the same of personal
property, tangible and intangible, of a decedent where the amount involved does not justify
formal proceedings. We know that the law provides an exemption of $1,000 to the widow
and heirs of a decedent free from the decedent's debts (FLA. CONST. article X, §4). Statutory
law of Florida makes the funeral expense of a decedent a preferred claim against his estate
to the extent of $1,500 and further provides that medical and nursing care or maintenance
of a decedent during his last 60 (lays shall be a preferred claim against his estate. The exemption and preferred claims are the framework within which the Small Estates Department
operates. Rarely will there be an instance where the Department will be handling or involved in matters exceeding $2,500 in total value. Generally, the amount involved will be
less than $1,000; it would be unconscionable to require the services of an attorney and to pay
court costs of $25 or $60 in order to obtain the release and transfer of such a small estate.
"The usual situation that calls for the handling by the Small Estates Department is as
follows: The surviving spouse or a member of the family, or a close friend of the decedent,
will come to the court seeking help in releasing a small bank account. Generally, he has
already gone to the bank and the bank has referred him to the court for help. The person
in the Small Estates Department designated to handle these matters will interview the
person. This is an intensive interview to determine if the estate comes within the scope of
the small estate idea and the purpose of the department is explained to him at that time.
The applicant is questioned as to all of the assets of the decedent of every nature. If real
estate is involved, he is told immediately that he must have formal proceedings and the department can be of no assistance to him. If the interview discloses that the only assets involved are tangible or intangible assets within the exempt and preferred claims limitations,
then full information as to the location, number of the bank account, the specific identity of
stock certificates, the payroll check, personal property held by the police department and
hospital, and other like matters, are noted. The death certificate is required to be exhibited
and the funeral bill must be presented, whether paid or unpaid.
"All information obtained from the applicant, such as the title of the bank accounts,
amount of the same, is verified. Our office has a list of the officers in each bank or savings
and loan institutions who will give the clerk the necessary information over the telephone.
The banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions have always been most cooperative. If funds are to be released to the surviving spouse or child of the deceased, a paid
funeral bill must be presented. If someone other than a member of a family has paid the
funeral bill and there is no known family, upon presentation of the paid funeral bill re-
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imbursement will be authorized to that person. If the Welfare Department has buried the
decedent, the funds will be released to the Welfare Department for the amount of their
usual charge in that respect. In the absence of family or friends, often the funeral home
itself applies to the court for a letter authorizing the bank to release the account to the
funeral home in satisfaction of their account. Under these procedures, we can release small
checking accounts, savings accounts, credit union accounts, patient accounts in nursing homes,
payroll checks, stocks of corporations, and personal property held by various police departments or hospitals. Insurance policies can be paid to those entitled to the proceeds if no
beneficiary is named or the beneficiary has died. Letters of authorization for the disposal of
funds under this procedure have been honored by banks and savings and loan associations
throughout the country and by transfer agents of corporations.
"When all information has been secured and verified and the amount involved comes
within the framework of the amounts above mentioned, the clerk will prepare a letter addressed to the proper institution authorizing the institution to turn over the assets of the
decedent to the proper person or institution entitled to them. This letter is presented to the
Judge, who reviews the contents and if satisfied, signs it and the seal of the clerk of the
court is affixed. The letter authorizes the release or transfer of the property; it does not order
the institution to do so. This is not a mandatory proceeding. The letter is issued only in the
event the court in its discretion feels that it should be. Attached to the letter is the paid
funeral bill and such supporting documents as may be required in the particular situation.
"To release the funds represented by a check payable to the decedent's estate, a letter is
written to the bank on which the check isdrawn but mailed to the individual authorized to
cash the same to be deposited as a collection item.
"Corporate stocks to be released or transferred go to the transfer agent by certified mail
with the letter of authorization and the following:
'Stock certificate, certified copy of death certificate; stock transfer assignment with
signature guaranteed by commercial bank or trust company; social security number of
individual to receive the transfer; and affidavit of domicile.'
"The Small Estates Department, as above noted, handles no matters where real estate is
involved. We can do nothing to assist with matters relating to government checks or savings
bonds. With reference to social security benefits, we have a special application and order form
that has been approved by Social Security in order that reimbursement of funeral expenses
may be obtained from Social Security. Motor vehicles are transferred by the state when no
probate is had through the Department of Motor Vehicles or the county tax agency. If the
decedent was a nonresident of Florida, property must be held in this state for a period of
90 days after letters are issued or, if no probate elsewhere, 90 days after death.
"Cost. If the interview reveals only personal property and qualifies for this department, a
charge of $2.50 for each letter necessary is collected. The Florida Statutes provide for the
service charge by the Clerk of the Circuit Court of $2.00 plus 500 for the affixing of the
seal. A receipt is written, receipted by the court cashier, and the original given to the applicant.
"Closing. Records of all of this are kept in the department. We use a plain legal size
envelope with name of deceased, date of death, and type of information on the top. These
envelopes hold copies of notes of all interviews and any correspondence pertaining to the
handling of each transaction. They are filed in a cabinet alphabetically. When all property
has been released, the envelope is marked "closed." Each year these files are purged of all
envelopes and correspondence that are 3 years old, as creditors are barred in an estate after
3 years."
FRANK B. DOWLING
Circuit Judge - Probate Division
26 February 1975
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CONCLUSION

Upon initial examination, the 1974 Code appears to be a substantial restructuring of the existing Florida probate laws. Further study, however, shows
the effect of haste and inadequate study before probate reform was attempted. 89 Harried by the proponents of the UPC, impeded by the advocates
of the status quo, and frustrated by the scope of its assignment, 990 the Study
Commission produced, and the legislature passed, what can best be described
as a "marriage of convenience" of existing law and the UPC. In terms of the
objectives of the UPC,991 comparatively little has been accomplished. Intestate
succession under the Code better accords with the probable wishes of the
average decedent,992 and the increased values for exempt property and the
family allowance better reflect an inflationary economy. 993 From a procedural
standpoint, the paternalism evidenced by close court supervision of administration has been somewhat decreased. 994 In addition, the Code has accomplished
some reduction in the cost and delay of administration. 9 95 Aside from these
basic reforms, clarifications have been made in existing law that should reduce
future litigation. 96
989. For example, compare the Florida approach to reform that is described in the text
accompanying notes 7-9 supra (part I) with the five-year study that preceded the 1966 adoption of the NEW YORK ESTATE POWERS AND TRUST AGr. Ives, The History and Organization of
the Temporary State Commission on Estates, 33 BROOKLYN L. REV. 407 (1967). The New York
study was conducted by a fourteen-member commission (subsequently expanded to seventeen
members), aided by a group of 30-40 research counsel. Id. at 408 n.3.
990. In creating the Study Commission, the legislature charged it as follows:
"(2) The commission shall study all facets of the Florida version of the uniform probate
code (House Bill 997; Regular Session, 1973) with a view toward insuring that Florida's law
provides an efficient and effective system governing the property and affairs of persons and
decedents affected by the uniform probate code. The commission shall recommend such new
legislation or amendments to House Bill 997 (Regular Session, 1973) as are needed to
achieve that goal.
(3)As part of its work the commission shall review the laws of other states in areas covered
by the uniform probate code, the changes in the uniform probate code as adopted or proposed by other states, and the reports of special committees of the American Bar Association
and the Florida Bar. The commission shall obtain the views of the public and business and
professional groups affected by the uniform probate code.
(4) The commission shall prepare and submit to the legislature and the governor, not later
than February 1, 1974, a report which shall contain:
(a) Such proposals for change in legislation as are recommended by the commission;
(b) Analyses of, and comment on, other relevant reports and studies of the uniform probate
code; and
(c) Review of, and recommendations of the current statutes and effectiveness of court administration and costs with regard to probate administration.
(5) The commission shall prepare and submit an interim report to the legislature not later
than November 30, 1973.
Section 2. This act shall take effect July 1, 1973." Fla. Laws 1973, ch. 73-307.
991. See text accompanying notes 12-26 supra (part I).
992. See text accompanying notes 35-55 supra (part I).
993. See text accompanying notes 231-245 supra (part I).
994. For example, see text accompanying notes 444-446, 656-658, 797-801 supra.
995. For example, see text accompanying notes 520-522, 628-632 supra.
996. For example, see text accompanying notes 191-222 (part I),940-942 supa.
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The value of the 1974 Code, however, should not be judged solely by its
limited successes. Viewed not as a final product, but as an interim "working
paper," it stands as a valuable contribution to the cause of probate reform in
Florida. It challenges the thesis that the UPC is a panacea for Florida's
probate ills 911 Certain modifications of existing law call attention to the need
for change, although they are not in themselves successful in meeting particular needs.998 Worthwhile innovations have been offered, but in some instances there is a failure to provide workable procedures to implement them.999
In short, the 1974 Code focuses attention upon the necessity for further change
and challenges those concerned -the bench, the bar, the public, (and commentators such as the authors) -to suggest further improvements. Through
such attention and challenge the 1974 Code could produce true probate reform
for Florida as the offspring of the "marriage of convenience."
997. For example, see text accompanying notes 251-255 (part 1), 927-928 supra.
998. For example, see text accompanying notes 70-86 (part 1), 490-500, 564-570 supra.
999. For example, see text accompanying notes 564-570, 953-969 supra.
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THE 1974 FLORIDA PROBATE CODE: TIEs, SOURCES, AND ARTICLE REFERENCES

Note: Many procedural provisions have been omitted from the 1973 "source" statutes and
there have been editorial changes made in almost all sections. These changes are not mentioned; when changes are noted (chgs.), they are believed to be substantive. Article references
refer to both the text and footnotes accompanying the designated footnote numbers.

Source

Title

1974 Code
Section

Article
Reference

731.101

Short title

UPC §-101;
F.S. §731.01

731.102

Construction against implied
repeal

UPC §1-105

731.103

Evidence as to death or status

UPC §-107

731.104

Verification of documents

New

731.201

General definitions

UPC §1-201 (chgs.)

rn. 45, 379, 523-524,
534-537, 552-553,
604, 764, 961

731.301

Notice; method and time;
proof

UPC §1-401 (chgs.);
see F.S. §732.09

nn. 413-418

731.302

Notice; waiver

UPC §1-402;
see F.S. §732.09

n. 417

731.303

When parties bound by others

UPC §1-403 (chgs.);

nn. 417, 426-441

732.101

Intestate estate

UPC §2-101

n. 45

732.102

Share of spouse

UPC §2-102 (chgs.);
see F.S. §731.23

nn. 45-55, 242-245

732.103

Share of other heirs

UPC §1-403 (chgs.)
F.S. §731.23 (chgs.)

no. 50-60, 79-80

732.104

Inheritance per stirpes

F.S. 731.25

nn. 42, 50

732.105

Half-blood

F.S. §731.24

nn. 44, 69, 218

732.106

Afterborn heirs

UPC §2-108 (chgs.)

nn. 311-315

732.107

Escheat

F.S. §731.33 (chgs.);
see UPC §2-105

nn. 44, 61, 417

732.108

Adopted persons and persons
born out of wedlock

UPC §2-109; see
F.S. §§731.29, .30

nn. 70-96, 217-219,
283, 290, 292

732.109

Debts of decedent

UPC §2-111

In. 189-190

732.110

Aliens

UPC §2-112;
see F.S. §731.28

nn. 347-349

732.111

Dower and curtesy abolished

UPC §2-113

732.201

Right to elective share

UPC §2-201 (chgs.);
see F.S. §731.34
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1974 Code
Section

Source

Title

Article
Reference

732.202

Election to take elective
shares

UPC §2-203;
F.S. §731.35

nn. 176, 266-272

732.203

Preexisting right to dower

F.S. §731.35(4)

nn. 176, 257

732.204

Proceedings on the election

UPC §2-205(d) (chgs.)

nn. 176, 266-272,
417

732.301

Pretermitted spouse

F.S. §731.10;
UPC §2-302

nn. 156, 163-167

732.302

Pretermitted children

F.S. §731.11 (chgs.);

nn. 156, 163-168

UPC §2-302

732,401

Descent of homestead

F.S. §731.27

nn. 55, 227-230, 962

732.402

Exempt property

UPC §2-402 (chgs.);
F.S. §731.86

nn. 55, 231-235, 243

732.403

Family allowance

UPC §2-403 (chgs.);

nn. 55, 236-245, 279,
417

see F.S. §733.20

732.501

Who may make a will

UPC §2-501;
fee F.S. §731.04

n. 100

732.502(1)

Execution of wills

F.S. §§731.07(1), (2)

nn. 104, 107-135

(chgs.)
732.502(2)

F.S. §731.07(3) (chgs.)

nn. 123-125

732.502(3)

F.S. §731.07(5)

nn. 113, 119

732.502(4)

F.S. §731.07(6)

732.502(5)

FS. §731.07(7)

n. 106

F.S. §731.071 (chgs.);

nn.126-135

Self-proof of will

732.503

UPC §2-504 (chgs.)
732.504(1)

Who may witness

732.504(2)

UPC §2-505(a)

UPC §2-505(b) (chgs.)

n. 119

732.505

Revocation by writing

F.S. §§731.12, 13;
see UPC §2-507(1)

nn. 154, 160

732.506

Revocation by Act

F.S. §731.14(1);

nn. 155, 160

see UPC §2-507(2)

Effect of subsequent marriage, F.S. §§731.14(2), .101;
birth, or dissolution of
see UPC §2-508
marriage

732.507

nn. 156, 169-176

Revival by revocation

F.S. §731.15 (chgs.)

nn. 177-180

732.509

Revocation by codicil

F.S. §731.16

n. 177

732.510

Republication of wills by
codicil

F.S. §731.17

n. 177

732.511

Republication of wills by
.reexecution

F.S. §731.18

n. 177

732.508

-
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Article
Reference

732.512

Incorporation by reference

UPC §2-510

nn. 136-140

732.513

Devises to trustees

F.S. §736.17;
see UPC §2-511

nn. 143-144

732.514

Vesting of devises

F.S. §731.21

n. 356

732.515

Separate writing identifying
devises of tangible property

UPC §2-513 (chgs.)

nn. 150-153

732.516

Devise of homestead

FLA. CONsr. art. X, §4(c),

nn. 227-230

as amended, F.S. §731.05
732.517

Penalty clause for contest

UPC §3-905 (chgs.)

nn. 307-309

732.601

Simultaneous death law

F.S. §736.05

nn. 181, 211, 316322

732.602

Construction that will
passes all property

UPC §2-604;
see F.S. §731.05(2)

nn. 183, 212

732.603

Anti-lapse; deceased devisee;
class gifts

UPC §2-605 (chgs.)

nn.184-190

732.604

Failure of testamentary
provision

UPC §2-606;
see F.S. §731.20(2)

n. 185

732.605

Change in securities;
accessions; nonademption

UPC §2-607 (chgs.)

nn. 191-198

732.606

Nonademption of specific
devises in certain cases; sale
by guardian of the property;
unpaid proceeds of sale,
condemnation, or insurance

UPC §2-608

nn. 197, 199-210

732.607

Exercise of power of
appointment

UPC §2-610

n. 214

732.608

Construction of generic terms

UPC §2-611 (chgs.)

nn. 216-220, 283

732.609

Ademption by satisfaction

UPC §2-612

nn. 211, 323-337

732.610

Devises to be per stirpes

New

nn. 221-222

732.701(1)

Agreements concerning
succession

F.S. §731.051

nn. 300-306

UPC §2-701

nn. 300-306

UPC §2-204 (chgs.)

nn. 273-279

New

nn. 273-276

732.701(2)
732.702(l)

Waiver of right to elect
and of other rights

732.702(2), (3)
732.801

Disclaimer of interests in
F.S. §731.37
property passing by will or by
intestate succession or under
certain powers of appointment

732.802

Murderer
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1974 Code
Section

Article
Reference

Source

Title

732.803

Charitable devises

F.S. §731.19 (chgs.)

nn. 113, 280-286,
417

732.804

Provisions relating to
cremation

New

nn. 338-346

732.901

Production of wills

F.S. §732.22

n. 417

732.1001-.110

Anatomical gifts

F.S. §§736.21-.31

nn. 338-346

733.101

Venue of probate proceedings

F.S. §732.06 (chgs.)

nn. 389-398, 405410

733.102

Vesting of devises

F.S. §731.21

n. 356

733.103

Effect of probate

F.S. §732.26 (chgs.)

nn. 361-367

733.104

Suspension of statute of
limitations in favor of the
personal representative

F.S. §734.27

nn. 774-781

733.J05

Determination of beneficiaries

F.S. §734.25 (chgs.)

n. 369

733.106

Costs

F.S. §732.14 (chgs.)

nn. 885-894

733.107

Burden of proof in contest

F.S. §732.31

nn. 561-563

733.108

Limitations against
unadministered estates

F.S. §734.29

n. 748

733.109

Revocation of probate

F.S. §§732.30(4), (5)

nn. 531-538, 712716

733.201

Proof of wills

F.S. §732.24

nn. 463-469

733.202

Petition

New

nn. 450-462

733.203

Notice; when required

F.S. §732.43(3)

nn. 457-462

733.204

Probate of will written in a
foreign language

F.S. §732.34 (chgs.)

nn. 470, 474-477

733.205

Probate of notarial will

F.S. §732.37

n. 471

733.206

Probate of will of resident
after foreign probate

F.S. §732.35

n. 472

733.207

Establishment of probate of

F.S. §732.27 (poss. chgs.)

nn. 473, 478-482

lost or destroyed will

733.208

Discovery of later will

F.S. §732.32

nn. 564-565, 568

733.209

Estate of missing person

New; see F.S. §§734.32
et seq.

nn. 383-385

733.210

Notice of administration;
filing of objections and claims

New

nn. 399-400, 405410, 514-524, 532538, 544-550, 560,
570, 947

733.211

Probate as prerequisite to
petition for construction of
will

F.S. §732.42

nn. 368, 417
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Article
Reference

Preference in appointment of
personal representative

F.S. §732.44 (chgs.)

nn. 490-500

Who may be appointed
personal representative

F.S. §732A5(1)

nn. 483-486

733.303

Minor not qualified

F.S. §732.46 (chgs.)

nn. 483, 487-489

733.304

Non-residents

F.S. §734.47 (chgs.)

n. 483

733.305

Trust companies and other
corporations

F.S. §732.49

n. 483

733.306

Effect of appointment of
debtor or creditor

F.S. §732.51 (chgs.)

nn. 647-655

733.307

Succession of administration

F.S. §732.52

733.308

Administrator ad litem

F.S. §732.55

733.309

Executor de son tort

F.S. §733.53

733.401

Issuance of letters

New; see UPC §3-601

n. 513

733A02

Bond of personal
representative; when
required; form

F.S. §§732.61, .67

nn. 505-512

733.403

Amount of bond

New; see F.S.
§§732.63-.66 & .69

nn. 505-506

733A04

Liability of surety

F.S. §732.65

n. 505

733.405

Release of surety

F.S. §732.68

n. 505

733.501

Curators

F.S. §732.21

nn. 576, 583

733.502

Resignation of personal
representative

F.S. §734.09

n. 577

733.503

Appointment of successor
upon resignation

F.S. §734.10

nn. 578-579

733.504

Causes of removal of
personal representative

F.S. §734.11 (chgs.)

nn. 486, 578, 581582, 653

733.505

Jurisdiction in removal
proceedings

F.S. §734.12

nn. 578, 653

733.506

Proceedings for removal

F.S. §734.13

nn. 578, 653

733.507

Administration following
removal

F.S. §734.14

nn. 578, 653

733.508

Accounting upon removal

F.S. §734.15 (chgs.)

nn.578, 580

733.509

Surrender of assets upon
removal

F.S. §734.16

733.601

Time of accrual of duties
& powers

UPC §3-701

n. 344

733.602

General duties

UPC §3-703

nn. 602-611

733.301
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Section
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Personal representative to

Article
Reference

UPC §3-704

nn. 613-617, 656

UPC §3-706. See F.S.
§733.03
UPC §3-707;

nn. 622-627

proceed without court order

733.604

Inventory

733.605

Appraisers

nn. 628-632

see F.S. §733.05

733.606

Supplementary inventory

UPC §3-708

nn. 625-627

733.607

Possession of estate

UPC §3-709;
see F.S. §733.01

nn. 614, 633-638

733.608

General power of the personal
.
representative

FS. §733.01(1)

nn. 638-646

733.609

Improper exercise of power,
breach of fiduciary duty

UPC §3-712 (chgs.)

n. 604

733.610

Sale, encumbrance or
transaction involving conflict
of interest

UPC §3-713;
see F.S. §733.31

733.611

Persons dealing with the
personal representative;
protection

UPC §3-714;
see FS. §§733.41-.42

nn.385, 589, 712723

733.612

Transactions authorized for
the personal representative;.
exceptions

UPC §3-715 (chgs.)

nn. 656-660, 672707, 710-711
n. 704

733.612(1)
733.612(2)

See F.S. §733.32

n. 705

733.612(5)

n. 659

733.612(6)

n. 704

733.612(7)

n. 659

733.612(8)

See F.S. §733.38

n. 704

733.612(9)
733.612(12)

.See F.S. §733.361

nn. 688-703
n. 704

733.612(13)
733.612(14)

n. 705

See F.S. §733.39

n. 705

733.612(19)

nn. 675-682, 879,
896

733.612(20)

n. 659

733.612(21)

Se F.S. §733.39

733.612(22)

See F.S. §733.08

733.612(25)
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Article
Reference
n. 707

Personal representative's
right to sell real property

nn. 659-666, 711

733.613(1)

F.S. §733.23

nn. 661, 270-723

733.613(2)

New; see F.S.
§§733.22-.25

nn. 662-666

733.614

Powers and duties of successor
personal representative

UPC §3-716

n. 585

733.615

Joint personal representatives;
when joint action required

UPC §3-717 (chgs.)

nn. 586, 588-592

733.616

Powers of surviving personal
representative

UPC §3-718

n. 587

733.617

Compensation of personal
representatives and
professionals providing
services

UPC §3-719 (chgs.)

nn. 851-884, 895900

733.618

Expenses in estate litigation

UPC §3-720

nn. 555-556, 885894

733.701

Notice to creditors

F.S. §733.15(1);
UPC §3-801

nn. 267, 516, 747

733.702

Limitations on presentation
of claims

UPC §3-803 and
F.S. §733.16(1)

nn. 748, 753, 759768, 924, 947

733.703

Form and manner of
presenting claims

UPC §3-804(l) (chgs.);
see F.S. §733.16

nn. 749, 755-756,
947

733.704

Amendment of claims

F.S. §733.17

733.705

Payment of and objection
to claims

F.S. §733.18 (chgs.)

733.706

Execution and levies

F.S. §733.19 (chgs.);
see UPC §3-812

733.707

Order of payment of expenses
and claims

F.S. §733.20 (chgs.);
see UPC §3-805

733.708

Compromise

F.S. §733.21

733.709

Claims undisposed of after
three years

F.S. §733.211

733.801

Delivery of devises and
distributive shares

F.S. §734.02 (chgs.)

733.802

Proceedings for compulsory
payment of devises or
distributive interest

F.S. §734.03
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733.803

Encumbered property;
liability for payment

F.S. §734.051

nn. 803, 809-810

733.804

Non-exoneration

UPC §2-609

nn. 803, 809-810

733.805

Order in which assets are
appropriated

F.S. §734.05

nn. 804, 811-814

733.806

Advancement

UPC §2-110;

nn. 323-337, 805

see F.S. §734.07

733.807

Abatement and contribution

F.S. §734.06

733.808

Death benefits; disposition
of proceeds

F.S. §736.172

733.809

Right of retainer

UPC §3-903

nn. 807, 815-816

733.810

Distribution in kind;
valuation

UPC §3-906(a) (chgs.);
see F.S. §734.031

nn. 667-671, 725,
823-830

733.811

Distribution; right or title
of distributee

UPC §3-908

nn. 726-728, 831835

733.812

Improper distributions;
liability of distributee

UPC §3-909

n. 833

733.813

Purchasers from distributees
protected

UPC §3-910

nn. 727-728, 834

733.814

Partition for purpose of
distribution

UPC §3-911

nn. 836-838

733.815

Private agreements among
UPC §3-911 (poss. chgs.)
successors to decedent binding
on personal representative

733.816

Disposition of unclaimed
funds held by personal
representatives

F.S. §734.221 (chgs.)

733.817

Apportionment of estate taxes

F.S. §734.041 (poss. chgs.)

nn. 806, 811-814

nn. 571-574, 839841
nn. 417, 842-843

nn. 262-265, 808,
817-822

733.901

Distribution; final discharge

New; see F.S. §734.22

nn. 794-801, 837

733.902

Discovery of will after
settlement of estate

F.S. §732.33 (chgs.)

nn. 566-570, 712716

733.903

Subsequent administration

F.S. §734.26

734.101

Foreign personal representative F.S. §734.30 (chgs.)

734.102

Ancillary administration

F.S. §734.31 (chgs.)

nn. 417, 498, 927928, 940-947

734.103

Ancillary administration;
claims

F.S. § §734.29(2)-(5)

nn. 922-923

734.104

Foreign wills; record and
effect after three years from
death of testator

F.S. §736.06

nn. 924-926
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734.201

Jurisdiction by act of foreign
personal representative

UPC §4-301

nn. 929-934

734.202

Jurisdiction by act of decedent

UPC §4-302

nn. 935-939

735.101

Family administration; nature
of proceedings

New

nn. 953-969

735.102

Administration in the same
manner as other estates

New; see F.S. §735.02

n. 955

735.103

Petition for family
administration

New

no. 953-955, 960

735.104

Certain administrative steps
dispensed with

New

nn. 956, 967-968

735.105

Administration in the same
manner

New

n. 957

735.106

Petition to require
administration under
chapter 733

New

n. 955

735.201

Summary administration;
nature of proceedings

New; see F.S. §735.01

no. 970-981

735.202

May be administered in the
same manner as other estates

F.S. §735.02

735.203

Summary administration;
petition

F.S. §735.05 (chgs.)

735.204

Summary administration;
testate estate; petition

New; see §735.05(2)

735.205

Filing of petition

F.S. §735.051

n. 980

735.206

Summary administration;
distribution

New; see F.S. §735.07

n. 974

735.207

Legal effect of order and
summary administration

F.S. §§735.09, .11 (chgs.)

nn. 974, 976, 981

735.208

Optional publication of
notice of entry of order

F.S. §735.10

nn. 974, 978

735.209

Joinder of heirs, etc., in
summary administration

F.S. §735.14

735.301

No administration required

New; see F.S. §735.04

nn. 982-988

735.302

Income tax refunds in certain
cases

F.S. §735.15

n. 982

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss3/1

n. 974

90

